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INTRODUCTION 
1. THE PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGATED 
i. Introduction. Charles Augustus Strong's 
philosophic labors centered in the problem of the rela-
tion between mind and body; particularly the origin and 
function of consciousness as a natural product of evolu-
tion. John Laird describes his work in the following 
words: 
Such persistence concerning a single 
(although widely ramifying) problem is 
rare even among the more dogged sort of 
pbilosopbers ••• Wben it is conjoined, as 
in the present instance, with a very un-
usual range of exact knowledge in psychology, 
science, and metaphysics, as well as with 
outstanding acuteness, conspicuous ability, 
and an altogether admirable philosophical 
style, the result, almost certainly, is an 
event of genuine importance in the philosophi-
cal world.l 
Strong ranks as an important contributor to the 
philosophy of critical realism in the United States. 
But, unlike most critical realists, who, as E. S. Brightman 
2 has observed, have concerned themselves almost exclusively 
with epistemology, Strong bad a well-developed metaphysics. 
1. Laird, Art.(l931), 106. His reference was particularly 
to Strong's ENOM. 
2. Brightman, BUSM, III, Summer session, #8. 
i 
Indeed, there is even a real question as to which 
emphasis was prior and more basic, epistemology or 
metaphysics. In favor of the view that the problems of 
epistemology were fundamental in Strong's thinking are 
1 2 3 4 Morris, and Klausner; while Calvert and Santayana 
believe that metaphysics is more important for him. 
There is thus a problem as to the exact relation-
ship of the two disciplines in Strong's philosophy. 
While som.e considerable attention has been devoted to 
each of these aspects of Strong1 s thought, no extended 
examination bas been made of the exact relationship 
between the two. The closest approximation to such a 
treatment appears in Klausner's study, but this is 
primarily epistemological in approach, and there iS no 
developed examination of such an aspect of Strong's 
5 
thought as the teleological. 
ii. The problem. The problem of this disseruation 
thus has two basic aspects. The ~irst is to determine the 
specific relationship that exists between Strong's 
epistemology and metaphysics in terms of their priority, 
1. Morris, STM, 217-233. 
2. Klausner, KBS. Note the small section he gives to 
metaphysical considerations. 
3. Calvert, P t~, 106 ff. 
4. Schilpp , PGS, 595-597. 
11 
5. Of. Klausner, KBS, 306, where he acknowledges that another 
volume would be necessary to do justice to . the place of 
teleology in Strong's philosophy. 
agreement, and relative critical depth. This, however, 
is but the method chosen to effect the implementation of 
the primary problem : What is the place of teleology in 
Strong 's thought--how does he use and recognize teleo-
logical factors? Of particular interest is his use of 
animal faith and other purposive factors in epistemology, 
while at the srune time attempting to deny teleology any 
stand ng in his metaphysics. 
2 . METHOD OF ORGANIZATION 
The investigation of the role of teleology in the 
thought of C. A. strong is carried on in terms of a 
detailed examination of his metaphysics and epistemology 
and the relationship between them. After a general exam-
ination of the nature of teleology, epistemology, and 
metaphysics , a pre liminary classification of Strong's posi-
tion in each area is set forth in the light of previous 
investigations. 
Part I of this dissertation studies the development 
of Strong 's epistemology with special emphasis upon the 
place of teleology in it. Part II subjects his metaphysics 
to the same investigation . 
The two basic divisions of Strong's thought; are 
treated chronologically . It is important that this be 
done since the development of his thought and the prom-
inence of various considerations and emphases at 
iii 
successive stages is basic for any approach that is 
concerned to determine what factors (epistemological or 
metaphysical) were most significant for his formulations. 
The concluding emphases of this study bring together, in 
comprehensive fashion, the results of the separate 
approaches. Not only are the epistemological and 
mAtaphysical brought together, but the place of teleology 
in Strong's thought is set forth from a synoptic viewpoint. 
3. BACKGROUND OF LIFE AND THOUGHT 
It is not necessary to set forth the life of Charles A. 
Strong in detail, for that bas already been done more than 
once. Calvert and Klausner each devot~a portion of his 
1 
dissertation to the life of Strong. Klausner's account 
is particularly full. There Rre also summaries of Strong's 
2 
activities to be found in several published sources. 
However, for the sake of this study, it would seem wise 
to note several aspects of his life and the background of 
his thought. Some of them (as will be noted) were obtained 
from Strong's personal friends, and are not, so far as is 
known, set down anywhere else. 3 
1. See Calvert, PWS, 6, 10-12, 102-107. Klausner, KBS, 
Introduction, Sec. 13 ; 1-5. 
2. E.g. Strong, Art.(l930),1 Schilpp, PGS, 595-597, 
Santayana , PP, 249-253; Who's \Vho, 1926 , XIV; 
Robinson, ARP, 659-660. 
3. In addition, the helpful glances into the life of 
Strong to be found in Santayana's PP were not available 
at the time of the two previous dissertations on Strong. 
i v 
i. Early l.ife and educatioh. Strong's early life 
was particularly favorable for his later scholarship. 
His father was president and professor of ·theology at the 
Rochester Theological Seminary. The elder Strong was an 
active and able scholar who cherished the desire for the 
best in education for both his sons. Consequently, 
Cha r l es was sent dur ing what would have been his high schoo l 
per iod here at home to study in Germany. After concluding 
his work a t the University of Rochester, he came to 
Harvard for a year. Many interesting insights and details 
of thi s latter period are to be gleaned from the writings 
of Santayana, through the rest of his life one of Strong's 
closest friends. Strong himself wrote but twenty-three 
1 days before his death, 
Mr. Santayana and I he.ve been friends since we 
were students at Harvard and together founded the 
Harvard Philosophical Club. Later we divided a 
Harvard fellowship and lived together in Berlin. 
After a separation of some years, during which 
he taught at Harvard and I at Cornell, Chicago, 
and Columbia, we rejoined forces in Paris, 
inhabiting t he same apartment. His preparation 
for philosophy had been mainly historical and 
logical, 2while mine bad been psychological and 
medical. 
1. Strong was born in the United Stat es in 1863; 
died in Fiesole, Italy, January 23, 1940. 
2. Schilpp, PGS, 44?. 
v 
Santayana s p eaks of Strong as the friend who has 
1 
known him longest. Strong was 1 he goes on to say 1 
2 
studious, serious and speculative. He had studied 
several years at a German Gymnasium in the province of 
Hannover. Upon his return, he felt that he could no 
longer maintain the traditional view of Christianity. 
The greatest prudence and reserve could not 
permanently conceal this sad fact from his 
father; and a terrible conflict fo llowed, 
s uppressed but life-long and embittered1 
between father and son. For it was not only 
the old man that was uncompromising. Very 
characteristically~ young Strong himself 
had transferred his complete conviction from 
Revelation to naturalism and Darwinian 
evolution. His whole interest and single 
ambition henceforth centered on proving the 
truth of his new faith and especially its 
moral sufficiency.3 
Strong speaks of his early days in terms of the 
influence of hi s father who was outstanding ~n his 
energy and orderliness. Yet 1 it was in reading proof 
for his father's publications that he finally came to 
feel that the position being supported and the arguments 
brought forth in its defense were alike unnatural. 4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Calvert observed in a latter to the present writer 
(9/3/53), "Santayana seems to have loved Strong as 
much as he was capable of loving anyone." 
For these observations of Santayana 1 see Schilpp, 
PGS, 595-59?. 
PGS, 595-6. Daniel Cory (long associate and secreta,ry 
of Strong and Santayana) has informed the writer that 
this break was one of the reasons Charles spent so much 
of his time in Euro~e. 
Strong, Art.(l930). Unnatural is Strong's word. 
vi 
v i i 
Thus he came to journey to Harvard where he met 
Santayana and under James became interested in the 
problem of perception. He says that he learned the 
importance in this connection of physiological and 
medical considerations. So, he began to study anatomy and 
1 physiology; he later turned for further light to paychology. 
For a time I looked at philosophical questions 
from a narrowly psychological point of view, 
ignoring the logical and epistemological 
refinements which, as I was later to learn, 
were necessary to their accurate solution. 
The relation of m2nd and body became my 
especial problem. 
Santayana's account of his meetihg with Strong brings 
out much of the basic personality of both men. Santayana 
observes that though the event had important consequences 
for the future course of his life, it occurred silently 
3 
and almost unnoticed during his senior year. Strong, he 
says, had something royal about him, though he was 
modesty and Puritanism personified. He had come from the 
University of Rochester to study philosophy for a year at 
Harvard. His was the decisive advantage of inspiring 
professional confidence--he was, as it were, 11 a clergyman 
by nature and habit, only some untoward influence bad 
crossed his path and deflected him from his vocation. 11 
The soul of honesty, he had immediately concluded that 
1. Strong, Art.(l930). 1 
2. Ibid. 
3. For this and the following material, see Santayana, PP, 
249-253. 
he must not p reach what he could not believe. 
He turned therefore to the nearest thing to 
being a clergyman that he could be sincerely, 
which was to be a professor of philosophy. 
He was · already, in aspect, in manners, in 
s peech, in spirit, t h orough ly professional. 
His earlier schooling in Germany had given him a 
strict training in all subjects--something not to be 
expected in America. 
He was slow but accurate, and his zeal in 
the pursuit of truth was unflagg ing. He 
had the memory and solidity of the head 
boy of the class. Besides, when you observed 
him afresh, you saw that he was very good-
looking , tall, firm, with curly black hair 
and noble feat1ires. It was only his shyness, 
reserve and lack of responsive sympathy that 
obscured these advantages. Perhaps if he 
found his proper element and were hap py they 
would shine out ag ain. 
The effect of Santayana on t h e young Strong was to 
enliven the latter and perhaps encourage him to feel 
that Sant!lyana could be for him "a useful pace-maker" 
in t he pursuit of truth. They went to Germany together 
at g raduation from Harvard and Strong became accustomed 
to having Santayana to talk with. As the years went by 
and Strong went to live in Berlin, in Paris, and finally 
in Fiesole, Santayana was often his guest for long periods. 
ii. Strong and Santayana abroad. Strong refersl 
to his early study in Germany after Harvard as significant 
for the opportunity of studying under Paulsen. "His 
1. Strong , Art.(l930).1 
viii 
panpsychism, derived from Fechner, promised an explanation 
of the connection of mind and body, to me still the only 
intelligible one."l 
Later, Santayana comments, when Strong was back in 
Europe once again, he 
had become rich,2 he was married and he had a 
young daughter: yet his life was strangely 
solitary. He was no less bored than when he 
was younger. He would actually have paid me, 
as he did one or two others, to live near him 
so as to have stated hours for philosophical 
discussions ••• I didn't accept that offer; I 
waited before retiring until I had money enough 
of my own to make me independent; but I did make 
his apartment in Paris my headquarters for some 
years.3 
It might be thought that, as a result of such close 
association, Strong's position would have become very much 
1. Strong , Art. ( 1930) .1 
2. The sources of Strong's affluence were probably two-
fold. First, his father was apparently quite well off, 
moving in rat.her wealthy circles. John D. Rockefeller 
as a prominent Baptist layman, was one with whom the 
elder Strong had considerable contact. It was no 
accident tha t Rockefeller gave $ 30,000,000 to the 
University of Chicago, for it was A. H. Strong's 
"proposals for a greater Baptist University in 
New York City [that] stimulated movement resulting 
in the University of Ch icago" (Fer:>:n, ER, 737). Second, 
Charles' wife was a Rockefeller. Thus, he was able to 
leave at his death in 1940, as an encouragement for 
philosophic and scientific research, a sum of ~133,500. 
Trustees: B. Russell, G. E. Moore, and Julian Huxley. 
See Klausne~ KBS, 5. His brother John described the 
fund to the present writer in a letter (9/30/53) as 
"accessible ••• to y .oung students of philosophy who by 
their talent and earnestness gave special promise." 
3. Santayana, PP, 252. 
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like Santayana's. However, Santayana himself admits that 
there was always a kind of latent tension between them. 1 
Up to a certain point there was sympathy "and a real 
interest in the same philosophical problems and political 
and social matters; and our views if not identical were 
cooperative." 2 Yet, Strong and Santayana were far from 
fundamental agreement. 
Santayana depicts the man as follows: 
Never was fortitude more entire than in this 
man. Sure of his vocation, if not always of 
his steps and method, he continued undaunted 
by neglect and comparative isolation, never 
losing confidence in the importance and 
ultimate success of his labor.3 
Even in the earlier days of their association Strong was a 
person who knew his own mind. It might even be said that 
Santayana and Strong want their own separate ways together. 
Certainly, Strong was never one to become the satellite of 
another. 
Strong wanted a philosoph:Lcal friend [Santayana] 
to talk with; at first, mainly for the sake of 
company and stimulation, later rather in the 
hope of forcing his views and confirming himself 
in them by convincing someone else of their truth.4 
1. Santayana, PP, 252. 
2 ~ Ibid. 
3. Schilpp, PGS, 596. 
4. Santayana, PP, 253. 
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iii. Sources of Strong's philosophic interest and 
direction. It is interesting that the habits of the two 
men were so different. Santayana says that Strong's 
hours were inflexible and ~o was his determination to 
1 
revert daily to the same discussions. Dickinson s. 
Miller feels that Strong's interest in philosophy was 
much more of a sincere and wholesame passion than was 
2 
Santayana's. Strong was, Miller stresses, a man of deep 
3 
conscience and earnestness. It is true, be says, that 
Strong's field was more limited as compared with Santayana's, 
but Strong was more thoughtful, a more serious mind. Strong 
was endowed with exceptional persistence and precision. 
This characterist i c 1s found in hi s books. Th~grow in 
exactness, but the basic subject remains the same. 
1. Santayana, PP, 253. In a similar connection, Dicki nson S. 
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Miller recounted, in a personal conversation with the 
writer (9/28/53), that on one occasion when he was a guest 
of Strong, Santayana being present, Strong checked Miller 
in a discussion on metaphysics, in deference to Santayana. 
The reason for it was, Miller says, that Santayana had 
asked Strong not to discuss philosophy so much in his 
presence, because he just couldn't stand so much emphasis 
on the subject. This suggests that Santayana's feelings 
that Strong was perhaps far too compulsive on the subject 
must be set over against Santayana's own lack of a whole-
hearted interest in technical philosophy. 
2. All mat erial from ~liller comes from an extended ~nversation 
(9/28/53) with him on the subject of Strong as a man and 
philosopher. Of Miller, Strong's brother, John Henry, now 
resident in California, says in a letter to the writer 
(9/30/531 "Dr. Dickinson Miller should be able to help you, 
.for Charles frequently spoke of him as a friend in whom 
he had confidence. " 
3. Unless and until otherwise designated, the material will be 
derived from the conversation with Dr. Miller as .noted above. 
The study of philosophy w~s an expression of Strong's 
own natural bent. Miller even doubts that his thinking 
was much influenced by his father's philosophical views. 
This is an interesting point, for Carl Henry in his · 
1 
dissertation on A. H. Strong argues for a definite 
relationship. Henry notes that personalistic idealism 
had a very real influence on his father's philosophical 
theology and goes on to say that through the father, 
personalism was the positive reason for Charles's break 
with Orthodox Christianity and the initial development of 
his panpsychism. 
The central philosophic difficulty to which he 
LCharlei! dedicated himself was bequeathed by 
ethical monism ••. Another son, John Henry Strong, 
resisted his father's philosophical vi2ws and 
remained in the evangelical tradition. 
Even if Miller were wrong, and there were a definite 
influence of father on son, philosophically, it seems 
highly doubtful that Henry's specific argument can be 
allowed. For one thing, in terms of his own account of 
the development of the father's theology, it would appear 
that the elder Strong's personalistic philosophy had not 
developed early enough to have been the reason and the 
1. Henry, IPIS, 362n. 
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2. Henry, IPIS, 362n. Dr. D~~e l Cory, a former associate of 
Strong, informed the present writer that Miller was correct. 
Charles was not apparently influenced by his father's views 
in the sense of being pos i tively motivated by them. 
motivation for his son's rejection of orthodoxy. For 
one thing, all the reasons that are given by either Strong 
himself or Santayana for this rejection deal not with the 
attractiveness to Strong of his father's ethical monism, 
. 
but rather with the usual problems of theology. Santayana 
even mentions Charles' collation of the Greek manuscripts 
of the Gospels and his resultant dissatisfaction with any 
view which would hold that they could be reconciled. 
This is a rather important point, for it bas 
xii1 
definite bearing on one of the problems of this dissertation: 
Whi ch was chronologically as well as logically prior for 
Strong, epistemology or metaphysics? The conclusion here 
could be affected by the alternative that is chosen, 
Henry's or Santayana's . Now, it would seem that both Henry 
and Miller (and ~antayana) might be mistaken: Henry, that 
Charles was moved to give up Orthodox theology because of 
his father's personalistic idealis~ and Mil l er and ~antayana 
that he was not influenced positively by his father at a11. 1 
1. Miller himself recalls the father's being present as a 
house guest of the son when he was a visitor there. 
Further, in his first book, Strong records in the 
preface, by way of expressing his obligations to the 
friends who assisted him in preparation of the book, 
the names of William James, Santayana, and Dickinson 
Miller. But, he says, "I owe most to my father" 
(WMB, vii). It seems rather doubtful that there 
was no influence here. The question is what exact 
form it may have taken. 
If Henry were right it would contradict Santayana's state-
ment that Strong transferred his allegiance directly from 
revelational theology to naturalistic evolutionism. 1 
For evidence that Charles was not influenced, at 
least in his break with orthodox theism, by his father's 
personalistic iddalism, a look at the chronology of each 
man's life is helpful. By 1903 when Charles' first book, 
Why the Mind Has a Body, was published, his father had 
developed his theology to a considerable extent under 
the influence of personalistic idealism. Thus, Charles' 
early metaphysical idealism could have been influenced to 
xiv 
a degree by this l a ter development in his father's thinking. 
But , it is also conceivable that the father's appreciation 
of metaphysical idealism may itself be an influence ot 
his son's thought. 2 At any rate, even if Charles h ad been 
affected by his father's later views, he could not possibly 
have been ~oved to his original break and, as Santayana 
3 
observes, directly into a fundamental and life-long concern 
with the mind-body problem (especially the natural origin of 
1. Strong's many references to Darwin and his conception of 
his own work as a type of detailed refinement of the 
former's basic evolutionary insight (an aspect of Strong's 
philosophy somewhat developed by Klausner, KBS) would 
also seem to stand against Henry's view. 
2. See Strong, ST, 97, 98, 281, where t he elder Strong quotes 
at length from t he early philosophy of his son. 
3. Schilpp, PGS, 596. 
mind ) by a position his father had not yet taken. This, 
Henry himself should have known. 
There is, however, a possible earlier influenc~ of 
father on son overlooked by both Miller and Henry. Henry 
himself gives u~ the background for it. It was in the 
middle period (18?6-1894) of the father's philosophic 
XV 
development that he s~ressed evolution, not in an idealistic 
sense , but in terms of Darwin a.nd Spencer, though theistically 
conce i ved . Henry observes that personalistic idealism did not 
begin to play a significant part in the father's thought 
unti l about 1894 . 1 
Charles, born in 1862, was 22 when he rejected his 
father's Christianity, went to Harvard, and met Santayana 
(1884). This was the period when his father stressed 
evolutionism in terms of his original theology. Therefore, 
if Charles was influenced at all by his father in the 
i nitial direction of his new thought, it would have been 
by the latter's emphasis on Darwinian evolution, although 
there is no way of knowing for sure that such was actually 
the case. However, this possibility gains probability by 
the kind of specific emphasis the father was making at 
the time. 
1. Henry, IPIS, 183. 
Especially significant is an address delivered by 
1 
the father in 18?8, entitleo_, "The Philosophy of Evolution."-
In it he says that before Spencer's forces can build up a 
universe, a creator is .required. Further, Spencer's 
theory is defective as an explanation of the origin of 
life and mind; though, as an evolutionist the father finds 
himself in large part in agreement with Spencer. However, 
Spencer's theory is further deficient as a theory of human 
knowledge, and as a basis for scientific and practical 
morality. 
Now, this not only sounds close to the basic type · 
of problem with which Charles began, but it could almost 
serve as a topical and chronological outline of Charles' 
2 thought a.nd writing. If there was any early influence 
by the father on the son, this would seem to be the point 
at which it may have come. There then appears to be 
sufficient reason for believing that C. A. Strong was 
not influenced in the original direction of his life work 
by the metaphysical idealism of his father (for after all, 
that came later in his father's development). 
1. Henry, IPIS; 110. 
2. Cf. only some of his books: Why th~ Mind Has a _Body, 
Tbe Origin of Consciousness, _ Essays on the Natural 
Origin of the Mind, and A Theory of Knowledge. 
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But, what about Miller? Perhaps, Charles was not 
even influenced by the evolutionism of his father. If 
that is true, it is nonetheless a fact that the son was 
concerned with evolution and the development of conscious-
ness in the world process throughout the length and breadth 
of his philosophic quest. Therefore, it would seem correct 
to say at the very least that Strong was influenced by the 
evolutionary emphasis of his day and that, as Santayana 
1 
said, for Strong there were only two alternatives: 
revelation and creation, or the natural origin of the 
mind in the Darwinian sense. It would appear that 
his metaphysical idealism arises in his own personal 
history and in his philoosphic theory from this general 
ground, and probably not primarily from the later 
philosophy of his father. 
iv. Some evaluations of his mind and thought. To 
return to Dickinson Miller's comments on his friend, 
Charles Strong, is to come once again to the assertion that 
here is an independent thinker. Indeed, perhaps too 
independent. Dr. Miller says he has never known a 
thinker so devoted to a single set of ideas. His personal 
devotion to his work made -possible real accomplishments. 
But he was limited in his ·expression and development, 
as Miller sees it, by several factors. 
1. Schilpp, PGS, 596. 
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A large part of his life he was the victim of a 
nervous condition, of a physical nat ure, that significantly 
1 limited his physical energy. When he was teaching, he 
was able to keep up with his work and perhaps do a bit 
more; beyond this, the delicate balance of his organism 
was upset and he could go no further. Extended and 
protracted periods devoted to study were impossible for 
him. In addition, for about the last t wenty years of 
his life, he was crippled by a spinal tumor and unable 
to walk. 
Further , he suffered from being inadequately 
condi tioned in his early philosophic period. It was 
not his schooling, but his training in philosophic 
exercise that was inadequate, says Miller. That is to 
say, he developed his position without the experience of 
the cr i tical fire of other minds. Even his critical 
articles were, in Miller's estimation, more occasions 
fo r the expression of his own views than the real coming 
to grips with another position. 
This criticism is in part mitigated by the fact of 
the several rather important changes of position than 
occurred throughout Strong's life, and in connection with 
1. Dan i el Cory, a younger associate and co@panion of ~trong, 
assures the writer that this was not a psychological 
source of his interest in the mind-body problem. 
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his attention to opposing views. However, it is still 
true that his criticism, as well as examination of other 
positions, often tended to be more external than it should 
have been. 
In spite, then, of the fact that Strong was moved to 
the essence view of sense data by Santayana, Miller 
concludes that he was not much indebted to Santayana. 
Witness even his later emphasis on sense data as 
particulars. Again, he was perhaps tooindependent. 
In Miller's judgment, Strong was, however, very 
definitely influenced by William James. He greatly 
valued James' doctrines on the function of cognition. 
Paulsen was a real influence but not as strong ~James. 
The latter impressed Strong not only as a thinker but as 
a man; this high regard was returned by James. 
Santayana points to earlier and probably deeper 
influences than any of the above, when he speaks of 
xi x 
Strong's evolutionary naturalism. A further insight into 
Strong's rundamental attitudes comes in this connection when 
Santayana notes that together they believed in the moral 
sufficiency of naturalism. 
He [Strono had not the least dread of moral 
discouragement, supposed to attach to naturalism. 
He found, however, a most grave problem in what 
never has troubled me, namely, in the origin of 
consciousness within an unconscious world.l 
1. Schilpp, PGS, 596. 
Strong was early under the influence of empirical idealism 
(the mind-stuff theory of Clifford). 1 Ultimately, he 
gave this up as the ultimate basis for sentience and 
knowledge, for the movement or function acquired by 
elements not in themselves necessarily mental or sentient. 
But he still felt be had successfully expounded the natural 
origin of the mind. 
In a series of books and articles Strong worked 
out this discovery, and the slowness of the 
learned world in taking note of it distressed 
but did not discourage him ••• He kept a single 
eye on his chosen task, tirelessly revising and 
perfecting every detail of his theory.2 . 
Santayana confesses to fundamental agreement with 
Strong's general view and solution to the problem of 
mind in nature, but to disagreement with what he calls 
Strong's rationalistic argumentation applied to the 
empirical world and involving a conceptual dogmatism like 
that of Leibniz. 3 Strong had rigidly and "zealously 
preserved his allegiance to a traditional morality and 
a precise scientific truth as the heart of religion. 114 
This zeal is pointed up in his friend's observation to 
the effect that 11 no wanderer was ever truer to a fixed 
vocation or carried his high thoughts more sternly hidden 
and unpolluted through the streets of Babel. 115 
1. Schilpp, PGS, 596. 
2. PGS, 596-?. 
3. PGS, 59?. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
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Strong's real work was in the fields of epistemology 
and metaphysics. As Miller says, Strong considered tbe 
two disciplines as but one idea with two sides. In 
Miller's opinion, fo~ Strong epistemology and metaphysics 
all seemed to go together from the first. Strong was a 
critical realist in epistemology and a panpsychist of 
a sort in metaphysics. 
·The years of his philosophic tbinging were 
given to clarifying his epistemological views 
and trying to show bow his theory of knowledge 
and his theory of being are mutually consistent, 
each requiring the other. 
This suggests that for Strong the necessary inter-
relationship of the two was not axiomatic or self-evident. 
Chronolo gically, they may be intertwined back to some of 
his earliest expositions, but whether they are mutually 
consistent in Strong's formulation, and what exact 
relationship they bear to each other, was a problem for 
Strong as well as for his commentators. 
It is conceivable that, as Strong construes them, they 
do not belong together; or perhaps, if they can be put 
together, the ground for an adequate teleology will have 
to be sacrificed. To this ~udy, as more particularly set 
forth above, this dissertation now turns. First, by way of 
general orientation, a review of the work of other investi-
gators in the field is undertaken. 
1. Klausner, KBS, Digest. 
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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF THE WORK OF OTHER I NVESTIGATORS ON STRONG'S 
TELEOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a general examination of the 
nature of teleology, epistemology, and metaphysics. 
Because of the importance of teleology in this study, 
it is examined here separately from the rest of the usual 
subjects of metaphysics. Epistemology and metaphysics 
constitute the other two divisions since it is in these 
contexts that the place of teleology will be studied in 
Strong's thought. In each of these areas, in so far as 
possible, a preliminary classification of Strong's 
position is attempted in terms of the conclusions reached 
by previous investigators. 
The procedure is deliberate. It is desired that at 
the outset of this study a picture may be had of the 
present state of opinion on the various subjects. These 
views can then be tested later against the sources them-
selves. In this way two objectives are accomplished: a 
1 
critique of Strong and a critique of his critics. The 
procedure should be beneficial for a more thorough penetration 
of Strong's thought. 
Because of the dearth of critical material on the 
place of teleology in Strong, the section on teleology 
will survey the historical development of the concept 
of teleology with special reference to those aspects 
particularly relevant to Strong's position. The second 
section on teleology will set forth an original evaluation 
of the teleological influences on Strong's philosophy. 
2. TELEOLOGY 
/ i. Introduction. Derived from the Greek word,r4Aos, 
meaning end, teleology designates the theory of purpose. 
A teleologist in the fullest sense is a person who would 
assert the operation of purpose or final cause in the 
1 
universe. 
Throughout the history of the Lteleologica17 
argument is the insistence that such order as 
there iS in the organiC and inorganic world 
is a surd mystery in the mechanical view of 
the world. However, a synoptic vi ew of the 
world, including the values human beings 
realize and sense, weighs the balance in 
favor of the teleological hypothesis.2 
It is commonly agreed that while the mechanistic view 
explains the present and the future in terms of the past, 
teleology explains the past and present in terms of the 
future. However, there is no such similar agreement on 
the implications of teleology as regards "personal 
1. Bertocci, Art. (1945), ?63. Note that. the antonym of 
teleology is mechanism • . Cf. Brightman, ITP, 338. 
2. Ibid., 246. This is teleology as applied to a 
world-view. 
2 
1 
consciousness, volition, or intended purpose. 11 There 
are, consequently, assertions of teleology that vary 
all the way from the mere admission that there is some 
particular telic fact somewhere in the universe, to 
belief in one universal and controlling purpose (as 
2 
above). 
The first use of the term teleology was by Christian 
Wolff in 1728. 3 However, the concept was present in one 
form or other almost from the beginning of philosophic 
endeavor. It is seen in the organic view of nature held 
by such ancient Greek thinkers as Heraclitus and 
Anaxagoras, and in the primarily anthropocentric view-
. 4 
point of Socrates. Indeed, the development of the concept, 
positively or negatively, is hardly lost sight of at any 
point in the succeeding history of philosophy down to the 
present time. 
Of special significance is Aristotle's view of 
purpose in which God, a.s the final cause, as it were 
attract s the universe to himself. 5 Some, at least, of 
the teleology of the world of nature then appears as a 
response that is not fully conscious. 6 In Thomas Aquinas, 
1. Long, Art.(l942). 
2. Brightman, ITP, 246 . 
3. Harr is, TBT, vii. 
4. Cf. Harris, TBT, vii-viii. 
5. Aristotl e , BWA, 879-881. 
6. Ibid., 459-461. Or, conscious at all. 
3 
this Aristotelian concept of purpose is taken up in the 
activity of Go d as personal agent from the viewpoint of 
1 
the Chris tian doctrines of creation and providence. 
The basic Aristotelian-Thomistic view was repudiated by 
such thinkers as Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, and Spinoza. 
Their opposition was to what they would call the 
anthropomorphism of teleological thought. Unfortunately, 
however, the new formulation had within it, logically, 
the seeds of the reduction of all nature to the movement 
of mat ter in space.2 
Leibniz attempted the reconciliation of the two views 
3 
of the world, mechanical and teleological. Life becomes, 
in his view, the principle for explaining nature , but in 
a maturer form than that found in neo-Platonism. 4 Leibniz 
thus postulated infinite, individual f orces or metaphysical 
points in continuous connection. 5 Teleology for Leibniz is 
expressed in terms of pre-established harmony. 
Kant, implicit~y in his Critique of Pure Reason and 
explicitly in his later thought, considers teleology to 
be a postulate of the practical reason, even as God, 
freedom, and immortality. On this ground he asserts the 
4 
1. Aquinas, Questions Disputatae de Veritate, Art., II, Qu., V. 
2. Of. Windelband, HP, 401. 
3. Windelband, HP, 401. 
4. Ibid., 422. 
5. Ibid. 
purposiveness of nature, but says that the purposes in 
nature as designed are not observed, but ore thinks such 
concepts "as a guiding thread for our Judgmeht; they are 
1 
not given to us through the Object." The concept of 
2 teleology is then a universal, regulative principle. 
In metaphysical idealism, the necessity of the 
3 
objective system of reason is not causal, but teleological. 
Thus, with the banishment of things-in-themselves, idealism 
reaches a view of teleology which transcends not only the 
limiting notion of Kant, but also the more or less 
external or atomistic formulat·ions of his predecessors. 
Here, at last, teleology is freed from all confusion with 
mechanism. Mechanism is not only subordinate to purpose, 
but mechanism itself is seen ultimately in terms of purpose. 
With Lotze, the block-unlverre of atsolute idealism is 
pluralized and activated to the extent that even conscious 
design must be seen in terms of instruments and a force 
4 
which in itself is blind. But this at least prepares the 
way for such a formulation as that of E. S. Brightman, in 
which both the teleological and the disteleological are 
firmly recognized: mechanistic laws are viewed as principles 
1. Kant, CJ, 311-12. 
2. CJ, 318. 
3. Windelband, HP, 590. This is true even of Berkeley since 
behind causality is .the purposive activity of a personal 
God. 
4 . Lotze, MIC, 666-?. Cf. Schopenhauer. But even -the 
latter does not construe his blind, striving world-will 
in thor ough-going mechanistic terms. 
5 
1 
of cooperative procedure in a personal world, and even 
2 
space (as well as time) receives a metaphysical status, 
along with the freedom of distinct, finite selves.3 Thus, 
the teleological concept is formulated in terms of a rea l 
world: a real un itas multiplex. 
ii. Teleological influences on Strong. Several views 
of teleology will now be examined. Since no explicit 
investigation of teleological factors in Strong's thought 
has been made by other inquirers, this section surveys the 
basic teleological influences on Strong by way of whatever 
may be implied teleologically from those investigations 
which have concerned themselves with any related aspect 
of his philosophy. The primary sources are the dissertations 
of N. \v. Klausner and E. R. Calvert. To be dealt w·ith are 
Darwin, James, and Paulsen , including also Fechner and 
Clifford. 
(1) Darwin. Klausner confirms Santayana's estimate that 
Strong's purpose was to show the natural origin of the mind -
as a product of evolution, even as Darwin described the 
4 
origin of the species. Strong felt that he was completing 
the theory of evolution and doing the world a serv1ce. 5 
There may be some doubt as to the exact source of Strong's 
Darwinian proclivities, but there is no doubt of the fact of 
1. Brightman, POR, 382. 4. Klausner, KBS, 305. 
2. POR, 218. 5. Ibid. Cf. Strong, CFS, V. 
3. POR, 382-3. 
6 
their presence. This is true throughout his entire 
philosophic career. 
Darwin defines the essence of his position as follows: 
If variations useful to any organic being ever 
do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterized 
will have the bes.t chance of being preserved in 
the struggle for life; and from the strong 
principle of inheritance, these will tend to 
produce offsprings similarly characterized. 
This principle of preservation, or the survival 1 
of the fittest, I have called natural selection. 
Darwin views these variations as occurring simply by 
virtue of the infinite complexities of the relations of 
organic beings to each other and to their conditions of 
2 
lifeT-in other words, by chance. However, there is a telic 
element even here. Darwin continually insists on the 
struggle for life. This certainly appears to involve 
some element of adaptation to ends. In addition, it would 
seem legitimate to assume that be would not deny in man the 
fact of experienced purpose. 
0 till, Brightman characterizes Darwin's scheme as 
3 
mechanistic. One reason for this is Darwin's insistence 
that variations are purposeless and accidental. But, then, 
it seems c1ifficult for Darwin to explain why "rudimentary 
variations would survive before all of the necessary varia-
4 tiona had occurred in combination." It would involve more 
than a mechanistic principle to account for this. 
1. Darwin, OS, 115-6. 3. Brightman, ITP, 24?. 
2. OS, 115. 4. Ibid. 
? 
However, it is just this 11 more 11 that Darwin will 
not allow. Consequently, his position is clearly 
mechanical. The deficiency of his view is also brought 
out by Bowne 1 s questions as to the arrival of the fit, 
and doubt as to the ability of mechanistic chance to do 
the job. Darwin holds by implication to the complete 
adequacy of this later factor, since it rests simply on 
the quantity of variations. Yet, it was this natural 
origin of man (and mind) that Strong, on his own testimony, 
desired to elevate into a metaphy;sics. 
( 2) James. If Darwin 1 s thought had an early and 
lasting influence on Strong, Jamed personality and thought 
had almost as great an influence in its own way. Strong 
speaks of this influence particularly in terms of the 
1 problem of perception and the field of psychology. In 
agreement with James, Strong postulated the nature of the 
subject 1 s life (experience) as consisting in feeling, thus 
doing away with any entity that feels. 2 However, be could 
never accept either James• pragmatism or indeterminism, 
though he confesses he was endebted to the 11 concrete 
empirical quality of hiS LJames!J mind. 113 Strong also 
got from James his motor explanation of awareness and his 
1. Strong, Art.(l930). 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid •. 
8 
1 pluralistic view of things. Consciousness, as James 
said, is nonexistent as an entity (substance), but very 
real as a function. 2 
James' influence on Strong was then more epistemological 
than teleological. Yet, his negative reaction to James• 
indeterminism and his acceptance of the view of the human 
spirit as a function are suggestive teleologically. They 
constit ute a confirmation of Klausner's view that when 
Strong implies that mind, intellect, and bocy are all 
designed for the purpose of maintaining man's particular 
and personal organization as long as possible, he does not 
mean to suggest a transcendent teleology, but a mechanistic, 
nat~ral, instinctive impulsion to action having its locus 
within the physical structure of each body. 3 
It is true that Strong would probably agree with 
James that the issues of personal and transcendent teleology 
are what give "the real interest to all inquiries into what 
kinds of activity may be real. 114 But, Strong's response to 
James' emphases, even as regards the creative aspects of 
finite persons, appears to be quite negative. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Strong, Art.(l930). 
Ibid. 
Klausner, KBS, 306. 
ation of this point 
volume." 
James, RE, 180. 
"The serious and critical consider-
of view would necessitate another 
9 
(3) Paulsen. In the case of Paulsen (and also 
Fe chner and Clifford) the influence on Strong was 
1 
posit i ve. When Strong reviews his life and thought, 
he is concerned to mark at the very outset his indebt-
edness to Paulsen. The latter, he says, supplied him 
with the only adequate principle fo r the solution of 
the relation between mind and body. Paulsen's view 
was essentially the mind-stuff theory of Fechner and 
2 Clifford. 
It is somewhat surprising that Paulsen's influence 
on Strong was ontological, devoid of the teleological. 
For Paulsen's own view not only asserted mind-stuff, but 
3 the fundamental role of purpose in the universe. This 
included both i ndividua l and collective life and i n 
a ddi t ion reached out to an idealistic pant heism. The 
un i t y of man ' s inner life "corresponds to t he unit y of 
the physica l world in universal reciprocal action. 114 
The whole world process for Paulsen is a manifestation 
of an inner, aesthetico-teleological, self-realization. 
1. strong, Art. ( 1930). 
2. For an excellent discussion of the contributions to 
Strong of Leibniz as well as Fechner and Clifford, see 
Calvert, PWS, 23-41. Of. also, Fechner, EP; and 
Clifford, LE; as well as Leibniz 1 s general works. 
3. Paulsen, IP, XV. 
4. Ibid. I 232-233. 
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For Strong, the key to his own view was to be found 
1 
in epistemology and especially in the problem of perception. 
Strong says that at the outset of his career he held the 
stuff of things to be consciousness.2 His early meta-
physical idealism, panpsychically construed, goes back 
to Spinoza 1 s view of an ultimate substance of infinite 
3 
attributes, of which two are thought and extension. 
Fechner , particularly, adapted this view to his panpsychism 
by making mind the fundamental nature of substance, of 
which body {and mind as we know it) is but an aspect. 4 
Though denying the atomicity of Leibniz 1 s monadology, 
Fechner is still faced with the problem of the unity of 
5 personality. But, he did not ignore or deny purpose. 
In f act, he treats the very essence of his panpsychism 
in terms of purpose, even as expressed in the 11 soul life 
6 
of plants." His confession of purpose in the universe 
insisted that 
1. 
2. 
~. 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
?. 
God, the highest, Being, fulfills and concludes 
within himself all that there is; man, the 
creature of God, attains the fulfilment and 
conclusion of his existence b7 consciously 
reflecting the divine nature. 
Strong, Art.(l930). 
Ibid. 
Spinoza, ~TH, Pt. II, Props. i 
Fechner, EP, Introduction; cf. 
Cf. Ueberweg, HP, II, 321-22. 
Fechner, RS, 176-185. 
RS, 223. 
a nd ii. 
Ueberweg, HP, II, 321-22. 
Fechner, EP, II, 526. 
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Clifford carried out a similar emphasis and faced 
s1$1lar problems. He derived his view from Wundt who 
1 
was dependent on Fechner. Because of their atomism 
neither Fechner nor Clifford recognized the unity of 
pe r sonality as axiomatic in their systems. Thus, their 
aff i r mations of such unity (for example, purpose) form a 
definite task of explanation for them. 
This is significant, because Strong faces a 
similar problem in his own panpsychism. But, it is 
of even more direct significance that Clifford, notably, 
denies any transcendent teleology except the total 
purposes of all men. This atheistic humanism will be 
seen to be essentially the position of Strong. 
3. EPISTEMOLOGY 
1. Introduction. "Epistemology is that branch 
of philosophy which deals with the nature and limits of 
knowledge. 112 "Knowledge is an act of my mind, and that 
3 
which I know is other than my knowle dge of it." Among 
the many variations of epistemic theory, the following 
4 may be noted as particularly relevant to the present .study. 
1. Fechner, RS 223. 
2. Brightman, POR, 528. 
3. Ibid., IP, 75. 
4 . For an excellent discussion of these various views, 
as well as all the basic positions, see Ferm, Art. 
(1945); Wood, Art.(l942); and Brightman, ITP, 75-100. 
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Epistemological realism asserts that there is a 
world external to the knower. The position can be taken 
either by a metaphysical realist or idealist. The former 
would · interpret the world "out there" as independent of 
mind and non-mental. The dualistic idealist agrees that 
what is known must be~stinguished from the knower, but 
says that it cannot be in every sense independent · of mind, 
or it could not be known. Thus, to be known, it must 
somehow be of the nature of mind. This is not, however, 
to assert that the object known must be construed as 
dependent for its existence on its being known. 
Both the metaphysical realist and idealist, if they 
share a dualistic epistemology, say that in the knowledge 
act, the idea and the object of the idea are not to be 
identified. However, both realism and idealism also 
have their monistic representatives. There are realists 
whose fundamental metaphysical assertion is that all is 
object. Thus, the idea of the knower and the object 
known ar e to be identified both in the knowledge process 
and as regards the qualitative being of reality. The 
monistic impulse may even be strong enough to lead to 
the conviction that quantitatively also reality is 
one. Absolute idealists share this latter conviction. 
13 
Absolutistic idealists would assert both the 
quantitative and qualitative unity of reality and, in this 
context, the identity of knower and object known. However, 
in contrast to the realist, who in his epistemological 
(and metaphysical) pan-objectivism asserts that all is 
object, the epistemological, monistic idealist asserts 
that all is idea. Of the many combinations and variations 
of these several foregoing views, two stand out as particu-
larly germane to the present discussion. 
The first, neorealism, is an epistemological and 
qualtative, metaphysical monism. Not only does it assert 
that in the knowledge act there is an identity between 
the knower and the known, but it also holds that 
qualitatively the ultimate nature of being iS a pluralism 
of neutral entities, alike in that they are neither mind 
nor matter, but rather metaphysical points and instants. 
Neorealists in general are in fundamental agreement both 
in their epistemology and metaphysics. 
Perhaps the most characteristic insist~nce of their 
epistemology is that the object known is neither dep~ndent 
for its being on the knowledge act, nor is it in any way 
affected by entering tnto the knowing process. Reality is 
directly present in consciousness without being conditioned 
~_hereby. This position had one of its most influential 
14 
formulations in the cooperative volume, The New Realism 
(1912), by Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin~ and 
Spaulding. This more formidable presentation bad been 
preceded by the very influential article, "The Ego-
Centric Predicament" (1910), by Ralph Barton Perry. 
The burden of Perry's article was to deny that because 
an object must always be present in a mental situation to be 
known, it must follow that it is mental in its own nature. 
Perrys says the ego-centric predicament proves only 11 that 
it is impossible to deal with that problem in the manner 
1 
that would be most simple and direct." This lack of 
direct approachability does not undermine for Perry and 
his associates, the epistemological v i ew of the immanence 
2 
of the independent object. 
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Critical realism is the second, general, epistemological 
orientation of special significance for this dissertation. 
For most of the adherents of this position, the problems 
of metaphysics are quite secondary to epistemology. Cr itical 
realism is primarily or ev en in many cases, exclusively an 
epist emology. 
Critical realism is a reaction to the criticism of 
neorealism. The deve lopment of the critical real ist view-
point not only has general similarities to the deve lopment 
1. Perry, Art.(l910). 
2 . Perry, PPT, 313, 308. 
of neoreallsm , but act ually possesses specific parallels. 
The @anifesto of critical realism, for example is, as 
that of neorealism, contained in a cooperative volume. 
In 1920, seven of the leading critical realists 
contributed to the volume entitled, Essays in Critical 
Realism, A Cooperative Study of the Problem of Knowledge. 
These were: Drake , lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, 
Sellars, and Strong. Basically t hey stressed, in contrast 
1 
with the neorealist s , a dualistic epistemology. An obj ect 
has at least some of the aualities that perception attributes 
- ~ 
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to it, 2 but not necessarily all. It is even possible to take 
a somewhat Kantian view and assert a thing-in- i tself other 
3 than our perceptual experience. Sellars consequently dev-
elops a theory of t he categories of knowledge. 4 
It was in this critical background that ~trong made his 
contributions. For the purpose of greater precision and 
specificity, we turn now to a more detai led study of repre-
sentatives of neorealism and critical realism. 
ii. Perry and Sellars. Strong's critical work was, as 
much as anything els e , significant for the evolution and 
5 ad jus tment of the neorealistic position. Ralph Barton Perry 
1. · Drake, Art. ( 1920) 
2 . Santayana, Art .(l920). 
3. Ibi d . 
4. Sellars , Art.(l920). 
5. Calvert , PWS, 102-3. 
early set the tone and background over against which 
Strong was to develop a great part of his own epistemology. 
For critical realism, Roy Wood Sellars peformed a similar 
service . 
It has been noted that Perry's article on the ego-
ant i c pred icament was in many ways the most significant 
initial expression of his opposition t o idealism, and of 
1? 
his basic epistemological orientation. The position perhaps 
re ceives its fullest development in his Present Philosophical 
1 
Tendencies , 1912 • It is worth-while to consider this 
presentation particularly, ·for it constitutes a classic, 
neorealistic epistemology. 
Perry asserts that though an external object iS 
independent, when it is known, it is an idea of the mind--
2 
it enters directly into the mind. Indeed, a thing and 
the i dea of it are one: ideas are only things in a 
certain relat ion; or, things, in respect to being known, 
3 
are ideas. . Further, the object is in no way condi t ionEd 
in the relation of being known. 
Since objects are directly experienced, neither their 
being nor their nature is in any way to be derived f rom the 
4 
circumstances of their be ing knowg_. Perry's metaphysical 
l. See especially Ch. XIII, 11 A Realistic Theory of Knowledge. 11 
2. Perry, PPT, 308. 
3. Ibid. 
4. PPT, 315. 
) . 
ultimates, neutral entities, thus belong to at least two 
series, that of mind and that ot matter. As in the case 
of Spinoza 1 s substance, each aspect is a true att ribute 
~f the thing known ; and , for Perry, the attr i bute iS 
known as it i s. The term neutral entity expresses 
the indifferenc e of the terms of experience 
not only to their subjective re lations, but 
tQ their physical relations as well ••• 
/though they do not exist 11 anywhere 11 buy l 
find a place wh en they enter into relationships. 
The dua.list may ask whether it is not true, even on 
Ferry's theory, that things must be viewed as acquiring 
an added character in relations, so that they are in 
some sense conditioned thereby. If so, the knowledge 
process, or knower, would have a conditioning effect on 
the object. Perry responds by laying further emphasis on 
the externality of relations. Indeed, he considers the 
doctrine of external relations the most general argument 
f or realism in epistemology as well as in metaphysics. 
The character of relation, he says, is extrinsic: 
things do acquire an added character in relations, but 
this neither conditions nor necessarily alters the state 
they already possess.2 Consciousness is a species of 
function exercised by an organism. The organism is 
correlated with an environment from which it is evolved 
3 
and on which it acts. This is the basis for the identity 
1. jjerry, PPT, 315. 
2. PPT, 317. 
3. PPT, 322-3. 
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of the idea and the object in knowing. 
Roy Wood Sellars has been credited with the "first 
1 
systematic presentation of critical realism." It occurred 
with the publication of Sellars' Critical Realism in 1916. 
As Werkmeister comments, 11 he gave name and direction to 
2 
the second phase of realism in America." His place among 
the leaders of the movement Sellars held throughout his 
career. One of the fullest and most reflective presenta-
tiona of his mature view is found in his later volume 1 
The Philosophy of Physical Realism, 1932. 
Over against neorealism, Sellars and the other critical 
realists insist on the creative, condi tioning, activity of 
mind on its object. 
Both categories and concepts of kinds are, for 
the critical realist, achievements under 
existential control •.. To reduce the perceptual 
experience to sense-data is a vicious mistake. 
It is a whole with characteristics of a whole ••• 
Perceiving is an organic act with characteristics 
of a unitary, synthetic act.3 
In his personal copy of The Philosophy of Physical 
Realism, E. S. Brightman called this an assertion of the 
"synthetic t).nity of apperception. 114 An element of 
Kantianism (which the neorealist would never allow) 
enters into critical realism both as regards the self 
and its knowle dge. Sellars goes on to say that "the 
1. Werkmeister, HPIA, 446. 
2. Ibid., 447. 
3. Sellars, PPR, 209. 
4. All further comments by Brightman in this section are 
derived from the same source. 
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1 perceptual experience is judgmental in character." 
The knower never literally intuits the object of per-
2 
ception. "The stimulation of the organism and its 
structural, operational response gives the ontological 
3 
reality. 11 But, the human knower ~· employs categories, 
and can think only in terms of these.4 
However, a little Kantianism goes a long way, and 
Sel lars feels constrained to make very clear that he 
never intends to make a thoroughgoing Kantian ,usage 
of the categories. He asserts that Kant's "categories 
have no natural foundation but are picked out of the air 
5 
and assigned to a Transcendent Ego." Sellars is actually 
asserting that, versus Kant, we build up the categories 
from experience. But he ismnetheless dualistic since be 
insists that one can make a mistake both about the 
6 
existence of 1 that 1 and its characterization as a 'what•. 
He likewise concludes in regard to a criterion of truth: 
~he correspondence of an idea with its object is not a 
test for truth but an implication of its truth. 7 
1. Sellars, PPR, 210. 
2. PPR, 211. 
3. PPR, 213. 
4. PPR, 214. 
5. Brightman comments, "Nonsense." 
6. Sellars, PPR, 221. 
7. PPR, 226 
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Sellars' view of consciousness makes possible what 
amounts to a considerable qualification of his epistemo-
logi cal dualism. He conceives of consciousness as in the 
bfain event as its qualitative dimension. 1 He even goes 
as far as to say that consciousness "is as extended as is 
the brain event to which it is intrinsic. 11 2 On this ground 
he denies the neorealistic assertion that as a critical 
realist he is forced to base knowledge on an inference. 3 
One affirms the physical world's existence: "contents 
are given or intuited, while objects are known. 11 4 
"The object has a structure and relations and powers 
wh ich can be revealed in the content of the idea. 11 5 The 
physical thing is thus 11 the direct object of knowledge. 116 
Sellars asserts in many places, in effect, that the knowl-
edge we have of the external world is direct, though 
mediated. Here is a dualism that seems distingu ishable 
21 
from the epistemic dualism of such thinker as E. S. Brightman. 
For Brightman insists that we do not know the external 
world directly, but that the latter is a situation-believed-
in. It is not then hard to understand why Sellars writes 
to Brightman7 that . 
1. Sellars, PPR , 414. 
2. PPR, 415. Bf\ightman co@ments, "Some brain events not 
extended?" 
3. Sel~ars, Art.(l920). 
4. Ibid., Strong's position at this point is very close. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
?. Sellars, Letter to Brightman, 3/29/40. Of. the 
exposition of Strong's similar vi ew below. 
the reference in perception is non-inferential. 
We denote and mean things and are merely guided 
in this by sensations and sense data •.. Things 
are the primary objects of perceptual operation. 
In the same context, Sellars records his dislike of 
epistemological dualism as a term because it always 
suggested to him the Lockean situation of a two stage 
procedure in our reference to things around us. 
The new realists who coined the term epistemological 
moniam made no such distinction between intuition and 
denotation. That was the implication of pan-
objectivism ••• When, then, knowing is used in the 
correct sense as involving denotation and judgment, 
perception is a one stage operat ion and this point 
is best brought out by asserting epistemological 
monism and defining knowing accurately.l 
iii. Epistemological classification of Strong by 
Klausner and Morris. (1) Klausner. Klausner in his 
dissertation, "Knowing and Being in the Philosophy of 
C. A. Strong"~ judges Strong's . epistemic theory to rest 
on the following propostions. There are two forms of 
cogn it ion--sense perception and introspection; the object, 
name ly the sensation, and the cognitive vehicle, namely 
22 1 
the primary memory image of that sensation, are practically 
the same; and, if the ego were not psychic, nothing would 
ever be given.3 
1. Sellars, Letter to Brightman, 3/29/40. Sellars says he 
supposes he puts it this way because Montague, for 
instance, always asserts that critical realism holds 
that we first know sensa and then infer things. 
2. Klausner, Dissertation for the Ph.n, Yale, 1940. 
3 . Klausner, KBS, 281. 
Strong, in Klausner's view, believed that a sound 
1 
epistemology is the necessary propaedeutic to metaphysics. 
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Sense data arise out of the experience of sensible qualities 
of objects (always partly subjective). 2 Introspection 
gi ves veridical knowledge: knowledge of our psychic 
. . 3 
states gives knowledge of the nature of reality. 
( i) \veaknesses an Strong's epistemology. Klausner 
advances a number of reasons why he feels that Strong 
4 
has not shown that knowledge is veridical. If, says 
Kl ausner, we are only sure of the datum, we cannot be 
sure of the object. Furth er, as A. K. Rogers has point ed 
5 
out, one does not act toward introspective data as 
t ward outer objects, and it is only through this 
reference to overt action (based on animal faith) 
that the 'vehicular' theory of perception gets its 
plausibility. 
1. Klausner, IBS, 286. It is interesting to note, 
howe ver, that Strong's own earlier emphasis 
appears to be primarily on metaphysics rather 
than epistemology . 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid . I 286 . 
4. See ibi d. , 283-5, for these considerations. 
These opinions are Klausner's until and unless 
otherwise noted. 
5. Rogers, Art.(l924 ). 
Strong also fails to apply consistently the distinction 
of datu~ and object to knowledge of space and time . He says, 
fi1JVhy shoul d we imagine real space and time to be wholly 
unlike space and time as they appear to us ?111 He asserts 
that we have an infallible intu ition of the nature of space 
re l ati.ons and time , as they exist in the external ly real 
world, and yet , inconsistently, he sti ll implicitly affirms 
the distinction betwee n datum and object . Consequently , he 
is dependent on inference and really has no infallib le 
intuition. 
Ultimate l y , Klausner concludes that Strong ' s various 
modifications of his theory did not solve the difficulties 
inherent i n his representationali sm : mental content always 
remains a substitution f or the object. 2 This is t r ue even 
when Strong says that cognition is vehicular through a 
psychic state, but is nonetheless direct through affirma-
tion or belief. 3 Even his avowal of sense data does not 
re l ieve the situation because s omething inside the se l f 
still stands for and reports something outside the se l .f. 4 
As Klausne r sums it up , Strong made a determined 
effort to strengthen and clarify h is epistemology to show 
t hat know l edge is veridical. But, though many of his sugges -
tions are so illuminat i ng that t hey cannot be ignored in con-
1. 
2. 
Strong , NOM , 124. 3. 
Kl ausner , -BS, 298-299. 4 . 
F..BS , 301. 
KBS , 302. 
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temporary theory, Strong is still left with an insoluble 
dualism. 1 This dualism is fatal in the light of his claims, 
for he never really proved the knower to have immediate knowl-
edge of the known . 2 Short of this latter, says Klausner , our 
knowledge is mediate and uncertain .3 Indeed, Strong actually 
comes ultimate ly to imp ly that the knowing itself modifies tbe 
known ; however , though the situation as he descri.bes it really 
involves this, he refuses to accept i~ consequences.4 
(ii) Strong's epistemological contributions. Strong is, 
however , exact, rigorous, and precise in his definitions and 
distinctions.5 One of his contributions to epistemology is 
his emphasis on the motor element in cognition--knowing an 
object by a~ting appropriately in respect to it. 6 Ye t, his 
preoccupation with perception caused him to ignore elements 
in the e p istemic situation such as Urban calls communication 
and intelligibility. 7 Klausner puts it thus : knowing is more 
than perceiving ; an adequate epistemol ogy must be able to 
throw light not only on knowledge via perception, but on 
knowledge vis_ conception and i nterpretation as well . 8 Mean-
ing i s more than a physical "pointiDg to;" Strong's epistemology 
is too limited: it reduces knowing to correct perception . 9 
1. Klausner, KBS , 303. 5. 
2. Ibid . 6. 
3. Klausner presupposes , of 7 . 
course, that there is no 8 . 
truth apart from certainty . 9 . 
He will not settle ultimately 
for probability as an ade-
quate basis for knowledge . 
4. Ibid. , 305. 
KBS , 307. 
KBS , 310 . 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
KBS , 311 . 
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Critical realists assert that internal percpetion is 
analog ous to external perception.l Strong adds that the 
inferred object is bound to the object of consciousness by 
causal relations, and he also extends his dualism (datum and 
object) to the area of the mind's perception of itself. 2 
Yet, he asserts a degree of correspondence between the two. 
None~heless, says Klausner , in neither the internal nor 
external world do we have, according to Strong, direct knowl-
edge of real objects. 3 
Another significant aspect of Strong's epistemology is 
his support of his theories of psychological, physiological 
and neurological data. He calls this the physical method, 
and is of t h e opinion that more of this kind of data wi ll, in 
themselves, clarify those knowledge difficulties which extend 
beyond the perce ptual process . To Strong, this conclusion 
seems obvious; Klausner challenges its axiomatic character.4 
(iii) Re lation of Strong's epistemology to his meta-
physics. Further, Klausner questions the possibility of 
successfully uniting a critical realist epistemology and a 
panpsychistic metaphysics in Strong's terms.5 Strong claims 
1. Klausner, KBS , 312. 
2. Ibid. This may be in its particular form original with 
Strong ; however, in essence the thing-in-itself distinc-
tion, even as applied to the internal experience , is 
brought out in Kant's discussion of time and the internal 
sense in his Critique of Pure Reason, cf. 85-91. 
3 . KBS, 313. 
4. Ibid. 
5. KBS , 314. 
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that the clue to his philosophy is in his theory of being. 
Knowing is a motor process by which knowledge of a psychical 
world i s reached. The physical aspect of knowing, on anal-
ysis, is revealed to be through and through psychical. As 
Klau sner describes it, "Knowing is a relation which unites 
two different psychic reals--the difference being inherent 
in their individual organization."l 
Klausner concludes that the union of critical realism 
and panpsychism cannot be log ically carried out, because, as 
he sees it, a critical realist epistemology cannot even be 
sure of the real nature of the self, much less of the onto-
logical status of the external world.2 
(2) Morris. The second estimate of Strong's epistemic 
theories, though briefer, is still important. Charles W. 
Morris in his Six Theories of Mind sets forth Strong's pan-
psychism with considerable emphasis on its relation to his 
theory of knowledge.3 Particular value resides in this 
1. Klausner, KBS, 313-314. 
2 . KBS, 314. It would appear that the criticism by Klausne~ 
in this form, is hardly sustained. If a dualistic epis-
temology does not, of itself, involve a metaphysical con-
clusion i n regard to the object known, it would certainly 
not follow that a union of critical realism in epistem-
ology and panpsychism in metaphysics amounts to a viola-
tion of logic . That there is no log ical contradiction in 
such a view seems to be borne out by the capability of an 
epistemolog ically dualistic view being attached either to 
a realistic or idealistic metaphysics. To show that 
Strong's epistemology and metaphysics do not belong 
together , it would be necessary to show that one involves, 
in some way , the denial of the other. 
3 . Morris, STM, 217-236. 
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exposition because of Strong's detailed criticism of Morris ' 
presentation. 
(i) Strong ' s concept of the essence as a particular. 
Morris begins by noting t h at St rong pre f ers to be judged by 
his volume, Essays _on the Natural Orig in of the Mind and by 
his article, "Is Perception Direct, or Representative?" 1 
This is in preference to his earlier works. 2 The point of 
this is that at the time of Morris' writing Strong had given 
up his earlier (not earliest) view that the sense datum is an 
essence or universal, and had replaced it by the view that it 
is "a particular, occurring only when it is intuited ••• not 
exist ( ing] independently or continuously.'' 3 Yet' Morris feels 
that Strong's position in its basic outline is still not 
significant ly changed .4 
Morris interprets Strong as attempt ing to explain given-
ness5 (intu ition of content) by the very nature of the psy-
chic self . Since , according to Strong ' s evolutionary view , 
mind as consciousness and intellection is a result of the 
1. Strong , Art .(l931). 
2 . Morris, STM, 217. 
3. St rong, Art .{l931) . 
4. Morris, STM , 217. 
5. Givenness, for Strong, is used synonymously with aware-
ness or consciousness (cf. OC, 35). This is the funda-
mental fact about experience. "Givenness requires a 
vehicle which is not itself given , and this vehicle is 
a psychic state" (Morris STM, 218; cf. Strong, OC, 130). 
"We are solely aware of things , not of the awareness of 
things " (Morris, STM, 218). The latter can only be 
inferred . 
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basic psychic material of reality, it is to be expected that 
this function would be distinguished as of biological advan-
tage to the organism.1 For Strong intellection is 
a more complicated givenness , a device for seeing 
beyond the horizon set by the senses ••• Thought 
looks before and after. It permits adjustment 
to objects whi l e they are yet unseen, to events 
in advance of their occurrence. It is a sort of 
anticipatory vision~ as ~ision is a sort of 
anticipatory touch . 
Thus, for Strong, all awareness is functional, 3 and is to 
be construed in terms of the psychical and its manifestation .4 
(ii) The knowledge - test . Morris feels that Stron · has 
actually presupposed psy chic states (supposed to be discovered 
by introspection) for the purpose of rendering introspection 
trustworthy "since the identity in nature between the vehic l e 
and the object known is the ground for confidence in the 
validity of i ntrospection ."5 This evaluation would seem to 
apply equally well to Strong's vehicular view of the sensa-
tions by which the external world is known . 6 
But, Strong also insists that sense data "are directly 
dependent on the individual organism, not on the external 
ooject ." 7 In fact , this is the basis of his own doctrine of 
1. Morris , STM , 220. This is a n involvement in teleology . 
2 . Strong , ENOM, 117-18. 
3 . Morri s, STM , 220. 
4. Ibid ; cf . Strong, ENOM , 117. 
5. ST M, 222 . 
6 . This view is not altogether fo reign to the later vehicu-
lar sensory doctrine of ~mitehead. 
7. Strong , Art.(l920). 
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the possibility of error, formulated in terms of his criticism 
of the inadequacy of neorealistic epistemology.l 
30 
However, Strong is concerned, as suggested by the identity 
theory above , to retain something of the neorealistic direct-
ness of knowledge. So, he asserts that "perception by means 
of the sense-datum is direct. " 2 Yet, the datum is never a. 
part of the thing. Thus, says Morr:i.s, . "a knowledge-claim 
about things or psychic states cannot be directly tested 
since what is meant cannot ever be existentially present.3 
Morris concludes that it is probably to Strong's credit 
that he never took his essence theory seriously enough to 
attempt to elaborate a corresponding metaphysics.4 Such a 
metaphysical view as would be necessitated by the essence 
theory, Morris believes, would be out of harmony with 
Strong's own panpsychism. It would shut the knower out from 
the known, whose innermost nature is supposed to be the same 
in kind as that of the knower.5 
4. METAPHYSICS 
i. General nature. Brightman defines metaphysics as 
the attempt to find t;he t r ue account of reality.6 Except 
among the nee-scholastics, the predominant definition of the 
1. Strong, oc, 37-8. 
2. Strong, Art .(l93l) . 
3. Morris, STM, 227 • 
. 4. STM, 233. 
5. STM, 232. 
6. Brightman, ITP, 231. 
detailed task of metaphysics has been rather Hegelian . It 
is viewed as necessitating a systematic interpretation of 
experience as a whole (including its implications) . l Tradi -
tionally , it has been described as the science of being as 
such.2 
ii . Influences on Strong . Since the earlier discussions 
of teleology and epistemology have anticipated much that is 
primarily metaphysical, the discussion of this final section 
is shortened accordingly . 
Strong , beginning a s a type of panpsychist , was early 
influenced by Leibniz . Specifical l y, this was channel l ed to 
him through Paulsen , whose own formulation bore the stamp of 
Fechner and Clifford . The influence of James and Darwin on 
Strong has already been discussed . It is sufficient to ob-
serve that metaphysical influences on Strong were generally 
from the same sources, positively or negatively , as the tele-
olog ical opinions previously treated . 
iii. General classification of Strong metaphysically 
by Klausner and Calvert . (1) Calvert. The work of Ernest 
R. Calvert constitutes the primary source. Although not as 
extended an over-all treatment as that of Klausner , Calvert's 
dissertation has the advantage of being concerned almost 
exclusively witn Strong's metaphysics , while Kl ausner puts by 
far the greater direct stress on his epistemology . 
1. Brightman , Art . (l945). 
2. Weedon, Art.(l942). 
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As has been observed, Strong was one critical realist 
who developed a metaphysics. In fact, it has been shown that 
there are many considerations in favor of regarding his meta-
physics as foundational in his thought. This is the view 
subscribed to by Calvert.l 
Calvert considers Strong's emphasis on introspection to 
be the key to h is metaphysi cs. 2 This is the source of his 
whole concep tion of the nature of the real.3 With this as a 
background, Strong identifies given~ with consciousness:4 
if one is aware of a thing, that thing is given--consciousness 
is the f u nction by which it is g iven.5 
One of Strong 's main objectives in h is philosophy is con-
sidereq by Calvert to be the explanation of the origin of mirrl 
in a n a tural manner out of the world which appears to be 
physical .6 Thus, Strong comments, "Nothing then prevents us 
from supposing •.• that external thing s are in their ultimate 
being of t h e same nature as the psyche. 117 In view of the 
' 
mu l t iplicity of experienced psychic states, Strong feels con-
strained to speak in terms of an immense number of isolated 
centers of psych ic life.8 
1. Calvert , PWS , 10. 
2 . PWS , 63. 
3 . Ibid. 
4. Strong, OC, 30, 32. 
5. See the discussion of this doctrine in the epistemic 
context above. 
6. Calvert, PWS , 69 . 
7 . I b id. 
8 . Ibid. Cf. Strong, OC , 127. 
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This does not, of cou rse, involve a denial of some sort 
o f unity or continuity ; as a matter of fact, it is to preserve 
continuity and avoid the emergence of the novel that Strong 
insi st s on t h e natural orig in of t h e mind as evo l ved from 
the physical world, which in its u ltimate natu re is psychical. 
Strong holds to a double a spect theory which looks upon 
mind as the object of i ntrospection and body as the object of 
sense perc pe tion. Both are but different sides of the srune 
reality .l If it be sugg ested that this kind of analysis , if 
carr ied far enough , ought to g ive neutral entities, Calvert 
agrees , but suggests that both for the sake of nat ural evolu-
t ion and Strong 's requirement that the stuf f of reality be 
subject to change , he refu sed to press his analysis to this 
p oint . 2 Further , such a metaphysics would appear to be less 
helpfu l as an exp l anation of the mind-body problem, wh ich is 
probably t he factor that was more influential in Strong ' s 
thinking than any other.3 
The p ositive chara cte r istics of Strong's mind-stuff are: 
it is temporal, s p atial, cap able of chang e, and psychic; the 
negative: it lacks cogni tion, will, unity, and the sensible 
qualities.4 Thus, in many respects, " t h e basic element of' 
Strong's metaphysics i s virtually identical with matter ."5 
1. Calvert, PWS, 71. 
2. PWS , 82 . 
3 . PWS , 83 . 
4 • PWS , 8 2- 3 • 
5. Ibid. 
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That is, with the exception of the characteristic vaguely 
referred to as the psychic (able to produce mind). 
Strong's last article, written upon his death bed 
was an attempt to clarify the position he had 
finally reached. He still classifies himself as 
a critical realist and points out the relation of 
his critical realism to his aQceptance of the con-
cept of substance. As for his debt to his prede-
cessors, he is now no longer talking about Fechner , 
or Paulsen, or Clifford. In this last article it is 
Spinoza to whom he expresses his great obligation.l 
Calvert finds a suppressed h ostility between Strong's 
e p istemology and his metaphysics . Strong had, he feels, a 
preconceived notion of what must constitute the natural 
ori g in of mind ,2 and in terms of this he set out to find 
logical and emp irical [and epistemic] evidence for this . 3 
Strong was also continually in danger of losing the 
psychic in the physical or vice versa.4 Specifically , the 
changes in his thlnking throughout the years involve, in 
the main, concessions to physicalism.5 His metaphysics is, 
in Calvert's judgment, hardly the equal in quality to his 
epistemology. 6 
(2) Klausner. In contrast with Calvert , Klausner 
represents the vlew that Strong's chief weakness was in his 
epistemology wi th metaphysical inadequacies stemming from 
this source. 7 But, he does agree with Calvert that the prac-
1. Calvert, PWS , 105. 5. PWS, 107. 
2. PWS , 106 . 6 . Ibid . 
3. Ibid. 7. Klausner , KBS , 313-14. 
4 . Ibid . 
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tical emphases found in Strong 's theories are to be explained 
with reference to his determination to explicate the natural 
1 
o"ri g in of the mind as a product of evolution. To this end he 
developed an extreme, mechanistic pluralism in the tradition 
of Greek hylozoism , Bruno , Campanella, Fechner , Lotze, and 
Leibniz. 2 "Perhaps no thinker has so consistently and com-
p l etely reduced the world to a punctiform nature. 113 " Never 
has there been a panpsychism so thoroughly pluralistic, 
atomistic, and mechanistic, as that. " 4 Montague believes 
it would have delighted Clifford.5 
Kl ausner does not feel justified in classifying Strong 
as a materialist. Indeed, he finds any classification of 
him in final , metaphysical terms defficult, for it seems that 
his position is just not made c l ear . 
Out of the real which is "blind sentience" and 
" persistent force," must come a universe, complex 
but orderly, which produces self-perpetuating 
organisms, whose actual and possible experiences 
are the fortuStous result of their peculiar 
organization. 
Strong does not delineate the cosmic variables or the 
categories common to the entire range of being. His only 
real principle is not of a cosmic, but of a secondary nature: 
it appear·s after one type of organ ism comes into being . It 
is the principle of survival. 7 Even feeling seems to be but 
1. Klausner , KBS , 305. 
2. I<:BS, 307 . 
3. Ibid . 
4 . Montague, Art . (l938) . 
cf. Klausner, KBS , 307. 
5. Klausner, KBS , 308. 
6 . KBS , 308-9 . 
7 . KBS , 309. 
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a local variable, for under certain conditions, feeling may 
exist as unfe lt.l The distinction between a felt and unfelt 
feeling seems to Klausner to be so great as to cast doubt 
upon the advisabi lity of the use of the same term in both 
cases . 
On the other hand, Strong never gives sufficiently 
serious consideration t o the possibility of the self-con-
sciou sness of the universe. 2 Klausner feels that since for 
Strong the universe is more complex in its order and structure 
than man, and since consciousness as a function arises 
[according to Strong] when a particular degree of organizat ion 
is achieved, this must stand as a distinct possibility.3 
This is Kl ausner's final comment on the limitations of Strong~ 
metaphysics. 
5. SURVEY AND TRANSITION 
The Introduction of this dissertation has set forth 
the problem and line of investigation. This is the deter-
minat ion of the place of teleology in the thought of c_. A. 
Strong, in the light of the nature and relationship of his 
epistemology and metaphysics . To launch the investigation, 
the background of his life and thought were traced. It was 
found t hat his earliest philosophic beginnings were rooted 
in a Darwinian naturalism and the attempt to erect a meta-
1. Klausner, KBS , 309. 
2. KBS , 310. 
3. If Strong were consistent, such a consideration as this 
ought to lead to the recognition of the possibility of 
the existence of a God. 
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physics on this foundation. 
This chapter has surveyed the field of investigation : 
teleo logy , epistemology, and metaphysics. Each study be g ins 
with a consideration of the natu re and h istory of the subject, 
and emphasizes t h e elements that have particular bearing on 
Strong 's thought. Thus, in each secti on , the groundwork is 
laid f or a pre l iminary classification of Strong ' s t h ought in 
that area . This. is accomplished through the exposition of 
the work of previous investigators in the field, for this is 
the over- all perspective of the entire chapter . 
Prepa rations are now sufficient to make possibl e the con-
sideration of Strong's epistemology from the perspective of 
t eleology . The study is chrono l ogical and proceeds by the 
examinat ion of Strong ' s successive publications, b oth bobks 
and articles . As part of the background of investigation , 
the v ar ious reviews and other resp on se s evoked by his writings 
are precise l y detai l ed . 
The jounn als are particul ar l y rich with regard both to 
Strong's own articles and the discussions and debates con-
cerning his position .by his contemporaries. His antagonists 
are almost invariabl y minds of first quality . This has not 
only brought into being val uable material wo rthy of preserva-
tion, but , at the time , it meant that Strong ' s thought was 
able to have a s ,ignificant influence on neo~eali sm as well as 
c ritical rea l ism . 
37 
PART I 
A CRITICAL EXAMINAT ION, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF TELEOLOGY, OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF STRONG'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
CHAPTER II 
THE EPISTEMIC DUALISM OF STRONG'S FIRST PERIOD 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In view of the uncertainty, at this stage of the study, 
as to the priority of epistemology or metaphysics in the phil-
osophy of c. A. Strong, it may be asked on what ground epistem-
ology is examined first. In reply, it may be observed that 
epistemology has enjoyed a leading place in modern thought. 
This has been especially true in the case of idealists; and, 
Strong be gan h is explicit philosophizing as an idealist. 
Al so , the present writer is inclined to believe that epistem-
olog y is at least log ically pr:tor in the philosophic enterprise. 
Among other reasons that may be given for this starting 
point, is the fact that no previous, extended consideration of 
Strong has begun with his epistemology.l This point of begin-
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ning is particularly germane for a discussion which is concerned 
to determine the logical and temporal priority of emphasis in 
Strong's thought, espec.i.ally since the preliminary examination 
to this point has suggested that his epistemology may have been 
adopted as a foil for his metaphysical speculations. 
1. Calvert's main concern was with metaphysics; Klausner 
actually began with a metaphysical discussion. Further, 
Klausner did not att empt to isolate Strong's epistemology 
from his metaphysics. 
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However, it might be felt that, if there were any real 
possibility of this, metaphysics would be the place to begin. 
On the contrary, it seems wisest to follow the present approach 
because of this very possibility. .Consequently, Part I is con-
cerned to ask: whether Strong's epistemology implies or is 
particularly suited to a particular metaphysics, and whether 
his work is genuinely critical and objective, or is determined 
by metaphysical prejudgments. 
This can be best ascertained by the attempt to approach 
his epistemology, apart from his metaphysics, to determine 
exactly what the facts are. If it should turn out that such 
an examination suggests few of the metaphysical emphases which 
Strong made, then the subsequent study of his metaphysics will 
be the more fruitful.! 
This chapter traces, with particular attention to teleo-
logical factors, the development of Strong's epistemic theory 
from his earliest relevant writings through his first major 
publication and the responses it evoked. It points out Strong's 
continual failure to recognize the many and pivotal purposive 
factors upon which his epistemology depends. It further shows 
how metaphysical presuppositions of a highly idealistic and 
teleological nature are involved. By way of anticipation it is 
seen that his present epistemic theory cannot properly be 
retained apart from the disavowal of a mechanistic world-view. 
1. This would also hold even if the opposite were the ease. 
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Among the major weaknesses of Strong's epistemology at 
this stage is his failure basically to extend his considerations 
beyond the narrow confines of mere sense perception. Included 
also among the points that call for strongest criticism is his 
uncritical use of instinct as an undefined substitute for 
purpose, and therewith a complete lack of recognition of any 
end but that of survival. The most important accomplishment 
of this chapter is to demonstrate that Strong's earliest 
epistemology depended, in itself and in the metaphysics it 
implied, up?n an idealistic, teleological metaphysics. · 
2. STRONG'S EPISTEMOLOGY PRIOR TO THE PUBLICATION OF WHY THE 
MIND HAS A BODY 
i. Presentationism in Knowledge. Strong's earliest 
published article is concerned with the philosophical psychol-
ogy of Hugo Munsterberg.l This first article is more meta-
physical than epistemological. It is not until the following 
year that epistemology comes to the fore. 2 The context of the 
discussion is similar, though entitled, "James Ward on Modern 
. Psychology." 
Ward had offered a critique of the fundamental conceptions 
on which Munsterberg and other younger physiological psychol-
ogists were basing their experimental work. 3 Munsterberg had 
1. Strong, Art. (1892 ) •1 
2. Strong, Art.(l894). Strong was then teaching at the 
University of Chicago. 
3. I b id., 73. 
asserted that "all mental states, emotions, and volitions 
as well as cognitive states are simply complexes of sensa-
tions, that is, of elements each essentially similar to 
blue, hot, sour." 1 
While Wundt called this an intellectualism which ignores 
any but cognitive elements, Ward rejected the position as an 
unacceptable presentationism. 2 Now, Strong cautioned that 
presentationism may be defined in at ~ast two senses. Nar-
rowly speaking, it may be viewed as resolving all mental 
states into sensations.3 In such an emphasis, purpose could 
be easily resolved into mere behavioral responses. Broadly, 
however, it may simply assert that psychology has to do 
solely with conscious events. 
Strong analyzed the situation in the following manner. 
Every sensation has a quality and intensity which constitute 
its objective aspect, but it also has an emotional tone--
the attitude of the organism toward the st1mulus.4 The 
characteristic of feeling has to do with the objective as 
well as with the subjective aspect. If feeling is taken to 
designate emotional tone alone, insufficient basis is given 
upon which to bring out the fact that emotional tone itself 
has both an active and passive side.5 To account for this, 
1. Strong, Art.(l894), 73. The statement is Strong's. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. This, Strong opposed. 
4. Ibid., 74. 
q. Ibid. If the possession of the quality of feeling were 
denied the objective aspect of a sensation because of 
its objectivity, the same restriction would have to be 
faced in the case of emotional tone. 
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the objective side of a sensation must itself be seen to be 
a feeling.l Strong's specific description of the active and 
passive aspects of emotional tone further points this up. 
And, it is seen that there is no feeling without some kind 
of volitional effect; that is, purposive activity. 
Retrospectively with reference to the sensation 
it attends we call it pleasure or pain, yet pro-
spectively and with reference to the changes it 
effects in consciousness it deserves the name of 
impulse or will.2 
Understandably, Strong also insisted that all the 
knower ever has is his conscious experience. If anything 
is to be known, it must enter into his conscious experience. 
Against those who would exempt the self from the implications 
of this dictum, Strong insists that the self is also a fact 
of conscious experience ("All feeling involves a subject 
which is also felt"3). 
Without proceeding too far into the metaphysics of the 
self, it is helpful to note several aspects of Strong's view 
of the basis of knowledge of the self. 
There are two theories of consciousness. The first 
conceives it after the analogy of the eye, which 
sees other objects but cannot see itself. The 
other conceives it as analogous to light which in 
illuminating ot her objects illuminates itself also.4 
1. cr. Whitehead. 
2. Strong, Art.(l894}, 74. 
3 • Ibid • , 7 6 • 
4. Ibid., 76-77. While,at this stage of his thought, Strong 
asserts that the self is a fact of conscious experience, 
he construes this after the analogy of the eye, in 
reference to the question of knowledge. The self is but 
only indirectly known. 
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However, to insist that the subject is felt does not 
mean, for Strong, that it is conceptually known: the anal-
ogies of knowledge do not cover all of conscious experience.! 
Yet, one would never know of the existence of the self unless 
it were directly experienced or felt. The empirical self, 
as Wundt saw, is the manifestation in consciousness of one's 
latent ideas and interests (when they are of determinative 
significance), fused under the form of a total feeling, 
occupying the background ~f consciousness.2 But this is 
not to suggest that the self is kind of a passive thing. 
It rather is active, an agent attending, though not, as it 
were, in the focus, but on the. fringe.3 
It is obvious that this description of the self, in 
spite of its many inadequacies, makes the unity and activ-
ity of the self depend on purposive factors: active and 
determinative interests. The category of purpose is not 
accidental here but rather it is essential. 
When the level of cognition is reached, Strong adopts 
Ward's position and asserts that a state is cognitive be-
cause it knows and not because it is known.4 And yet the 
feelings are directly involved even here. When the ego 
attends to its feelings, it attends to the cognitive states 
1. Strong, Art.(l894), 77. 
2. Ibid., 79. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., ao. 
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of which the feelings are the subjective side.l The exper-
ience of attending to attention is the remembering of states 
just past and the discriminating consideration of the aspect 
of attention in them.2 
"Representative knowledge holds for knowledge of other 
beings but it does not hold for ourselves."3 In fact, one's 
knowledge of · the self is one's only immediate contact with 
reality. And, there is nothing in consciousness of which 
the person is not conscious.4 As stated, even feelings 
have their cognitive side ·. 
Every experience may have behind it a representa-
tive idea of itself, an idea which will be cognitive 
of the emotional aspect as well as the cognitive . 
aspect of the experience, but which will itself be 
attended by a new feeling.5 
A brief word of evaluation is now in order. This 
first article has been dealt with at length to bring out 
clearly Strong's earliest published epistemic attitudes. 
Further formulations should be judged, to an extent, by 
1. Strong, Art.(l894), 80. 
2. Ibid. Note the important place assigned to the act 
of attending. It is doubtful that attenting would 
retain meaning adequate for the use Strong makes of 
it unless it be construed as a purposive . aot. 
3. Ibid., 81. What Strong is asserting here is that the 
knowledge of the self is built on an immediate, not a 
representative experience. He thus actually uses 
'representative knowledge' in two senses: as contrasted 
with immediate knowing {which he denies is ever possible), 
and as expressive of a mediate knowledge which is built 
on a mediate experience. It is in the latter sense that 
he uses the term here. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., 80. 
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the relation they bear to these. In this way, the degree 
or change in Strong's thought, as well as its significance, 
may be ascertained. 
In the earliest expression of his epistemology, Strong 
is a metaphysical idealist who believes in the reality or 
external objects. The inner experience also reveals the 
self because the selr is directly experienced, 1 though 
known through accompanying cognitive states. Here is the 
basis upon which he will later insist that external objects, 
though known by representation, are not just inferred. 
Whether such is an allowable conclusion, further examination 
will have to det·ermine. However, as to the 'directness' 
or the knowledge of the selr (though it is admittedly known 
only through the corresponding cognitive state) at least a 
preliminary judgment can be given. 
It would seem to be a question, not as to whether the 
self is known directly, for this apparently compels agree-
ment, but rather a question as to whether Strong's explana-
tion is essentially acceptable. The issue is the doctrine 
of feeling and cognition as two sides of one experience. 
Perhaps, the 'two-side' concept is a bit too much like 
picture thinking; however, it would seem necessary that if 
any feeling is ever to be conceptualized that it must be 
1. This is akin to E. s. Brightman's concept of self-
experience. 
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capable of being universalized. What must be the nature 
of a feeling that would thus render it capable of being 
known in this way? 
At least, it must belong to an intelligible system i n 
(i.e., as the object of conceptual activity) the moment of 
its being known. Now, does this mean that to possess this 
potentiality, a feeling must in its very nature be ideal, 
or possess aspects that are ideal? There would seem to be 
no other alternative. As Blanshard says, the elements must 
be present here which wi~l make possible the later passage 
1 to higher and wider experience. Strong will later express 
explicitly his acceptance of a purely mechanistic meta-
physics. Since the epistemological framework espoused in 
this earlier period remains substantially unchanged, it may 
be asked how Strong can continue to assert this integral 
relation between feeling and idea in a mechanistic background. 
If he is to make logic this deep, he ought to move rather in 
the direction of an idealistic metaphysics. At any rate, 
purpose, inseparably connected as it is with thought, is 
early lodged by Strong at the heart of his epistemology. 
1. Blanshard, NT, 1, 62. Whether Blanshard is correct is 
asserting in this connection that universals are present 
from the start, seems to be another question. However, 
it does seem undeniable that cognitive factors must in 
some way be present in anything that is ever to enter 
into cognitive experience. As for the specific relation 
to feeling, Hocking's pos i tion is more illustrative. 
46 
ii. The psychology o£ pain. Two of Strong's earliest 
articles ("The Psychology o£ Pain"1 and "Psychical Pain and 
Pain Nerves"2 ) are concerned with the psychological-
epistemological aspects o£ the experience o£ pain. The 
more general article will be examined first. 
Strong begins, interestingly enough £or one who paid 
very little direct attention to the problems o£ axiology, 
with an emphatic skepticism ae to the identification of 
pain and displeasure. He is willing to admit that pain 
usually calls forth displeasure, but cannot see that pain 
is displeasure.3 Further, he also questions whether pain 
is always felt only with re£erence to tactile or temperature 
sensations.4 Specifically, he cites psychological studies 
and case histories to support the conclusion that the 
senses o£ touch and pain are independent o£ each other 
and that the sense of temperature is independent of both.5 
Now, while a sensation is unthinkable without a 
quality and intensity, the same cannot be aaid, at least 
with the same emphasis, £or a feeling tone. 6 This is in 
agreement with Wundt•s observation that in the experience o£ 
extreme physical pain, the excessiveness of the £eeling tone 
1. Strong, Art.(l895). 
2. Strong, Art.(l896). 
3. Strong, Art.(l895), 330. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., 333. 
6. Ibid., 340. 
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is such as to cover up as well as overpower the sensation's 
quality and intensity.1 Thus, Strong concludes that, as 
certain visual sensations may possess the content 'blue', 
the distinctive content of certain cutaneous sensations 
may be pain.2 Physical pain and pleasure may, consequently, 
be placed "on a common fo oting with our other senses as 
fundamental elements of mind."3 
Pain is an independent mental content, not 
necessarily attached to any other element of 
consciousness ••• It is on that account to be 
classified with sensations.4 
Strong disagrees with Hume that images are but 
weakened sensations.5 However, 'he does allow that 
whatever is true of images generally must also be true 
of images of pain.6 For, physical pain is not a compound 
(for example, an indifferent sensation plus a feeling of 
displeasure), but is itself a sensation, and this sensation 
calls forth displeasure~ 7 
In his second article, "Physical Pain and Pain Nerves", 
Strong continues his defense of the same basic position. 
However, he cites the fact that tactile and temperature 
pains can exist separately from each other as seemingly 
in opposition to the conclusion that "pain is the exclusive 
function of a fourth sense."8 But he finds that this is 
1. Strong, Art.(l895), 330. 5. Ibid., 345-347. 
2. Ibid. , 344. 
3. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 347. 
7. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 345-346. 8. Strong, Art.(l896), 66. 
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actually evidence that pain is a substantive. For, pain, as 
an attribute which may modify its subject but need 
not, and which may exist by itsel£ and in that case 
has an intensity of its oyn, is not an attribute, 
but a separate sensation. 
The judgment of pain ae unpleasant is not an analytic 
but a synthetic judgment because pain is an organic sensa-
tion.2 Yet, according to the traditional theory, the total 
experience of extreme pain could be classified only as a 
feeling. How, says Strong, what would be from that point 
of view neither a cognition nor a volition, appears upon 
proper analysis, to be a sensation together with its 
emotional reaction.3 Physical pain must be separated from 
displeasure. 4 
These articles on the nature of pain bring Strong's 
early metaphysical idealism into focus on a significant 
and specific epistemic problem. His expressions in this 
regard show him to be emphatically anti-behavioristic 
(or anti-materialistic). Such a strongly motivated 
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experience as pain may call forth displeasure, but it may not.5 
1. Strong, Art.(l896), 67. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 68. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Strong observes that it is a common experience for what 
is only mil dy or very slightly painful, often to be 
enjoyed by normal persons. 
Apparently, one is rree enough rrom his physical side to 
be able to exercise a degree of control over it. In other 
words, the situation here is not a mechanical one. The 
attitude and purpose of the subject determines, at least, 
to an extent , the response that is forthcoming. Strong 
is continuing t o use the ractor of purpose in his 
epistemology in a way that can be grounded only in a 
metaphysical teleology. Further, though pain is found to 
be the distinctive content of certain cutaneous sensations, 
they are in themselves as all other sense~. , fundamental 
elements of mind. Pain is not out there. 
Strong's whole treatment of this problem is suggestive, 
at this early date, of a groundwork for the categories of 
knowledge. This is further brought out in his insistence, 
against Hume, that images are not just weakened sensations. 
This would seem to imply some kind of creative activity or 
the mind. And, it would appear difficult to interpret this 
process in a mechanical manner. 
iii. The knowledge of time. In 1896, Strong also 
published a piece entitled, "Consciousness and Time."1 
With it the p icture of Strong's epistemic thinking as a 
background to the writing of Why the Mind Has a Body is 
complete. 
1. Strong, Art.(l896). Strong was now teaching psychology 
at Columbia University. 
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The problem of this article is the nature of present 
time and the relation of consciousness to it. Strong loses 
no time in informing his reader that he prefers what he 
calls the ~natural" answer. 1 This amounts to the view that 
consciousness inhabits present time.2 If Bergson, for 
, example, had been present to raise the objection that a 
thing, to exist, must endure, he would find Strong in agree-
ment. In spite of the previous assertion, Strong would 
insist that since the present instant is a mere boundary 
line, consciousness especially would have no existence 
were it not for duration.3 
How then can succession be sharpened down to a point? 
Strong answers that this is not a resting but a moving 
point, passing from an earlier instant to a later one.4 
If it seems that the idea of a point is an abstraction, 
Strong counters by insisting that it is the resting point 
that is a mere abstraction, while the moving point is 
another name for actual duration in present time.5 
The conception of movement is necessary in order 
to render time's flight, its fugitive quality. 
The conception of a point is necessary in order 
to render its infinite successiveness.6 
1. Strong, Art.(l896), 149. 4. Ibid., 152 
2. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 150 • . 6. Ibid. 
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Since a changing consciousness is not the same as a 
consciousness of change, all that is needed to supply the 
room that consciousness demands, is present time, rightly 
conceived.1 Reality, as known, is simply one ever-changing 
present--the present is the only datum.2 Succession is not, 
however, the creation of the mind. If there is to be knowl-
edge of succession, it must be preceeded by actual succession, 
for knowledge is in its nature retrospective.3 
Memory is then necessary for the consciousness of 
perception. 4 "Our apparently direct consciousness of the 
immediate past is an illusion." 5 Self-transcendence is 
involved, but it is representative and ideal.6 
Thus, for Strong, time is the moving present. Without 
proceeding to many questions and objections that m~ be 
raised from the viewpoint of the metaphysics of time, it 
may be noted that while reality is known as an ever-
changing present, it is nonetheless known, in some sense, 
as it is. There is actual succession within and without 
the mind, though this must be known retrospectively. The 
knowledge is after the fact, but it is real knowledge. 
1. Strong, Art.(l896), 153. 4. Ibid., 155. 
2. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 154. 6. Ibid., 157. 
So, on the one hand, Strong is disinclined to follow 
that type of idealism which makes time a completely 
phenomenal category. But, on the other, he insists upon 
the necessity of a self-transcendence which involves ideal 
represent at ion. Strong is still a metaphysical idealist, 
and an epistemological dualist as well; ~t, he cannot 
accept all categories as phenomenal. 
While, as has been noted, Klausner finds this an 
inconsistency, it seems that Strong is simply asserting a 
position that bears striking similarity to that of 
. 1 
B. P. Bowne and E. s. Brightman. That is to say, if all 
categories were phenomenal, one would be left with · an 
unknowable thing-in-itself, which is also unthinkable. 
Since Strong tends toward this Kantian view at certain 
points in his subsequent thought, it is well to keep in 
mind his initial attitude toward time . It is also 
suggestive as regards the human category of purpose. 
Certainly, the category of purpose is not necessarily 
phenomenal. 
3. THE POSITION OF WHY THE MIND HAS A BODY 
i. Introduction. This section is concerned to 
expound and evaluate the epistemology of Strong's earliest 
extended work with special attention to the teleological 
factors involved. Since it is generally agreed that this 
1. Bowne, TTK, 44; Brightman, POR, 351. 
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basic orientation or his thought was rundamental ror his 
subsequent development, a rather considerable space will be 
allotted to its exposition. 
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The more extended treatment or this material will enable 
later discussions to be seen in the light or his initial 
system and also make possible the avoidance or repetition by 
confining attention rarther on to significant developments 
and variations. This approach will also help convey, at the 
outset or the discussion, the flavor or Strong's thought. 
It appears that Strong's philosophy had ita first 
beginning in a metaphysical context. Then, in the articles 
that have just been examined, a growing explication or epistemic 
issues is manifest. But, with the publication of Why the Mind 
Has a Body, the metaphysical strain again dominates, though 
epistemology is prominent. With the publication or Essays 
on the_Natural Origin of the Mind, 1930, the epistemic element 
has commanded the foreground. In the meantime, a large part 
of his epistemological discussion is confined to articles. 
This development adds further support to the view that 
his epistemology grew while his metaphysics early arrived at 
something quite close to its final form and was affected 
only toward the very close of his life, and then simply by 
the cumulative weight of his theorizing in the field of 
knowing. 
ii. The importance of the problem of causal relations. 
The very title,Why the Mind Has a BodLis suggestive as to 
the nature of Strong's metaphysical position. An idealist 
might well ask why the mind has a body; while, to a realist, 
the question would rather be why the body has a mind. 
Specifically, Strong observes that the question of the 
direction of causal influence is secondary to the question 
of how body and mind are related so as to allow causal 
relations at all.l 
However, the wording of Strong's thesis, 'why the mind 
has a body,' poses a problem. Does he mean to ask what the 
purpose is of the mind having a body, or is he simply en-
quiring as to genetic origin? Certainly, more than the 
latter is involved, although he does at t empt a causal explan-
ation on this level. However, if the purpose or end is what 
he has primarily in mind, the only answer that he ever gives 
is in terms of survival value. Epistemically, however, the 
relations of mind and body accomplish much more than merely 
making survival possible. The volume does not, then, as 
will be seen in the exposition, fulfill its announced in-
tention. The reason for this is Strong's failure to develop 
a category of purpose to ground and explain his constant 
but implicit appeal to purposive activity. 
1. Strong, WMB, 4. 
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Questions of teleology, both in epistemology and meta-
physics, would be fUndamentally affected by the answer 
given here. Epistemically, as well as metaphysically, the 
assertion of causal relations would put an element of 
discontinuity in the physical series, whereas the denial 
would make the activity of the brain but part of a closed 
physical circle.l 
Automatism and parallelism assume that the (sensa-
tional) brain-event, accompanying or immediately preoeeding 
a sensation, would produce the same physical effects even 
if there had been no sensation.2 Interactionism seems to 
necessitate the view that the sensational brain-event occurs 
just prior to the sensation, as the cause precedes the 
effect in time.3 Automatism agrees at this point, but par-
allelism makes the two simultaneous.4 Automatism and par-
allelism also give cerebral correlates to all mental states 
of every kind, while interactionism commonly denies this in 
the case of the 'higher' mental states.5 
Strong's approach to the issue is empirical, at least 
as regards his enunciation that an exact determination of 
the facts should precede all discussions of theory.6 First, 
there are instances of the apparent action of mind on body. 
1. Strong, WMB, 6. 4. Ibid. 
2. WMB, 8. 5. WMB, 8-9. 
3. Ibid. 6. WMB, 9. 
It has even been asserted by many psychologists that every 
mental state is followed by bodily changes.l On this 
basis, James and others have helped support their defin-
ition of an idea as a plan of action. Second, there is 
the apparent action of body on mind, a physical change , 
followed by a mental. But, both these facts are equally 
explicable on a purely empirical level on any of the three 
theories, interactionism, automatism,or parallelism. 
In support of the apparent dependence of mind on body, 
a physical change is found to be followed by a mental 
change which is not limited to the mere production of new 
content, but may actually alter the vividness with which 
this and indeed all the contents of consciousness may be 
apprehended.2 Thus, a moderate stimulus effects a mere 
alteration of content, but an excessive stimulus effects 
a change in the degree of consciousness.3 
It is true that the same effect might be brought 
about by a moderate sensation of sufficient interest.4 
However, a sufficiently excessive stimulus may actually 
involve, not alone the diminution of consciousness, but 
the actual abolition of it by the rendering of the indi-
vidual unconseious.5 These facts seem to suggest more 
1. Strong, WMB, 20. 4. Ibid. 
2. W11B, 25. 5. Ibid. 
3. WMB, 26. 
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than mere action of body on mind; rather, a real depend-
ence of mind on body. 
However, Strong ought to have seen that the power of 
certain interests to moderate the degree of consciousness, 
as he himself admitted, would mitigate this apparent depend-
ence of mind on body. What is more, the power of some 
attitudes of mind to induce something very like unconscious-
ness, plus the common fact of human purposes leading on 
occasion to the deliberate destruction of consciousness 
all this would suggest a question as to whether a one-way 
dependence of mind on body is even apparent. These con-
siderations are passed over by Strong almost without notice. 
It seems that Strong is blind to the most common aspects 
arising out of the functioning of the total personality. 
It appears conclusive to Strong, however, not only 
that body acts on mind, but that mind is dependent in some 
sense on body.l This is in addition to the cognitive rela-
tion which Strong considers one fundamental type of depend-
ence.2 Strong might have noted here how Aquinas would 
concur and insist that there would be no knowledge of any 
kind were it not for sense experience. The cases of Helen 
Keller and Laura Bridgman would seem to bear this out.3 
1. Strong, WMB, 30. 
2. WMB, 31. Dependence of this kind is, within limits, 
allowable. 
3. For an excellent discussion of this point see Cassirer, 
EM, 33-38. 
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Proceeding, however, f'rom h:ts view of' a wider depend-
ence, Strong asserts that mind must consequently be con-
ceived of !!as a phys ical mechanism operating under strict 
conditions ." 1 Body definitely appee.rs to have the edge of 
influence on mind, he says. 2 Factually, "consciousness is · 
inseparably bound up with the brain-process and cannot 
take place in its absence. 113 It is thus observationally a 
correlate (accompaniment) of consciousness . But, this last 
may be admitted as true to ordinary experience without the 
necessity of concurrlng in Strong's overemphasis on the 
pla.ce of body. 
iii. The immediate correlate of consciousness and 
its extent. The correlates of sensation are brain events. 4 
Prain process and psychophysical process may be spoken of 
as identical, according to Strong. 5 However, he is willing 
to grant that certain extra-cerebral events may in part 
make up the psychophysical proces s, and that not all cere-
bral events may be of such a nature as to be included in 
this particular process.6 These last admissions help make 
it clear that Strong is not dealing with undeniable facts 
in this immediate discussion but rather is in the realm of 
speculation. 
That consciousness as a whole is physically condit ioned, 
is undeniable according to the previous discussion. However, 
1. Strong, vVMB, 32. 4. Cf. WMB, 46. 
2. Ibid. 5. WMB, 49. 
3. WNiE, 37. 6 • Wivffi , 50 • 
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more may be said, Strong maintains, since sensations and 
images, as localized, are correlated with the events of 
a particular cortical area.l One might go further, in 
the light of the evidence now in hand, and suggest that 
no mental states are exempt from a psychophysical repre-
sentation, even though, Strong is forced to admit, the 
nature of such cerebral correlates would be "difficult of 
approach except from the mental side."2 
However, some indirect evidence is available, he 
feels, from the fact that all states are affected "in 
the direction of exaggeration or in that of suppression, 
by physical influences."3 And, even if so-called higher 
states were without cerebral correlates, they would not 
necessarily be exempt from indirect cerebral condition-
ing.4 After all, these higher states appear to depend on 
sensation, and sensations on brain-events.5 
1. Strong, WMB, 51. · 
2. WMB, 53. This seems essentially an admission of the 
non-empirical nature of such postulates. It is also 
evidence that the essential spirit of strong's approach 
is external rather than internal, since he never actu-
ally makes any real effort to make good his assertions 
on the mental side. 
3. Ibid. But the physical is not the only source of these 
effects. 
4. WMB, 57. 
5. Ibid. Here is another deficiency in Strong's approach: 
rooting all thought ultimately in sensation. This is 
quite different from the assertion that w~thout sense 
experience we could not think. cr. Kant, CPR, 41, 
"Though all our knowledge begins with experience, it 
does not follow that it all arises out of experience." 
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All aspects of conscious experience must be in time. 
This includes mental events (thinking) as well as psycho-
physical (cf. brain or nervous processes) events.l The 
sensational brain event is either simultaneous with the 
sensation, or immediately prior. 2 But the exact answer 
to this question depends on the resolution of the problem 
of causal relations. 
iv. The causal question. Brain is the physical con-
dition (accompaniment} of consciousness only in the sense 
that the two are uniformly given together.3 Indeed, the 
empirical evidence is such as to suggest the propriety of 
denying any causality (direct interaction) between mind 
and body.4 This is actually supported by the view of cor-
respondence that gives the mental element the same place 
in the mental series as the physical in the physical series~ 
The only causal relations would be between the members of 
the same series. 
Since the facts would allow a parallelistic explana-
tion, the brain and its contents (cf. also sense data in 
psychophysical form) must not be supposed to be antecedent 
to consciousness.6 Not only are there no real reasons for 
the materialistic view, there is much against it. Such a 
1. Strong, WMB, 63. 
2. WMB, 64. 
4. WMB, 79. 
5. WMB, 80. 
3. WMB, 78. 
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position is not even true to the pattern of causation as 
it appears in the physical world, for there is no proto-
type there of a caused event which is incapable of also 
being a cause.l But, this is what is asserted, when the 
mind is made a mere epiphenomenon of brain. It is inter-
esting to note here that Strong's failure to give purpose 
a ·serious hearing amounts to the consignment of purpose to 
the level ·.of the epiphenomenal. At least, to the degree 
that he does this he is condemned by his own reasoning. 
Further, Strong also finds the very idea of a brain 
event creating a mental state most difficult (if not im-
possible) to conceive.2 Now, this does not mean that 
Strong thinks that causation, where present,is something 
that can be perceived. Through the senses all that is 
perceived is a series of phenomena; even between mental 
states all that is detect able is a phenomenal continuity.3 
However, though agreeing to this extent with Hume, Strong 
cannot see how the denial of a rational connection between 
cause and effect can be made good on this basis.4 A 
rational connection is an aspect of a cause which makes 
possible an inference to an effect, prior to the actual 
experience of that effect.5 This is still true even if 
all that is ever possessed is the phenomenal experience.6 
1. Strong, WMB, 101. 4. WMB, 147.. 
2. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 
3. WMB, 145. 6. WMB, 151. 
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But not even this rational connection can be so asserted 
as to explain how a mental state could be created by a 
brain event. This is an important point, for Strong will 
ultimately come to assert the source of the mental to be 
that which in itself is not mental, as such. It· would 
appear that his present objection could be lodged against 
thi~ ~ later view quite effectively. 
Another aspect of the problem of the physical pro-
ducing the mental presents itself in the case of the 
relation between a nerve current and the sensation pro-
duced. Specifically, what happens to the energy embodied 
in the nerve current?1 It cannot be used up in the pro-
duction of the sensation, since the sensation is not a 
form of energy (apparently). 2 In such a case, Strong con-
eludes, the sensation must be merely the brain event's 
concomitant and not the effect of the nerve current.3 
When the relation between sensation and volition is 
reached both must be regarded as forms of energy.4 Thus, 
the resolution of the 'mechanism' of knowledge involves 
a metaphysical judgment as to the nature of being. 
1. Strong, WMB, 157. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. A thorough-going idealistic metaphysics could 
allow for interaction at this point, and not have to 
delay the recognition of real causation until sensation 
and volition are reached. Strong does admit this 
latter, however, and the causally important place he 
thus grants to volition shows one of the fundamental 
uses he makes of purpose; after all, what is volition 
unless it be purposive~ 
4. Ibid. 
63 
v. Trans-subjective inference. Now, before the meta-
physical nature of being cam be enquired into, the pro-
priety of belief in something more than a solipsistic 
situation must be established. Strong says that epistemo-
logically, 'material objects exist only as modifications of 
conseiousness."l This is fundamental in Strong's epistemo-
logy. One actually starts not with consciousness itself, 
as such, but with these special modifications. 2 However, 
consciousness itself is presupposed.3 Material objects 
are believed to be real because of their steadiness and 
independence of the subject's will; but, in one sense, 
they are only abstractions from consciousness, since they 
require it in order to be conceived.4 Immediate knowledge 
(in the sense of knowledge of immediate experience) is 
possible only of the contents of consciousness.5 But, the 
soul itself ("mind or consciousness, however construed") 
is not an immediate datum, conceptually, but an inference.6 
The 'cogito' is given but not the 'ergo sum.'7 The proce-
dure is synthetic and not analytic. "Our essence lies, not 
in being a mental substance, but in being conscious."8 
1. Strong, WMB, 194. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. Compare the parallel with Bowne at this point. 
4. WMB, 194-195. 
5. Ibid. 
6. WMB, 197-198. 
7. Ibid. 
8. %~B , 203. Soul is thus conceived of in the sense of a 
self. 
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A thorough-going phenomena: lism involves solipsism.l 
But the answer to phenomenalism does not rest on (or 
require) proof of other minds. Their existence must simply 
be taken for granted.2 The argument for analogy is not 
allowable, because it involves a conclusion which is a non-
sequitur: the introductio~ of a new mode of existence.3 
The argument amounts to this, that like consequents 
(intelligent movements) must have like antecedents 
(thoughts and f eelings). But it is impossible for 
the antecedents to be perfectly alike, in that the 
thoughts and feelings which give rise to my move-
ments are immediately given, while those which give 
rise to other people's movements are not given.4 
Argument from analogy might indicate the nature of 
extra-mental realities, but their existence would have to 
be known on some other ground.5 But since such realities 
are naturally assumed, the only alternative is to continue 
to do so "in the absence of positive reasons to the con-
trary," even though neither external nor internal senses 
lend the slightest support.6 This conviction of certainty 
(of the existence of other minds) is not founded on reason 
or experience, but on instinct alone. 7 Thus, non-empirical 
existences are known--this is transcendent knowledge.8 
This grounding of belief in the existence of external 
objects on instinct raises a nice question: what is the pur-
1. Strong , \VMB, 212-215. 
2. WMB, 216 - 217. 
3. WMB , 21 7-218. 
4. WMB, 217. 
5. 'IA71.'IB I 218. 
6. WMB , 218-219. 
7. WMB, 219. 
8. WMB, 221. 
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pose of such an instinct? One could certainly agree with 
Strong that it functions to make possible survival. How-
e ver, why should the universe care about my surviyal? If 
Strong says (as he actually does later) that the instinct, 
among other things, came about quite accidentally, then he 
might as well suggest that if the letters of the alphabet 
in sufficient quantity were cast into the air and allowed 
to fall on the ground a sufficient number of times, on at 
least one occasion, they would land in the form of one of 
Shakespeare's plays. But as E. s. Brightman suggests, 
''To say that a book expresses the purpose of its author 
is a fuller explanation of its meaning than to say that it 
was set up by a linotype machine."l 
Such knowledge (both of empirical and transcendent 
character) is involved in perception as well as memory.2 
Only the present moment is empirically given and therefore 
empirically known. 3 The past, as another mind, is known 
only transcendently, through conjecture, inference, memory, 
and so forth.4 Physical objects are empirical facts as 
the individual's mental states; and, since reality is not 
identical with the perception (else hallucinations would 
1. Brightman, ITP, 253. This grounding of belief in ex-
ternal reality on instinct will be subjected to 
critical examination below. 
2. Strong, WMB,221. 
3. WMB, 222. 
4. Ibid. 
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be impossible), physical objects are to that extent items 
of transcendent knowledge (not immediately known, but, 
still, possible experience).l 
But, physical objects are empivical in that they orig-
inate in and refer to experience.2 "Only the inference to 
other minds is transcendent knowledge in the full senae."3 
Anything inaccessible to perception or immediate experience 
may be called a thing-in-itself.4 
Sense without the intellect could never give knowledge 
of the physical world, but this does not mean that the in-
tellect creates the physical world, for the latter's order 
is imposed on the intellect independent of the individual's 
will and knowledge, even as it would be if it came from 
5 without. 
In the case of spatial discrimination, for example, 
although it is an act of the intell_ect, it is made possible, 
Strong contends, by the physiological nature of the sense 
organ by which parts of the object are able to affect the 
nervous system separately. That the sensation itself 
should lose this spatial order so that it would have to be 
restored by the intellect seems unallowable to Strong in 
the light of his above expos1tion.6 
1. Strong, WMB, 223-225. 
2. WMB, 225. 
4. WMB, 233. 
5. WMB~ 234. 
3. WMB , 228. 6. WMB, 235. 
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The data of sense are not then ''at the outset a mani-
fold without form or order." 1 An object is a datum of sense, 
and the promptings which induce attribution of external 
reality to it come from sense, so they can hardly be a 
construction of the intellect. 2 The idea of permanent pos-
sibility of sensation as the meaning of extramental reality 
also necessitates the postulation of an extramental. cause.3 
The work of the inte.llect is in no wise creative ••• 
The intellect only elicits and reali zes in thought 
an order that was implicit in the stream of sensa-
tions from the outset. The physical world is not 
con~tructed, but only re-constructed, by the in-
tellect.4 
Further, the simplest explanation of the fact that phy~ 
ical things are experienced in common by different individ-
uals is that the order is external.5 At this point, a 
thorough-going phenomenalism would have t o have recourse to 
a pre-established harmony.6 
If Kantians raise the objection that .it is illicit to 
use the causal category to transcend experience, it must be 
insisted that there are two kinds of causal relations, real 
and phenomenal.7 Real causation is revealed by the connec-
tion of one's mental states with extra-mental realities, and 
1. Strong,WMB, 234-235. 
2. WMB, 236 •. 
3. Ibid. 
4. WMB, 238-239. 
5. WMB, 239 •. Note that Strong is giving reasons for 
belief in, the external world throughoub this section. 
6. Ibid. 
7. WMB, 241. 
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with mental states (and brain events) inter se.l 
Up to this point Strong is frank to admit that, as far 
as his general argument is concerned, the universe might 
consist wholly of individual minds having causal relations 
with each other. What Strong has in mind here might be 
better expressed (were it not for his apparent determina-
tion to avoid all such reference even of an illustrative 
nature) by an allusion to the divine mind. Strong is say-
ing that up until now the data might be accounted for 
(although not most plausibly) by a divine mind and other 
finite minds in causal interaction with our own. Compare, 
for example, certain aspects of Berkeley's epistemology. 
The question now is whether there are other existences 
which are symbolized by our perceptions of the natural 
world. 2 S.trong adduces three lines of proof to support 
the affirmative: cosmological, physiological, and evolu-
tionary. 
Cosmologically, things-in-themselves must be assumed 
back of phenomena to account for the coherence and intelli-
gibility of the universe.3 Otherwise, there would be only 
individual minds and gaps of nothingness in between, making 
the passage of causal influences across them a major miracle~ 
Physiologically, perceptions are both preceded and con-
1. Strong, WMB, 241, 243. 3. WMB, 259. 
2. WMB, 251. 4. Ibid. 
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ditioned by physiological events--i.e., they are erfects~l 
Only if these c.onditioning facts are things-in-themselves, 
can order and intelligibility be introduced into the facts 
of physiological psychology. 2 Strong is saying, in effect, 
that the order, stubbornness, and connection of physical 
racts is intelligible only on this basis. Further, that 
physical antecedents or sensation are not sheer phenomena, 
but symbols of realities, is proved by the fact that a 
stimulus of an excessive nature can actually abolish con-
sciousness completely.3 
From that point of view of evolution, metaphysical 
idealism needs a foundation more basic than the mere fact 
of awareness; agency must be taken account or as a char-
acterictic of concrete mind.4 Physical facts are not only 
modifications of consciousness, but consciousness is a 
particular; there is a psychophysical correlation between 
mind and body. Consciousness and its associated body are 
alike non-sell-explanatory.5 The choice is the fragmentary, 
disconnected reality of introspection, or a bold non-ration-
1. Strong , WMB, 264. 
2. WMB, 264-265. 
3. WMB, 265. As noted above, this overlooks the power 
of mind to accomplish the same thing. The fact that he 
must again and again depend on the reality and causal 
efficacy of volition, while at the. same time he ignores 
it whenever he can, testifies to his prejudice against 
giving purposive ractors a fair hearing. 
4. WMB , 273. And what is agency, ir it be intelligible, 
but a purposive act? Without this Strong cannot explain 
concrete mind--and this by his own admission. 
5. Ibid. 
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al leap to things-in-themselves, since they cannot be 
log ically demonstrated.l This pre-rational instinct is 
akin to faith in memory.2 External things and other minds 
stand or fall together. 
Perceptions must not, however, be taken as of maximum 
fidelity and be equated in knowledge-giving power with in-
tuition, since knowledge is only representative and mediate~ 
Even, as Berkeley supposed, 1 extramental' reality might 
actually be a divine mind.4 
Things-in-themselves imprint copies of themselves 
on the mind, they call forth in it subjective 
states that serve5as their symbols, and so get themselves known. 
The representative char~cter of knowledge is corrobo-
rated by the fact that an extra-bodily object is discovered 
in physiolog ical psychology to be the cause of a perceptional 
brain event (a s ort of 'physical idea 1 ).6 Now, the idea is 
-
only phenomenal: it can but stand for the real process by 
which things-in-themselves elicit perceptions.7 As the per-
ceptional brain event is not an accurate portrait of the 
extra-bodily object, a corresponding disparity (immense) 
must be postulated between the perception and the thing-in-
itself; the former is only a symbol of the la.tter.8 
1. Strong, WMB, 273. 
2. Ibid. 
3. WMB, 276. 
4. WMB, 277. Strong is finally 
forced to the allusion. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. WMB, 278. 
8. WMB, 279. 
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Later, in response to criticism by Norman Kemp Smith,l 
Strong reasserted the validity of his doctrine of percep-
tion.2 He cited the fact that if the qualities of inde-
pendently existing objects were directly apprehended in 
preception, it would be impossible for anyone to apprehend 
them as other than they are. Therefore, since percepts do 
not vary with the object but with the brain state, there 
can be no immediate perception of an extra-bodily object. 
Strong's representationism in this period is a corol-
lary of his general epistemic dualism. He does not so much 
single it out for emphasis and refinement as look upon it 
as a necessary conclusion in the light of the rest of his 
epistemology. Later developments in Strong's epistemic 
theory bring the question of representationism to the fore 
by way of his special theory of the function of the repre-
sentation. Like the eye which does not see itself in the 
act of vision, the symbol of the object is looked upon as 
bringing the object, as object not· as symbol, to the atten-
tion of the knower. Thus, the period dominated by his The 
Origin of Consciousness may be spoken of as that in which he 
disavows epistemic representationism in the old sense. 
Not only are many traits of reality lost in the repre-
1. Smith, Art.(l904). 
2. Strong, Art.(l904). 
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sentation, the latter has qualities of its own which do 
not correspond to the real stuff of being.l That there is 
some correlation cannot be denied in the light of the ef-
fective adjustment2 that is possible in practical life. 
However, its extent is another question. 
What, for example~ is the relation between the space 
form and relations in the external world? It would seem 
that there must be ~ kind of ontological order as the 
source of the phenomenal experience.3 Moreover, while a 
symbol is rigid and soulless (i.e. corporeal) the reality 
symbolized can be very much alive.4 When, however, it is 
remembered that 'physical' facts are merely phenomena--
modifications of mind, mental states are seen to be basic, 
i.e., they belong to the same category as things-in-them-
selves.5 
This argument depends, of course, on the supposition 
that mental states are not of a different nature than eon-
sciousness.6 The view is supported by the fact that any 
conception of reality must be based on experience and the 
only reality that is experienced is consciousness, leaving 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Strong, WMB, 279. 
Again, what is adjustment if not purposive? 
WMB, 290. 
M~B, 283. Cf. Bergson. 
WMBt 287. 
Ibia. 
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no other material of explanation.l 
But this is not to say that reality is to be construed 
in terms of objects of perception or thought, since thoughts 
and perceptions are only "particular cases of mental states 
in general. 112 
It is perfectly true that our only key to the 
nature of reality is our own consciousness: but 
it is equally true that this is our only key to 
the nature of the polyp's [or earthworm's) con-
sciousness; and if, in forming some faint notion 
of the latter, we take our start rather from our 
dumb feelings that from our more intellectual 
states, how much more in forming a notion of the 
realities that underlie inanimate matter ••• Thus 
the only type of idealism consistent with psy-
chological facts is idealism of feeling.3 
An unusually extended exposition is now before the 
reader. Its purpose has been to delineate clearly and com-
prehensively the spirit and content of Strong's earliest 
and very vigorous presentation of his epistemology. Because 
of the length of this presentation, no similarly extended 
exposition should be necessary later, at least in the field 
of epistemology, if not also in that of metaphysics. 
Since Strong's first book is so much of a key to his 
entire system, especially in setting forth the problems to 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Strong, WMB, 297. Cf. Brightman in a letter to Philip 
Mayer, 3/4/46, "Experience--conscious awareness in all 
its manifold variety--is the only fact we actually have 
in our immediate possession ••• ! take experience to be 
a sample of reality ••• Tbereis nothing else." 
WMB, 290. 
WMB, 290-291. This anticipates the di s cussion of Part 
II. There, especially beginning with ~he Origin of 
Consciousness, Strong's panpsych1~m will be carefully 
examined. 
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be i nvestigated, space is now given to a brief summary of 
the position as presented, together with an evaluation of 
certain critical points. 
4. SURVEY AND EVALUATION. 
i. Summary. The discussion of Why the Mind Has a Body 
is divided into two sections, the empirical and metaphysical. 
The empirical is concerned first with a survey of what 
Strong considers the undeniable facts, and second with 
empirical evidence for the various metaphysical theories of 
causal relations. The metaphysical section expounds Strong's 
concept of things-in-themselves and concludes with the appli-
cation of his cumulative principles to the basic causal 
theories. 
Among the undeniable empirical facts of the mind-body 
relationship, Strong emphasizes the dependence, in some 
sense, of mind on body. An important aspect would be the 
cognitive relation. One may define mind, ac cordingly, as 
a strictly conditioned physical mechanism. Yet, in the 
examination of the relation between sensation and volition 
it appears necessary to regard both, and in fact the 'mech-
anism' of knowledge as a whole, as forms of energy of a 
metaphysical kind. This does not militate against the pre-
vious conclusions, since all that Strong attempted to 
assert ~ that mind and brain are correlates of each other--
they are given together. 
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The only undeniable facts of the mind-body relation 
can be formuls_ted in terms of the "law of psychophysical 
correlation."l Consciousness and brain are simply given 
together--one is not found without some correlation in the 
other.2 Correlation, however, implies nothing as to the 
subordination of one to the other. The metaphysical 
question is still open on this level. 
On the other hand, it soon becomes clear that material 
objects exist only as modifications of consciousness. Im-
mediate knowledge is possible only of the mind. The pro8-
lem then is how to escape solipsism. Strong will not allow 
inference or analogy to solve this problem because, he 
insists, a non sequitur is involved in all such argumenta-
tion, for it always concludes to a mode of existence other 
than that from which it starts. 
Consider the problem of the knowledge of other minds. 
While my own thoughts and feelings and movements are immedi-
ately given, those of others are never so. If I conclude 
from the contents of my experience to the existence of minds 
external to me, I am illicitly (in a strictly logical sense) 
1. Strong, ~.TMB, 38. _ 
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2. This is Strong's description of the empirical situation 
when subjected _to the examination he has made above. How-
ever, it is just possible that Strong's failure to con-
dition this statement precisely is an indication of an 
underlying materialistic theory. Certainly, the fact 
that this correlation of which he speaks can be accepted 
in any detailed sense only as an hypothesis (a point 
which Strong seems hesitant to make known) testifies 
clearly to such a bias. 
passing from a type of immediate experience, on the one hand, 
to the non-immediate on the other. There is no ground, as 
Strong sees it, for such passage, since the non-immediate 
is never given. What then is the source of the conviction 
of the existence of extramental (i.e., outside my mind) 
reality? Strong finds it to be instinctual (ef. animal 
faith). And, such beliefs must be held to unless positive 
1 
reasons to the contrary are adduced for giving them up. 
This is supported in Strong's thinki ng by the order of 
the physical world being imposed on the intellect independ-
ent of one's will and knowledge, which is what would be 
expected if it eamefrom without. He cites as further evi-
dBnee the fact that , in the case of space, the physiolog-
ical nature of the sense organ makes it possible for the 
parts (spatially separate) t ·o affect the nervous system 
separately. It appears improbable to Strong that the sensa-
tion itself would lose this spatial order so that it would 
have to be restored by the intellect. 
Indeed, since the prompting s which induce the attribu-
tion of externality come from sense, externality can hardly 
be a construction of the intellect.2 The intellect is not 
creative but recreative. To strengthen the ease against 
sensations being taken as purely phenomenal, Strong points 
1. Note the similarity to Bowne here. 
2. Strong, WMB, 234 y235. 
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to physiological psychology and the effect an excessive 
stimulus can have in actually abolishing consciousness com-
pletely. 
All the evidence demands that one settle either for 
the fragmentary, disconnected reality of introspection 
(solipsism), or frankly make a bold, non-rational leap to 
the existence of external objects, since they cannot be 
logically demonstrated. This must be accepted even though 
the mind never possesses more than symbols of external 
objects, and these symbols have qualities of their own 
which do not correspond to the real nature of being. 
ii. Critique. Perhaps the most crucial epistemic 
issue arises ·at this point in connection with Strong's 
attempt to escape solipsism. H~ repudiation of the pro-
cedure of concluding to external reality on the basis of 
an inference from the immediate nature of the content s of 
one's consciousness appears to rest on a strictly deductive, 
logical basis. The conclusion he says, cannot assert 
extramental reality since extramental character is not in 
the premises.l Now, one may wonder how Strong would make 
room for any process of discovery. Would such not involve 
inductive inference? If so, why forbid it here? 
Strong would probably reply that he is not forbidding 
1. It would seem that Strong's argument in this form would 
hold, even if the quality of objective reference as 
possessed by certain of the data, were insisted upon. 
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it; but rather insisting that it be recognized that the 
source of the idea of extramental reality is not to be found 
in a strictly deductive operation upon what is found in the 
field of one's consciousness, but rather in induction; and, 
that the inductive process involves the leap of intuition. 
Such intuitive belief is to be accepted unless there be 
positive reasons for doubting it. It may now be enquired 
whether this position is essentially different from the 
dualistic inference of E. S. Brightman, who says that an 
external world must be postulated to give a rational ex-
planation of the cause of the comings and goings in con-
sciousness. 
An inductive process, if affirmed by Strong, would be 
in essence what Brightman asserts. That Strong is actually 
asserting this is borne out by his insistence that without 
the postulation of an ordered, external world, all that is 
left is uhe fragmentary, disconnected reality of the solip-
sistic state. The external world is then apparently a 
rational postulate. 
The difficulty, however, is that Strong does not speak 
of belief in the external world as a postulate or a war-
ranted hypothesis. Rather, he continually defines it as a 
non-rational, instinctive leap. Yet, on the other hand, the 
way in which he has defined the non-rational leap seems to 
make it simply the best hypothesis--the source of which is, 
of course, intuitive. But, it would nonetheless be a rational 
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hypothesis. Indeed, Strong actually goes about to show 
why it is the most reasonable view. His position thus 
appears, when the confusing terminology is penetrated, to 
be essentially that of E. s. Brightman. Strong's animal 
faith is actually a rational faith (though he is concerned 
to insist that it is a faith).l 
Strong's meaning here is further brought out in his 
discussions with the cr.itics. Norman Kemp Smith was among 
those unsatisfied with Strong's emphasis on the instinctive 
basis of external reference.2 Strong replied by defending 
his view as finding the source of external reference in 
instinct but the criterion of such belief in the rational 
superiority of such an hypothesis. It is a better explana-
tion of the cause of . many of the variations in the contents 
of consciousness. 
In response to criticisms of his doctrine by Charles M. 
Bakewell,3 Strong defined his use of the term instinctual 
as designating non-reflective thinking and acting according 
to an idea which represents (stands for and makes possible 
1. The writer believes that the account given here is much 
more in line with Strong's actual expressions than is 
Klausner's. The latter believes that Strong involved 
himself in a contradiction by asserting the leap to be 
irrational and yet adding proofs of his position (KSB, 
96). But, the explicitness of Strong's presentation 
seems to militate against this view. Note below 
Strong's responses to his critics. 
2. Smith, Art.(l904). 
3. Bakewell, Art.(l904}. 
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adjustment of relation to) an extramental reality. Instincv 
is a peculiar habit of action. Thus Strong insists that 
we instinctively believe in and operate as if there were 
an external world, before we cast about to explain and 
give reasons for our action. And, when we .do attempt to · 
give reasons, one of the most important data that must not 
be overlooked is the fact of this instinctive response. As 
E. s. Brightman suggests, instinct is not a test Cdr truth, 
but it suggests truth.l 
It should not pass unnoticed that Strong is compelled 
to introduce distinctly purposive elements in any thorough-
going attempt to explicate his position. Thus, he has 
recourse to the concept of adjustment. In other words, 
purpose lies at the heart of Strong's attempt to transcend 
the situation-experienced. The very nature of knowledge is 
purposive, almost in the sense of Royce's definition of a 
true idea as a fulfilled purpose. 
However, this is only a bringing to the surface of 
teleological factors that have been implicit all along. 
Among Strong's earliest writings is found his description 
of sensation as both active and passive in nature. There is 
no feeling, he says, without some kind of volitional activ-
ity. For example, a particular bodily experience may be 
1. Brightman, ITP, 52. 
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responded to as unpleasant or not, depending on the interest 
and intent of the individual. Here is volition which is not 
just mechanical action, essentially aimless, but a pur-
posive, adjustive response. Strong continually uses the 
factor of purpose in his epistemology in a way that neces-
sitates a teleological metaphysics. 
The process of remembering Strong defines in terms of 
attending to states which are past. Now, it is doubtful 
that attending would retain the meaning adequate for the 
important use Strong makes of it here, unless it be construed 
as a purposive act. What is more, the unity and activity 
of the self upon which the possibility of attending rests 
is itself defined by Strong in reference to determinative 
interests. The category of purpose is essential and not 
accidental here. 
Later Strong makes explicit his purely mechanistic 
metaphysics. Since the epistemological framework espoused 
in such issues as those mentioned above, remains substan-
tially unchanged, it must be concluded that he is making 
all along an illicit use of purposive factors. At ~ast, 
the introduction of them is the introquction of the eiement 
of miracle. 
Furthermore, Strong's early and continuing acceptance 
of the categories of experience as not necessarily phenom-
enal is most suggestive as regards the category of purpose. 
The epistemic situation does not necessitate that purpose be 
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viewed as phenomenal. The only way then that its candidacy 
for metaphysical reality could be cancelled would be by 
denying its presence in the epistemic situation. Strong 
does not attempt this explicitly; however, his failure to 
grant recognition to apparently purposive factors as they 
occur amounts to an implicit denial of their existence. 
But, though implicit, such treatment must be defended--
yet, Strong seems to think that silence is its own justifica-
tion. In other words, he just never faces the issue~uarely. 
If purpose or end is what Strong has in mind when he 
attempts to explain why the mind has a body, the only answer 
he ever g ives is in terms of survival value. But, it is a 
matter of undeniable fact that epistemically, the relations 
of mind and body accomplish much more than merely making 
survival possible. This is especially apparent in the case 
of instinctual belief in an external world. Thus, Strong's 
first book does not really ful f illits announced intention. 
He fails there to take into consideration at all such factors 
as the aesthetic, the pleasurable, even the refinements of 
mechanical invention, all of which are made possible by 
knowledg e, but much of which is entirely unnecessary for 
mere survival. Strong's evolutionary processes far out-
reach themselves; or perhaps, better, his hypothesis falls 
far short of the facts. 
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So it is in the same vein that Strong, although forced 
to concede the fact, insists on ignoring the importance of 
the power of interests (conscious purposes) in their ability 
to moderate the degree of consciousness as effectively as 
physical causes are able to do. Ind.eed, Strong almost 
completely ignores the attributes of the personality as a 
whole. In a similar way Durant Drake in effect passes over 
purpose by reducing it to a simple biological set of an 
organism toward a certain type of motor expression.l 
To this, E.S. Brightman responds that such is a "behavior-
istic description" and an approach which takes into 
consideration only the "objectively (sensuously) observed."2 
That Strong's approach, in its essential spirit, is 
external rather than internal, is borne out by his assump-
tion (though he asserts it as undeniable empirical fact) 
that there is a bodily correlate for every mental event. 
He never really attempts to make this good in the light of 
the evidence from the mental side. Thus, on the basis of 
this gr a tul tbus assumption, Strong goes on to root all 
t h ought ultimately in sensation. When he admits that agency 
is a necessary characteristic of concrete mind, the contra-
diction is apparent, for intelligent agency is inconceivable 
if it be not purposive. 
1. Drake, MPN, 229. 
2. Brightman, Notes in MPN, 229. 
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Also imports.nt is Strong's view of the creativity 
of the intellect. The forms and categories are not comple tely 
phenomenal, but do have some metaphysical grounding. The 
order of the physical world as imposed independent ly of the 
individual's will and knowledge, the spatial character of 
a sense organ conveying the experience of space into the 
sensation it.self, and the power of some stimuli to abolish 
consciousness altogether are all cited as evidence that the 
mind is at most recreative and not the exc lusive, creative 
source of the structure of what is known. 
This presentation embraces much that demands assent. 
Rowever, some reservation is in order. The argument from 
the spatial character of a sense organ seems wide of the 
mark. The very spatiality alluded to is what the problem 
is all about. Of course, this spatial situation exists , 
but--as phenomenal. The question is whether there is also 
a metaphysical order of space . 
The consideration Strong introduced rather suggests how 
there might be an experience of space if space is self-
sufficient. This asp~ct of sensation could be a factor in 
supporting the metaphysical view of space as seemingly 
more coherent. But, to argue from the character of the 
sensation directlz to the reality of space as such in the 
external wor ld is to forget that all the mind ever has 
present to i t are data as modifications of consciousness. 
Even the brain is experienced only as an aspect of 
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consciousness. This is the status of Strong's argument 
from the fact of the spatial extensiveness of the sense 
organ. It being, as directly experienced, also a modification 
of consciousness, the method of empirical coherence must be 
introduced or there is a leap, which is not only pre- or 
non-rational, but also irrational. 
5. TRANSITION 
The further developments of Strong's epistemology up 
to and including his second major work, 'The Origin of 
Consciousness, 1918, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Having laid such a detailed foundation in the present chapter, 
it will be possible to shorten subsequent discussion in 
many places, retaining only the key features of his 
developing view. After the discussion of Strong's second 
book, attention will be turned again to the journals. 
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CHAPTER III 
INSTINCTIVE, NON-REPRESENTATIVE EXTERNAL REFERENCE 
IN STRONG'S SECOND PERIOD 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, Strong's developing epistemology is 
set forth in terms of his earliest emphasis on inst!n ctive, 
non-representative, external reference. It is shown how 
Strong roots external reference in the direct, instinctive 
response of the ego. The account Strong gives is analyzed 
and its purposive character is shown to be its most 
important factor. This is inexplicable on Strong's supposi-
tion that purpose arises quite accidentally out of a universe 
which is at heart ateleological. 
The role of essences in Strong's epistemology further 
underlines his involvement in teleology. If the cognitive 
process is construed mechanically, essences are not necessary; 
all that need be assumed is a refinement of reflex action. 
Essences may be asserted as logical entities in the way 
that Strong does only if significant meaning be retained. 
Only the reality of purpose can account for intelligibility. 
Essences, as the detached concrete natures of external objects, 
further suggest some form of idealistic metaphysics. Yet, the 
wider, teleological applications of Strong's epistemology 
reveal his arbitrary dependence upon the metaphysical view 
that the world is a machine. 
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2 . STRONG' S NATURALISTIC EP I STEMOLOGY 
i. Idealism and realism . The year after the publication 
o f ~~y t h e Mind Has a Body, Strong wrote an article entitled, 
"Idealism and Realism." It was in part an answer to an 
article by Montague on the question of realism. 1 Montague 
had criticized Strong's analysis of the epistemic situation 
· as assuming that the qualitative contents of one's immediate 
consciousness are either exclusively outside or inside the 
psychophysical organ ism.2 Strong replied that the facts 
proved tha t perceptions vary with brain events and not vice 
versa.3 
It is true that on the basis of common sense we 
habitually act on the assumption of the external reality of 
certain things; and, Strong does not wish to deny but rather 
affirm this common belief. However, he insists that states 
of mind can never be more than symbols, even if they be 
symbols of realities beyond the mind.4 Indeed, thought 
itself enterseven into what is commonly called perception--
perception is a kind of conception.5 
It is in terms of t h is epistemolog ical dualism (and 
also a type of panpsychism) that Strong develops his 
''Naturalistic Theory of the Reference of Thought to Reality."6 
1. Montague, Art.(l904). 
2. Ibid., 294. 
3. Strong , Art.(l904}, 525. 
4. Ibid. , 544 ~ 
5 ~ Ibid., 547. 
6. Strong, Art.(l904)8. 
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Here, he essentially accepts James theory of 
1 cognition. In the form that Strong adapts it to his 
own viewpoint, it involves the assertion that the relation 
of cognition may be resolved into a feeling resembling a 
reality and operating upon it. This rests on the view that 
the physical event resembles the external object and 
the resemblance is not wholly lost in the brain event. 
The latter are thus said to correspond. That is to say, 
the brain event has extra-bodily reference.2 A cognitive 
relation thus consists of resemblance or correspondence 
(symbolism) and causation.3 
Indeed, Strong is so concerned to give due emphaSJis 
to the presence of causative stimuli that he insists that 
the doctrine of the general as prior to the particular 
"rests on a confusion between the vagueness of ignorance 
and the universal reference of thought. "4 It is the 
practical habit of the race which makes subjective 
experience into knowledge, through instinctive thought 
and action, as if one had to do with an independent reality. 5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
For the development of this view, which Strong calls 
the James-Miller theory, see James, Art.{l885) and Art. 
{1895); Miller, Ar~.(l893} and Art.{l895). 
Strong, Art.{l904) , 256. · 
Ibid., 258. That is, there are two factors: 
resemblance and causation. 
Ibid., 259. 
Ibid., 260 
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Four years later in a cooperative volume with his 
Columbia University associates,l Charles A. Strong still 
acknowledged his indebtedness to William James. 2 But his 
formulation still had its distinguishing marks. He refers 
to na~ve realists as champions of the ob ject, though he 
warns that "they exaggerate the directness and adequacy 
of our knowledge of it." 3 On the other hand, he believes 
that while the transcendental idealists are protagonists 
for content, they mistake it for the object and reduce the 
object to a state of mere r~tivity to the mind.4 The 
immediate empiricists espouse the cause of 'experience,' 
but overlook the fact that experiences are cognitive 
because they lead to reactions which are adjusted to 
independent ob jects.5 
As a substitutionalist, Strong insists that an 
experience is a cognitive substitute for an object. The 
experience is objectified due to certain reactions which 
make "the experience virtually the object."6 Thus, 
experiences are cognitive only by virtue of some kind of 
external relation.? Strong will allow the designation 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of 
William James. 1 Strong, Art.(l908) , 191. 
Ibid., 1? 7. 
Ibid. 
Ibid • . 
Ibid.,l79. 
Ibid., 182. 
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'consciousness ' to human experi ence strictly neither as 
the function of knowing, nor as mere sentient existence. 
For him "the word signifies the knowing of objects, together 
with the awareness of the subject."l 
It was o~ly a few years previously that Strong had 
suggested the same conclusions as the result of an examina-
tion of Moore's so-called refutation of idealism. 2 Moore's 
fatal weakness, he said, was his failure to discuss the 
app lication of 'esse is percipi' to mental states.3 While 
admitting that pain itself, for example, can be distinguished 
as a mere feeling from the thought about it, Strong contends 
that the feeling is actually transformed into an object of 
thought.4 Thus, although pain would have to exist as a 
mental fact or state of sentiency before there coul~ be 
thought about it, it must not be forgotten that if con-
sciousness were completely obliterated, pain also would 
cease to exist.5 Nothing can be conceived without conscious-
ness being implied thereby; and, it is impossible to conceive 
of consciousness "as a particular existence side by side with 
~ 
other things. 110 
1. Strong ; Art.(l908)1, 183. 
2. Strong, Art.(l905). 
3. Ibid.l 174. 
4. Ibid. , 175. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 183. 
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ii. Critique of pragmatism. In view of the general 
spirit of Strong's epistemology, it was to be expected, in 
spite of his emphasis on pragmatic factors and his personal 
and intellectual closeness to William James, that he could 
not be satisfied with a thorough-going pragmatic defense of 
truth. In a very interesting article, he attempted an 
appreciative evaluation of p ragmatism and found that, 
however much he would like it otherwise, he .could not 
completely accept the position.! 
Strong convicts pragmatism of failing to take into 
account the fact that truth and right action depend on the 
conformity of idea t o object.2 On the other hand, pragmatism 
is correct in insisting upon a procedure that forbids the 
confusing of the logical and psychological sides of truth.3 
In James' attempt to unite cognition and external object·, 
which he asserts to be distinct and separate existences, he 
takes too narrow a view of the connecting context when he 
restricts it solely to future occurrences.4 Truth, says 
92 
1. 2 Strong, Art.(l908). The first section of this article was 
2. 
3. 
4. 
written before hearing James' discussion on "The Meaning 
and Criterion of Truth" at the meet:tng of the American 
Philosophic Association in 1907. The second sect:ton was 
written a few days later. In private discussion with 
James, the two men had reached complete agreement as to 
the facts of the case and James had accepted the account 
·given in the second section. In the third section, 
Strong offered his criticism. For this account, see his 
article, 256. 
Ibid., 259. 
Ibid., 260. 
Ibid., 261. 
Strong, is rather a matter of correspondence; such additional 
factors as consequences ought to be assigned primarily to 
the realm of utility and not to that of truth.l 
3. THE COGNITIONAL THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
i. Anticipations. In a series of three articles in 
1912, six years before the publication of The Origin of 
Consciousness, Strong discussed at length the nature of 
consciousness. Much of this material was specifically 
preparatory for the latter publication. For one thing, he 
rea~fir.med his epistemological dualism.2 A so-called 'image' 
can never be any more than "a medium for cognizing an object."3 
The relations of the image itself are not those of the object, 
except secondarily; they are primarily the relations of the 
brain event. 4 Self-transcending ~eference is a matter of 
"logical or intentional projection;" it is not mer~ly a given , 
psychological fact.5 
11. The Origin of Consciousness. When he comes to give 
extended consideration to his theory of consciousness in !he 
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Origin of Consciousness, Strong spends an even greater portion 
of his discussion d i rectly on epistemology. The aim of this 
volume is to clarify the apparent disparity in complexity 
between mind and brain process, and to expound more fully the 
nature of mind stuff and the origin of consciousness out of it.6 
1. Strong, Art.{l908) 2,263. 
2. Strong, Art.(l912), 543. 
3 • Ibid. , 544 • 
4 • Ibid. , 572. 
5. Ibid., 600-601. 
6. Strong, OC, 1. 
In the course of his discussion, Strong admits to 
several changes of view. One of the most important, 
epistemologically, is his treatment of datum and object.l 
Here, Strong is concerned to bring the two closer together 
than he had done in Why the Mind has a Body. The data are 
now looked upon as mental appearances of objects in the mind. 
"Our indirect and representative theory of perception has 
become a direct theory. n2 But Strong is still a dualist 
because the datum is not considered identical in every 
sense with the object. 
ii~. Givenness. One of Strong's most important 
expositions in the Origin of Consciousness is that of 
'givenness.' He begins by noting that "all experiences, 
in order .to be such, have to be given ••• An experience which 
is not given is not an experience."3 Psychic states and 
the function of awareness or givenness must not be confused. 
In agreement with James, Strong insists that "awareness is 
not a datum of experience."4 
1. Strong, OC, 5. 
2. OC, 8. That is, 'direct' in the sense that what is 
given is considered not as given but simply in 
itself. This completely refutes Klausner's view 
that in OC Strong was still a representationalist. 
3 • OC 1 31. 
4. oc' 32. 
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His terms are to be taken in the following meanings. 
An object is a real thing, existing in one continuous space 
and one continuous time."l An essence or datum is whatever 
is capable to being given (in the context either of sense 
perception or thought), "considered not as given but simply 
in itself."2 Consciousness is to be understood as awareness 
or givenness: it is the "function by which things are 
given."3 The ego or the self is the "being ••• to which things 
are given."4 A psychic state signifies the concrete state 
of the self on the basis of which things are given."5 
Two of Strong's most fundamental theses, in the light 
of the above analysis, are that the object as an existence 
is not given in sense perception, but only the object as an 
essence; and, that no givenness is given in additbn to the 
essence.6 Givenness is not an intrinsic attibute of what 
is given, since givenness is always to some one--what is 
given is distinct from the one to whom it is given.7 The 
vehicles of the givenness of essences are psychic states 
as well as sensations.8 But, representationalists are wrong 
when they hold that an essence which is given represents its 
object. If cognition is accurate, the essence is the essence 
1. Strong, oc, 35. 5. Ibid~ 
2. oc, 35-96. 6. Ibid. 
3. oc, 36. 7. oc., 37. 
4. oc, This is not to be understood 8. oc., 79, 95. 
as suggesting soul psychology. 
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of the object even though knowledge is nonetheless vehicular 
and precarious.1 
iv. The cognitional categories. Strong describes his 
entire analysis of cognition as resting on three categories 
(classes of things): the object, the essence, and the ego.2 
He says that if cognition were but intuition, two categories 
alone would be involved--the object and the ego.3 But, 
because of the vehicular nature of cognition, a third cate-
gory is involved--the function of consciousness through which 
the object is apprehended. 4 The psychic states function as 
symbols of the object; the experience of the object taken as 
a whole (to be distinguished both from the object and the 
psychic state by themselves) is, in -so , far as it is accurate, 
the essence of the object.5 This, Strong calls the object's 
'what' without its existence.6 
The basic characteristics of the object are its 
independence and continuous existence.7 The essence_~ since 
it is the object deprived of its particular space and time, 
is a universal . 8 The term ego designates the self so far as 
it exercises cognition.9 When involved in such activity, 
1. Strong, QC I 43. 6. oc, This is very close to 
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2• oc, 170. Santayana's concept of essence. 
3. Ibid. 7. oc, 171. 
4. Ibid. 8. oc, 177. 
5. Ibid . 9. oc, 181. 
the ego cannot be known any more than one can see him-
1 
self at the moment when he sees. The ego is knowable 
only the moment after when givenness (to be distinguished 
from what is given) becomes inferable. 2 This inference or 
hypothesis iS not, in ordinary experience, a conscious act, 
but is the same instinctive kind of thing involved in the 
common sense affirmation of external objects (especially 
when one assumes certain material objects to have existed 
unperceived by humans). 
The greate~illusion or fallacy about cognition 
arises out of neglecting the nature of knowledge as 
vehicular. This means that the essence is mistaken for 
~he object. 3 It fails to recognize that given-essence is 
not the object known: "because cognition is vehicular, 
it does not follow that it is not direct. 84 Given-essence, 
for Strong, is the object without its particular existence. 
Knowledge of a particular comes about only when instinct, 
through attention and motor attitude, uses the given-essence 
to the end of real knowledge of a real thing. 
Four factors are always present in introspective 
cognition as well as in sense perception: the object, the 
1. Strong, OC, 182. 
2. OC, 183. 
3. oc, 191. 
4. oc, 190-191. 
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cognitive state, attention, and a motor attitude. 1 
Attention and motor attitude go together, the latter 
2 
arising out of the former. Error is possible because, 
as Kant saw, given-essences might reveal nothipg, or at 
least nothing accurate, about an object's existential status. 3 
v. The perceptions of change and space. The essence 
given in the perception of change, duration, and succession 
in unquestionably a single block. 4 But it is illicit to 
conclude that both the object that is thus known and the 
psychic state that knows must be themselves indivisibly 
block-like. 5 Since change requires time, it is important 
to observe that, for Strong, time is composed of instants. 6 
Now, he admits that things cannot continue to exist in an 
instant, but insists that things must exist in instants. 
For change is necessarily from one state to 
another, and a changing thing can . be in a 
given state only an instant ••• There is no 
getting instants out of time, or, if they 
are there, denying that they are successi~e, 
and that each, as it comes, is a present. 
Strong supports this view with the observation that 
while a moving body must always be in some place, it cannot 
1. Strong, OC, 201. 5. oc. 
2. oc, 201-202. 6. oc, 257. 
3. oc, 208-209. 7. oc, 257. 
4. oc, 256. 
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be held to exist in two places at once, or, indeed be 
considered as passing from one to another without being in 
any place. 1 Motion is then the sum of a body's successive 
positions while the corresponding time is the sum of its 
successive instants. 2 
Lest it be thought that Strong is suggesting that 
instants alone make up time, he advises that their succession 
must not be left out of account. 3 If there is going to be 
any time, a plurality of instants must be considered to-
gether: the logic of time demands the recognitlon of its 
infinite divisibility and successiveness, which are not 
4 directly experienced, but deduced. 
On ~the other hand, the present that the individual is 
aware of is not an instant but an interval of determinate 
length, 1 the smallest duration that we can conveniently 
seize. 115 It is by a kind of 'primary memory' that the 
temporal parts of an event are compacted together into 
such an interval so that duration or change may ultimately 
be perceived. 6 
1. Strong, 00, 258. Quantum physics would seem to 
suggest otherwise as regards this latter point. 
2. oc. 
3. oc. 
4. oc, 258-259. 
5. oc, 259. 
6. OC, 261. His formulation does not seem to be secure 
from Zeno's objections. 
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As time cannot be conceived to have been derived out 
of an originally non-temporal existence, so space cannot be 
conceived to derive from t he non-spatial or from mere time.l 
Space is spontaneously and distinctly perceived when the 
elements between which it holds are discriminated.2 Actually, 
quality and space are coeval, interpenetrating each other.3 
Since all perception is correlated with a spatial process, 
perception must be held not only to be of space but to be 
in spe.ce.4 
vi. Summary of the process of knowing. There are real 
objects in space and time. When an object affects an indi-
vidual's content of experience, it is given to the self as 
exercising cognition (i.e., as ego). The three categories 
or classes of things upon which Strong's analysis rests are 
then: the object, the essence, and the ego. The term essence 
refers to the function of cognition through which the object 
is apprehended. Since the object, as such, does not enter 
consciousness, it is left to psychic states to function as 
symbols of the object. The experience of the object taken 
as a whole (to be distinguished both from the object and the 
psychic state by themselves), is, in so far as it is accurate, 
the essence of the object. This is the object's 'what' (con-
tent) without its 'that' (existence): it is a universal. 
1. Strong, OC, 289. 
2. oc, 290. 
3. oc, 294, 296. 
4. OC, 300. This would not appear to follow. 
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But, the. given essence is not the object known. Cog-
nition is vehicular: knowledge of a particular comes about 
only when instinct, through projection (cf. attention and 
motor attitude) uses a given essence to the end of real 
knowledge of a real thing. Thus, while an essence may be 
a single block, neither the object nor the psychic state 
need be. Knowledge is direct because the ego deals instinc-
tively with the essence, through projection, as if it were 
the real thing and not as a symbol. The ego knows the object 
directly as the eye sees the object directly e!en though the 
object is never in the eye. 
4. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Roy Wood Sellars analyzed Strong's theory of knowledge 
as approximating his own.l Yet, he felt that Strong had 
emphasized the directness of knowledge to such a degree as 
to threaten a lapse into neorealism.2 Further, to Sellars, 
Strong had failed to do justice to meanings and imageless 
thought; and, he is sceptical of the ability of psychic 
states to carry logical entities (essences).3 But Sellars 
does confess, "It [OC) has helped me to clarify my thoughts 
on many points and forced me to defend my own presuppositions.4 
i. The nature of the datum and the meaning of meaning. 
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In a series of articles following the publication of his Origin 
1. Sellars, Art.(l919), 314. 3. Ibid., 316-317. 
2. I bid. , 316. 4. I bid., 319. 
of Consciousness, Strong continued to defend and develop 
essentially the same perspective. In 1920, he contributed 
and essay entitled, "On the Nature of the Datum," to Essays 
in Critical Realism.l In this classic and influential sym-
posium on the critical realist position, Strong asserted 
that the nature of the datum is the crucial question in the 
problem of sense pereeption. 2 
He insisted that the datum is not the real thing (ob-
ject as such); or an ideal representative of 'the r.eal thing 
(representationalism); or an ideal thing, logical in its 
nature; or something psycholog ical in nature but real; or 
logical in nature, but real; but rather that it is " t he 
logical essence of the real thing."3 
Strong supports his position by arguments to show that 
the objects of consciousness in sense perception are not the 
actual external existences (the latter are rather believed 
in or affirmed). Nor, are they psychical or internal exist-
ences (either representative or non-representative of external 
existences). For Strong, to exist means to have being in both 
space and time. Universals then, in this sense, do not exist.4 
And, though they are entities, logical in nature, they are 
1. Drake, ECR, 223-244. 
2. Strong, Art.(l920), 223. 
3. Ibid. Strong would apparently apply this last to all 
sense perception. 
4. But, as E. S. Brightman suggests (Notes in Drake, MPN, 9 ), 
since the datum of consciousness does exist in time, there 
is no point in denying it this description. 
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not to be identified with what is perceived but are only 
"the det Bched concrete natures or 'essences' of those 
things." 1 This is a case, then, of psychological duali t y 
combined with logical unity: the essence embodied and the 
es.sence given are logically the same, when perception i .S 
veridical. 2 
One of the collaborators with Strong in the critical 
realist symposium offered in that same year an evaluation 
of Strong's theory of essence.3 He summarized Strong's 
view as follows: 
In knowledge we are, through the instrumentality 
of a psychical state, affirm!ng the presence, in 
an object independent of t he ... knowing experience, 
of an abstract logical essence, this objective 
essence alon~, and neither the object nor the 
essence's own "givenness" being given, or immedi-
ately apprehended.4 
Rogers feels that while Strong has not expounded, he 
has nonetheless suggested the real answer to the nature of 
knowledge: an identity between sensation and ob ject, in 
character, as far as is necessary to make cognition possible.5 
However, at the same time, Rogers finds the whole essence 
theory irrelevant; sensation plus instinct is sufficient for 
1. Strong, Art.(l920), 223-224. 
2. Ibid., 244. The emphasis here on essences being given 
indicates a preoccupation with the object of knowledge. 
As E. S. Brightman comments, "[This] emphasis on the 
epistemological object tends to obscure the activity 
of the self in knowledge" (Notes in Drake, MPN, 7). 
3. Rogers, Art.(l920). 
4. Ibid., 62. A psychical state is not a thought but a 
feeling. 
5. Ibid • , 70. 
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a sensat ion or image to function as an adequate cue to con-
duc t .1 Salter also found fault with the theory of essence, 
but from a different point of v iew, objecting that no clear 
and satisfying definition seemed to be available as to what, 
specifically, the essence of an object actually is. 2 
Ralph Barton Perry, in his review3 of Essays in Criti-
cal Re a lism, observed that although the conception of 
essence was suggested to Strong by Santayana, Strong was 
responsi ble for its identification wit h t he datum in sense 
percep tion.4 Perry cannot see how Strong can deny that 
t h e data themselves are the real things; in fact, it seems 
to him t hat Strong' s epistemology actually involves nee-
realism in his i nsistence on the directness of knowledge 
and the log ical ideality of the essence and the object.5 
Anothe r commentator described Strong 's avoidance of repre-
sentationalism in this fashion: 
Representationalism interposes between percipient 
mind and perceived object an immediate mental 
object; Strong expels this igtermediary from the 
psyche into a logical realm. 
Elsewhere,7 Strong describes sense perception as the 
lowest of the cognitive faculties; it is the point at which 
meaning first comes to exist for the mind. The function of 
meaning or intending, since Strong views it as depending on 
1. Rogers, Art.(l920), 71. 
2. Sal t er, Art.(l920), 306. 
3. Perry, Art . (l921). 
5 • Ibid. , 403. 
6. Gregory, Art.(l921), 363. 
7. St r ong, Art.(l921), 313. 
4. Ibid., 40Cn. 
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the bodily reaction to causal stimuli, lies without the mind;l 
it is symbolized in the mind only by a sensuous state. Thus, 
it is because of the physical relations between the object 
and the mind that the mind is enabled to mean the object.2 
Further aspects of the place of the external world in 
this epistemology crumout in an exchange between Bertrand 
Russell and Strong in reference to Strong's article on the 
meaning of meaning, and his estimate of his epistemic theory~ 
Strong reaffirmed appearances not as existences but as sensa-
tions used as signs.4 
The datum is the datum of the totality of the senses 
that focus on the object, and though grasped by means of 
sense, the datum is not really a sensible thing, but some-
thing understood or meant. 5 Vfben there is real knowledge, 
there is belief that the object exists as possessing the 
characters manifest in the appearance. 6 He agrees with 
Russell that a sensation is not in itself self-transcendent 
or knowing, but denies that a perception is simply a phys-
ical relation--Strong insists that it is a relation of 
significance. 7 
1. F.c.s. Schiller, Art.(l921), 447, judges the existence 
of personal meaning to be a pitfall for Strong. 
2. Strong, Art.(l922), 71. The position here is very close 
to James. 
3. See Strong, Arts.(l922), 1 & 2, and Russell Art.,(l922). 
4. Strong, Art.{l922), 313. . 
5. Ibid., 316. In Strong's final period he rejects this 
view and concludes that the datum is a particular, a 
phantasm. 
6. Ibid. 313. 
7. Ibid., 486. Of. Whitehead. 
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One of Strong's most interesting and entertaining 
expressions of the basic themes of his Origin of Conscious-
~~ occurs in his little book entitled, The Wisdom of the 
Beasts. In the form of fables, 1 he makes his arguments 
most telling and delightful. His purpose he records as 
follows: 
As I have been accused of an over-use of technical 
terms in my serious books, and of sacrificing the 
s t yle to the idea--a grave defect, I admit, in a 
philosopher--I have endeavored in these fables to 
say the same thing in words that he ~ho runs, or 
travels by train or motor, may read. 
Basically, the same epistemic theory as is found in 
The Origin of Consciousness is presented in this later 
volume. Special emphasis is laid upon the futility of 
either relativism or excessive abstraction. Though certainly 
Strong himself is guilty of this in his devotion to the 
spirit of physical science. 
The flavor of the whole is brought out well by the in-
stance of the top, who, having lost his momentum and finally 
lying motionless on the ground, sadly reflects that "if all 
motion can be looked at from two points of view, it is the 
point of view of the universe that prevails in the long run."3 
Or, as the tortoise said to Achilles, "it is better to be 
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safe and sound practically than safe and sound mathematically."4 
1. Cf. Lewis Carroll's writings. 
S. Strong, WB , v. 
3. WB, 6. 
4. VVB, 22. 
or, again, as the bee thought as it settled upon a flower, 
"One point of view is as good as another--if not better!Q 
ii. A THEORY OF KNOWlEDGE. In 1923 Strong published 
a small volume devoted, as its title, A Theory of Knowledge, 
suggests, entirely to epistemology. It represents substan-
tially the viewpoint of the Origin ·or Consciousness, but 
also serves to point ahead to the later culmination of his 
thought in the Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind, 
(1930). 
At the outset, Strong makes bold to suggest that his 
theory rests on the assumption that there is a real world 
in space and time and that the self is a part of it.2 He 
conceives of the self as immediate experience or feeling.3 
In immediate experience, he finds, in .agreement with Bradley, 
no distinction of subject and object.4 The object is appre-
hended by the combination of feeling (cf. sensation) and 
instinctive activity; this is the function which is desig-
nated intellect.5 Too often in epistemic theory, he warns, 
the sense datum is inadvertently substituted for the true 
datum of perception (the object as given).6 
Strong conceived his theory of knowledge to have a real 
bearing on life and action. He finds perhaps the most sig-
nificant aspect of his doctrine from this point of view to 
1. Strong, WB, 6. 4. TK, vii-viii. 
2. Strong, TK, vii. 5. TK, viii-ix. 
3. Ibid. 6. TK, viii, x. 
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be that all cognition or consciousness depends on an active 
tendency, with the result that willing and knowing are two 
sides of a single occurrence.l Instinct, he holds, is even 
more basic in the mental structure than intelligence.2 
Further, it is because the self is composed partly of sense 
that the experience of beaut~ is possible.3 The chief 
ethical need for practical life is an intelligence of the 
instincts with reference to~e needs of other people.4 
From an examination of cognitive experience, St r ong has 
concluded that all that is ever really, immediately grasped 
is in a present instant. Everything else is past and is 
known only by memory. 
Since the present along is real, Strong insists that 
the sel~ being present in the fullest sense, is the only 
line of advance or process there is; the past leads to the 
future only through it--it is the determining force.5 The 
infinite variety of reality guarantees novelty for man.6 In 
the nature of things, the human mind looks upon feeling and 
force as reality, and time and space as truth; but, they are 
all simply reality. 7 
1. Strong, TK, 81. 5. TK, 93-94. 
2. Ibid. 6. TK, 98. 
3. TK, 85. 7. TK, 101-102. 
4. TK, 92. Though this appears 
contradictory, it is still 
Strong's assertion. 
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In reviewing A Theory of Knowledge, A. K. Rogers 
commented that it amounted to a briefer sketch of Strong's 
The Origin of Consciousness, with commentaries and corol-
laries added.l One criticism he raised was what he eon-
sidered to be Strong's failure to realize that since the 
world appears to have qualitative essences, their presence 
in knowledge cannot be explained if one denies "to sense 
feelings the qualities traditionally ascribed to them 
by the empiricist."2 Another reviewer accused Strong of 
having constructed his analysis too much in terms of de-
veloped, visual experience and having assigned logic too 
high an epistemolog ical position.3 
In the spirit of his Theory of Knowledge, Strong com-
posed an article in the same year called, "A Vindication 
of Common Sense."4 Against Bergson and his followers, he 
asserted data of experience as not unqualified facts of 
sense, but rather, qualified objects.5 Bergsonians ever-
looked the fact that the belief that data reveal reality 
is an integral part of experience, and that belief is an 
element internal to the data.6 The true world of common 
sense contains these factors, What is more, Strong would 
substitute for Bergson's concept of intuition that of intro-
1. Rogers, Art.(l924), 313. 4. Strong, Art .. (1923). 
2. Ibid. , 314. . 
3. Storck, Art.(l924), 468. 
5. Ibid., 186. 
6. Ibid. I 193. 
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spection, which is essentially retrospective.l 
In an article entitied, "Epistle to a Neo-Realist,•2 
he turned again to the question of meaning. Here, he described 
meaning as that which is endowed upon whatever is used as a 
sign. If, for example, sensuous experienc~are used as signs, 
what is meant is the object(s), and th~ whole function may 
be described by the term knowledge. 3 Meaning is equivalent 
to essence; in fact, Strong now expresses preference for 
meaning as over against the purely logical term, essence.4 
In defense of his epistemic dualism, he says, "Are meanings 
not enough? Cannot the object be properly saluted unless 
it be embraced?"5 
5. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
i. The essentials of Strong's epistemology to this 
point. In general, as well as specifically in the case of 
external reference, Strong defines cognition as consisting 
of resemblance or correspondence (symbolism) and causation; 
the last factor meaning simply that the individual operates 
upon the object through the feeling elicited. The habitual 
activity of the race which makes subjective experience into 
knowledge proceeds on the basis of thought and action which 
are instinctive in their assumption that an independent 
reality is what is being dealt with. 
1. Strong, Art.(l923), 194. 
2. Strong, Art.(l924). 
4. Ibid. , 315. 
5. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 313. 
Perhaps his most important change epistemologically 
in The Origin of Consciousness was his abandoning of a 
representational theory of perception. What he now adopts 
he calls a direct theory, though in a dualistic context. 
111 
In this discussion, Strong's terms have the following mean-
ings. Object: real thing; essence: what is given in sense 
perce ption or thought, considered not as a content of con-
sciousness but as a logical entity or meaning; consciousness: 
awareness or givenness; psychic state: a concrete state of 
the self on the basis of which essences are given.l 
Representationalists are wrong in holding that an essence 
that is g iven represents its object. Strong insists that if 
cognition is accurate, the essence is the essence of the ob-
ject even though knowledge is nonetheless vehicular and pre-
carious. An essence is an accurate experience of an object 
taJ{en as a whole . This is to be distinguished both from the 
object and the psyc~ic state by themselves. Strong calls an 
.essence an object's 'what' without its existence. If cogni-
tion is not accurate, the essence is not the essence of the 
object to which it is attributed. 
The ego is the self so far as it exercises cognition. 
When so involved, the ego cannot be known any more than one 
can see himself when he sees. It is knowable only the moment 
1. An essence is given; only consciousness is givenness. 
after, when givenness (as distinguished from what is given) 
is inferrible. This process of inferring is intuitive or 
instinctive. 
Perc eption is a case of psychological and ex istential 
duality combined with logical unity: the essence embodiedin 
the object and the essence given are logically the same. 
Rogers criticized this essence view as unnecessary. He 
judged sensation plus instinct as sufficient to enable a 
sensation or image to function as an adequate cue for con-
duct. 
Strong admits that his epistemic theory rests on the 
as sumption that there is a real world in space and tima. 
Both time and space he feels must be conceived of as instants. 
Motion is the sum of a body's successive positions while time 
is the sum of its successive instants. The plurality in both 
cases is considered together. And, the present that an indi-
vidual is actually aware of is an interval, compacted together 
by a kind of 'primary memory,' as the smallest duration we 
can conveniently seize. The infinite divisibility of both 
time and space are not directly experienced, but deduced. 
The wider application of his epistemology he finds to 
stem primarily from his view that all cognition depends on an 
active tendency which implies that willing and knowing are 
but two sides of a single occurrence. This active t~ndency or 
instinct is more basic than intelligence. And, because the 
self derives at least part of its content and structure from 
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sense, the experience of beauty is possible. The chief 
ethical desideratum of practical life is an intelligence of 
the instincts with reference to the needs of other people. 
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Since, according to his time-instant theory, the present 
alone is real, the self, being present, is the only line of 
advance or progress there is for man. It is the determining 
force through which the past leads to the future. The infi-
nite variety of reality guarantees novelty for man. Reality 
is made up of force (or feeling) in time and space; however, 
the mind, from its subjective perspective, looks upon feeling 
and force as reality; and time and space as truth--though 
they all together constitute riality. 
ii. Crit;ique. Many topics that one is tempted to enter 
into at this point may be more profitably reserved for more 
extended discussion in the examination of Strong's metaphysics 
(to which the second division of this dissertation is devoted). 
There are, however, aspects that arise out of his epistemology 
that may well be discussed without venturing too far afield. 
To these, attention is now given. 
(1) Objective or external reference. One of the most 
characteristic assertions of Strong's vehicular theory of 
knowledge is that a subjectiye experience takes on objective 
or external reference when an essence is dealt with virtually 
as if it were the external object. Strong cites the fact that 
in ordinary experience one never finds himself operating in 
terms of an essence, but always in terms of the external 
object itself (if the essence in this case be that of an 
external object rather than the essence of one's previous 
thought, for example). 
Take the instance of driving a oar and swerving 
suddenly in the belief that one is about to run down a 
pedestrian. A moment later one may realize that what he 
took to be a pedestrian was nothing more than a configura-
tion of the .mist. However, the immediate and spontaneous 
response was in terms of what the configuration was instan-
taneously taken to be. 
It may be later reflected that all that the individual 
ever really possessed, in one sense, was a pattern in the 
field of his consciousness. However, this comes only later. 
The action that actually want on without reflection was in 
terms of the object. 
I.f the situation be epistemologically analyzed, and it 
be asserted that the datum or essence was interpreted as 
representing what was out there, Strong demurs. He advises 
that the interpretation is what the philosopher is engaged 
in. The actor in the situation reacts immediately and in-
stinctively. He normally takes the . datum for the object--no 
questions asked. Thus, Strong roots external reference in 
the instinctive response of the individual. 1 But it is even 
1. The instinctive urge thus bestows upon the essence the 
quality of externality~ 
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wider than this. ~fuat manifests itself in the individual 
is the result of the cumulative effect of the instinctive 
activity and experience of the race. 
(2) The purposive character of instinctive, epistemic 
response. Taking Strong's account, for the moment, as it 
stands, it is apparent that the category of purpose is the 
important factor in the whole theory. Starting with the 
ordinary individual's day to day experience, it is found 
that the knowledge venture,l from the point of view of the 
attitude and activity of the individual, depends on the 
implicit determination of the individual to act as if the 
essence were the object.2 
Now, although this may be described as an instinctive 
response, it is nonetheless a response. As a response (and 
the same . could be said analogously of a chemical reaction), 
it at least manifests something ·about the nature of the self 
(in this case) and the universe in which it is found. What 
is revealed is a pattern of adjustment which makes process 
(if not a kind of progress) possible; and, in the case of man, 
makes survival possible. 
1. As early as shortly after the publication of WMB , F.c.s. 
Schiller had written William James about Strong 's theory 
of knowledge as follows: Strong "admits that a 'will to 
find out' is an essential ; preliminary to finding out: 
in all knowing it is the wi ll which starts the process, 
while the final shape of our beliefs is moulded by the 
results of our experiments," (Perry, TCWJ, 241). 
2. Cf. Hume's propensity to believe. 
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Is this an instance of teleology? From the point of 
view of the investigator, it_ could certainly be spoken of 
as a kind of telic tendency. As E. s. Brightman comments, 
Purpose, in cons cious experience, is organization of 
means for the realization of an end; and in nature 
we find such organization whether or not we assert 
that it is due to conscious foresight or plan. 
Teleology is closely related to axiology, for the 
purpose asserted in the teleological theory is 
usually that of producing and preserving values of 
some sort.l 
Now, if the focal factor that makes self-transcending 
knowledge possible is. an instinctive, telic adapt ion, it 
would seem that any lack of the conscious experience of 
purpose would be balanced here by the depth of the telic 
response. Supposing with Strong that man as a purposive 
being is a later and accidental development from a universe 
tha.t is at heart ateleological, one would naturally expect 
to find man's purposive activity manifest essentially only 
on the periphery of his being, ·in like manner as are many 
of the late, cultural refinements of the more highly civil-
ized races. 
Teleological factors would be present only when man was 
active in a highly conscious fashion; when he lapsed into 
non-reflective states· or activity, the purposive would vanish 
and the mechanical would take over. But, this is not what is 
found. According to Strong, the very heart of conscious 
1. Brightman, ITP, 245-246. 
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activi t y is found upon analysis to proceed unreflectingly 
. as a purposive process. This would seem to locate telic 
process deep in the essential nature of man. 
If Strong should respond that an individual's instinc-
tive response, which seems purposive, is but the result of 
the cumulative conditioning of the development of the race, 
the teleological is still not banished. I t might be asked 
how the first purposive responses happened to arise. There 
would h ave been no weight of the ages in such a case. The 
response would either be purposive in itself, or would 
represent a tra i t which man would possess because of his 
· continuity with the universe which produced him. The appeal 
to chance as the source would be the admission of ·total 
i nability to offer any explanation at all. 
Vfhat then as to the nature of the universe? It would 
certainly appear to have a very strong teleological factor 
in it to be able to: (1) adapt means, through long ages to 
the production of man, (2) constitute man a being who would 
reflect this power of adaptlon at the core of his being and 
in the most es sential activities of his living. 
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(3) The role of essences. Strong's epistemology has 
been taken a s presented. But, is it adequate? The crucial 
issue upon which the adequacy of Strong's epistemology may 
well turn is well formulated in the criticism by A. K. Rogers. 
He judges the introduction of essence to be unnecessary in 
Strong 's theory. He a sks why, for the purpose of an adequate 
cue to conduct, sensation plus instin t are not sufficient. 
Strong's answer would undoubtedl be that since the 
epistemic situation involves psycholo ical and existential 
duality; then, if there is to be any nowledge at all, if 
though t is ever to reach its object, n element of unity 
(or cont inuity) must be posited. Thi element Strong de-
scribes as the logical unity and cent nuity of the essence: 
the essence embodied in the object an the essence given are 
logically the same. 
From one point of view it would eem that Rogers is 
suggesting that the datum is unnecess ry. All one needs, 
for example, is the sensation plus tinct. This would not, 
however, seem to bear inspection. , certainly, the indi-
vidual experiences an object in nsciousness whi le the 
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object, as such, is not there. ~~at ogers would be deecribing 
on his interpretation would seem bett r illustrated by the 
experience of reflex reaction. case, there is sensa-
tion and response, but it would be spoken of an illus-
trative of the much more complex and ualistic tone t hat 
characterizes the usual experience o an external object. 
Roger's suggestion, from this point view, would actually 
seem to fit quite well with solipsis • 
However, it may be that Rogers 
the object as given, though ideal (a 
of its being immediately present), 1 
than in any sense logical. 
s simply asserting that 
not real in the sense 
psychological rather 
the problem of meaning 
arises. If the object as given is on y psychological, how 
can this psychological datum ever be aised to the level 
of being known in a conceptual sense? As Strong says in 
regard to a feeling, it can be ui~hed from one's 
thought about it, but when it is thou ht, it is trans-
formed into an object of thought. 
that unless the psychological were i 
(and the logical psychological) in 
, it would seem 
some sense logical 
nature (at least 
it must be capable of being conceptu lized) it could never 
be grasped by the concept. This is suggest that an 
essence must be thought--only that i 
being thought. Quali·a would not the 
transformed into logical definitions 
must be capable of 
be artificially 
Further, error could 
arise at any point in the cognitive recess--hence knowledge 
is, as Strong says, precarious. Wha is more, if to be cap-
able of being known, reality must be able to appear in psy-
chological-log ical form, not only is Rogers refuted, but 
Strong's epistemology would strongly hint of an idealistic, 
if not personalistic, metaphysics. verything here would 
fit perfectly with a thorough-going, teleological metaphysics. 
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Further, the unity of self-expe suggests that it is 
highly doubtful that there be a psychological 
experience that would be completely of logical elements 
(in the above sense). It would r then that something 
more is needed than a sensation and nstinctive response 
thereto (by the ego which does the i erring) to explain the 
experience and adaptation of the indi idual in terms of 
his environment. 
Strong introduced essences betwe n sensations and 
instinctive response, though he, of c urse, continues to 
insist that it is the ego that does e instinctive infer-
ring. The question is what is the 
how does it respond. If its being 
in a purely mechanical fashion the a 
faced Rogers' account would remain 
introduced. Now there seems to be 
this mechanical process is what 
of Strong's introduction of 
The answer seems to be that 
the deficiencies of a pure mechanism 
factors. 
ure of such an ego and 
activity are construed 
e difficulties that 
n though essences be 
reason for denying that 
intended. What then 
d emphasis on logic? 
attempting to correct 
y bringing in these 
The difficulty is, as Rogers sa , that these factors do 
not belong in such a system as has outlined unless 
the mechanistic orientation is But, Strong is 
determined not to give up any of the And here is 
his error. Essence {as he interpret it) and logic have no 
real meaning apart from a teleologic 1 perspective. Strong's 
position at this point may ed as recognizing the 
necessity of those factors which onl teleology can yield 
while asserting that they can be der ved from a mechanism. 
The inadequacy of this conc lusion is mirrored in Strong's 
failure to do any more the.n merely a sert it. He not only 
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does not show how such is possible, h emphasizes the so-
called mechanism of knowing so strong y that the appearance 
of the purposive can be nothing but a inexplicable emer-
gence--which latter is just what he 
And, what is more, Strong says 
ties of the logical type, the 
external objects. This would seem 
the possibility of a Platonic idea o 
nts to avoid. 
at essences are enti-
concrete natures of 
involve, at very least, 
Aristotelian form 
being somehow embodied in the object. In knowledge, this 
form would be detached, as it were, rom the object: and 
take up residence in the conscious experience of knowing 
even though for Strong the object wo still be known 
directly because responded to direct 
us that all percept ion is but low-le 
Indeed, Strong tells 
conception. 
Th is means, then, that the esse ce is the true vehicle 
through which the object is cognized But if, as Strong says, 
the essence is the '.,what' of the obj ct divorced from its 
existence, how is it possible to a Earticular object? 
It would seem that all that could ev r he possessed on this 
basis would be a general idea. How ould knowledge of a 
singular existence in a particular 1 cation in space and time 
ever be obtained? 
This would seem to amount, in S rong's system, to the 
question of how the idea of external ty (in detail) ever 
arises. He would answer that the ex licit idea arises only 
upon sophisticated analysis; while, t is always implicit 
in the attitude (motor and otherwise) of the individual. In 
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other words, the essence as external d particular is 
affirmed instinctively. This solutio 1 however, is not 
completely satisfying to Strong in al respects, for later 
he will detail more carefully the pla e of essence and the 
nature of instinct in his epistemolog • Further evaluation 
of this point will be reserved until 
(4) Time, space, and the wider 
tions of Strong's epistemology. 
and space as a plurality of successiv 
quately dealt with only from the pers 
However, since he attempts to ground 
ology, it should be noted that he is 
eleological implica-
g's conception of time 
instants can be ade-
of metaphysics. 
in his epistem-
orced to admit in the 
case of time that what the individual is actually aware of 
is an interval or span; i.e., a specious present. Vmen 
he goes on to say that the infinite ivisibility of time 
and space are not experienced but de uced, it becomes clear 
that his concepts here are primarily metaphysical in their 
derivation. If anything, the epi s ter ic situation itself 
would suggest the Bergsonian concep of time as real dura-
tion. 
As for the relation of Strong's epistemology to his 
metaphysics, it is perhaps significa t to observe that in 
the volume devoted entirely to an e osition of his theory 
of knowledge, Strong admits that his epistemology rests on 
the assumption of the existence of a real world in space and 
time. In other words, his epistemol gy is not an attempt to 
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come at the knowledge situation in th most empirical 
fashion possible; it is rather an mpt to analyze cog-
nitive experience in the light of ain metaphysical 
postulates that have already been pted.1 
In the corollaries Strong himsel deduced from his 
epistemology, instinct played a 
him all cognition depends on an 
eludes that willing and knowing 
occurrence; and further, that 
intelligence.2 He then bases the 
experience on some aspects of the 
ental part. Since for 
tendency, strong con-
t two sides of a single 
t is more basic than 
sibility of aesthetic 
f not being of the 
nature of intellect. For an adequat ethics, what is chiefly 
needed is an intelligent ordering of our instincts. 
According to his epistemio anal sis, Strong concluded 
that only the present Even the specious 
present is an illusion. Thus, he i ers that the self, being 
in the present, is the only line of dvance or progression of 
reali t y there is. 3 
There wider applications of epistemology appear 
prime facie to disclose a rather exp icit metaphysics. This 
1. 
2. 
3. 
In this, Strong resembles most m 
their conviction as to the propr 
metaphysics before entering in d 
The following chapter will treat 
of the instinct factor. 
The nature of time and space wil 
consideration in the section on 
taphysical realists in 
ety of settling one's 
tail into epistemology. 
in detail strongts .use 
receive extended 
etaphysics. 
metaphysics seems to take the specifi conclusions of his 
epistemology as occasions to focalize their expression. 
The fact and validity of aesthetic ex erience, for ex:.a.i-nple, 
strong assumes without difficulty or iscussion. He then 
finds in his epistemology certain 
support it. Our instincts are also 
cal matters. The only real problem 
and application. Intelligence, its 
ors that seem to 
be trusted in ethi• 
their organization 
already fore-
shadowed in the very nature of cognitive experience, has 
this task delegated to it. 
Perhaps the more important usion to be questioned 
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is Strong's opinion that instinct is more basic than intelli-
gence. If willing and knowing are 
occurrence experience of the self, 
is the more basic aspect? Indeed, 
guided my intelligence, is it 
is, consequently, more basic? 
two sides of a single 
assume that instinct 
instinct has to be 
sible that intelligence 
Strong might reply that althoug this activity of in-
telligence would show that lntelllge ce is a guide to exper-
ience, there is nonetheless somethin which intelligence does 
not create, but can only seek to 
fore, the latter is more basic. 
on the other hand that instinct 
ct--1nstinct.1 There-
ver, it might be noted 
t create intelligence 
and cannot even guide it in anything but a rudimentary fashion. 
1 • . In the cognitive situation, inte ligenee corrects and 
renders instinct meaningful. 
Here, perhaps is where part of the ent orientation of 
Strong's thought comes out. He is ermined to revolve 
all apparently purposive activity int mere motor response. 
Hence, he arbitrarily selects instinc as basic because 
intelligence cannot function without t. The fact that 
the dependence may be mutual he never takes into considera-
tion. 
Thus, he insists that 
instinct is always what is depended 
ledge experience 
on. If it were 
suggested on the contrary that witho t intelligence in the 
knowledge experience all knowledge w uld be swept away 
(intelligence without instinct, ding to Strong's own 
analysis, should leave at least elf-transcending know-
ledge), Strong would appeal to anima life. 
Instinct without intelligence i actually represented 
in the lower orders of life. There re, on the other hand, 
no instances (at least pervasive) of intelligence without 
instinct. Therefore, intelligence, later arrival in 
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the evolutionary process, is less ba In this way, Strong's 
fundamentally naturalistic metaphysi revealed as having 
all along hovered in the background. It may be spoken of as 
naturalistic, since an appeal utionary development 
would not support instinct as intelligence 
unless there were coupled with it th metaphysical hypothesis 
that mind (at least in the sense of ntelligence) ·could not 
be the ultimate and most basic aspec of the real. In other 
126 
words, his epistemic interpretations ould not be maintained 
unless the teleological were ruled ou from the beginning. 
6. TRANSITIO 
This chapter has traced the development of Strong's 
epistemology to the point where the issues arise which 
ultimately led to the position rth in his Essays on 
the Natural Orisin of the Mind ), and A Creed for 
Sceptics (1936). After the publicat of the latter vol-
ume, the further elaboration of his 
in a number of important journal 
these (194i) was composed on his 
was expressed 
The last of 
and to a degree 
represents the final synthesis of hi total thought. The 
next chapter will trace epistemolog lly this line of devel-
opment. It will also present a tele logical summation of 
his epistemology. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FINAL FORM OF STRONG'S E ISTEMOLOGY: 
INTUITION, INTENT, AND ANI MAL FAI H DISTINGUISHED 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is devoted to Charle Augustu.s Strong's 
final ep istemological formulations. expos i tory sections 
are centered about h is last two volumes, Essays on the 
Natural Origin of the Mind (1930) and Creed for Scentics 
(1936). In the years that ·lie betwee the publication of 
these works, a number of articles app Likewise, from 
1936 until his death in 19401 Strong ontinued his journalistic 
activity. The l atter part of this fi al chapter on Strong's 
epistemology is concerned to survey a his complete 
theory of knowledge from the perspect ve of its implications 
for metaphysics and teleology, as wel as in terms of its own 
inner structure. It shows that in sp te of Strong's determina-
tion to avoid teleology by the reduct on of epistemology to 
physiological psychology, he was comp lled t o appeal to 
purposive factors. Indeed, intent as well as animal faith, 
is in effect the introduction of purp se as essential to 
his analysis of knowledge. 
1. His lgt article: "Final Observat ons." It was seen 
through the press by his friend a d a3s ociate, Daniel M. 
Cory. Cory was close to both Str ng and Santayana. 
Cf. his articles on the l a tter in the Schilpp volume 
and i n The Journal of Ph ilosophy, 51(1954), 5?-61. 
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This chapter further shows that though survival 
functions for St r ong as a teleological end (itself a contra-
diction of his ateleological position), the concept of sur-
vival alone is unable to explain the n n-survival values of 
knowledge. Further, Strong's introduc ion of essences into 
his epistemo logy is inexplicalbe and i consistent in the light 
of his extreme emphasis on the mechani m of knowledge. And 
~8 
that emphasis, coupled with his preooc pation with sense 
perception, make Strong's account of s lf-experience essentially 
unintelligible. 
All of this roots in the fact tha Strong's metaphysics 
was determinative for his epistemology The cardinal principle 
of his metaphysics was the natural ori in of the mind from 
the physical universe. In other words 
ruled out from the beginning. 
thet teleological was 
spite of this, 
teleological factors are involved in e ery crucial point in 
his epistemology, and themselves imply a teleological 
metaphysics as their source. 
2. ESSAYS ON THE NATURAL ORI IN OF THE MIND 
i. Intuition and intent. In his preface, Strong 
records his avoidance in this volume f the term 'appearance' 
a.nd the substitution for it of •sense datum•. 1 Also, he now 
distinguishes, in agreement with Santay na, intuition from 
intent as functional relations enterin into the perceptive 
act. It is the datum of intuition to ich he refers when 
be makes use of the term sense datum. 1 Klausner advises 
of another characteristic of this volu the continued 
repudiation of representationalism. 2 also ceases to 
regard the datum exclusively as an ess it is now a 
particular (cf. phantasm)~ He observe that his purpose has 
been to construct an evolutionary psyc One of the 
most effective helps to this end be fi in physiological 
psychology and the relation between ne ve processes and 
corresponding mental states. 5 
The fundamental propoation of an volutionary psychology 
is: the self in so far as composed of feelings (as the 
nervous process is composed of motions in matter) must be 
distinguished from the activities of t e self which are 
essentially functions.6 The functions of perceiving and 
1. Strong, ENOM, v. 
2. Klausner, KBS, 151. 
3. Cf. Strong, ENOM, 92, "The sense-d tum •.. while in its 
nature an 'essence•, is in percept on always predicated 
of a real thing, and therefore, in use, a particular." 
In this sense be speaks of the dat m as a phantasm--
the content of an obj~ct (form, gh st) without i ts 
existence until it is 'predicated. 
4. ENOM, 2. 
5. ENOM, 5. 
6. ENOM, 7. 
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remembering rest in the use of the 
(which they go to make up) for 
external or past things before 
elings by the self 
rpose of bringing 
And, the added 
factors in this situation are not on y these 'other 
things' as they are made to appear, ut also other 
2 things as they really are. matically reacting 
self uses sensations, for example, a signs of external 
3 
objects. 
Awareness is thus a function using "non-self-
transcendent and intrinsically unaw feelings as signs. 11 4 
For this reason, awareness cannot b a datum of observation 
because, "a function which is only use •.. cannot appear 
sensibly before the mind as a physi al object or feeling 
5 
can." Since feelings are non-cogn tive in themse.lves, 
they are not known in the moment of their existence; they 
are but components through which th functioning self 
makes possible the knowledge of som object.6 Thus even 
a feeling as it is must be distingu shed from that feeling 
as it later appears as an object of knowledge--something 
else in consciousness stands symbol cally for it at a 
? later time. 
1. Strong,ENOM, 2. 
2. ENOM, 8. 
3. ENOM, 10. 
4. ENOM, 13. 
5. ENOM 10, 
6. ENOM 14. 
?. Ibid 
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Objects in perception are, furt er, related in a two-
fold way to the observing organism: "they call forth 
sensory perceptions in it," and "the provoke the organism 
to a reaction addressed to them."l he •sensible picturing' 
(as it were) of the object is design ted intuition; while, 
the mental reference to it as an exi tent l iS to be denoted 
intent.2 These are functional aspec s of a single 
perceptive act. 3 But, the sense dat m (datum of intuition) 
is not the immediate object of knowi 
object in and through perception is 
4 thing. The fallacy of representati 
the only such 
real external 
is the assertion 
that the real thing is known by infe ence or by some other 
si.plilar mode. 5 
Strong confesses ::to past sins, 
engaged in condemning. He sums his 
follows. In 1903 (Wh the Mind has 
a representationist who did not yet 
that 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
had to be made, as s.bove, betwe 
Strong, ENOM, 16. 
ENOM, 16. His use of 'picture' 
( ENOM, 20n) notes 1s only to rend 
It is really, of course, not a p 
Ee above. 
Ibid. 
ENOM, 18. 
Ibid. 
uch as he is now 
evelopment up as 
he says he was 
distinction 
n feeling and 
trong elsewhere 
r the concept vivid. 
cture, but a predicate, 
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awareness. 1 onsciousness), he feels 
that certain excessively subjective spects have been 
dropped, but he was still a represen ationist. 2 It has 
been seen in the previous t this is not strictly 
or completely true. Following , Klausner designated 
The Ori gin of Consciousness as uing representationism. 
An actual study of the source reveal d that Strong had, at 
least implicitly, dropped representa ionism by that time. 
Indeed, there are explicit expressi s within it to this 
effect. The resolution of this discrepan~y is to be fo~~d 
in the matter of degree of Certainly it must 
be admitted that Strong disavowal of 
representationism in a much more em atic way in the 
Essays on the Natural Ori in of the Mind, than in the 
previous publication. 
This conclusion is supported b the fact that while 
Strong says that representationism to him up until 
the writing of his Essays, as a mat in his 
contribution to Essa s in Critical he disavowed 
representationism in so many words above). The 
answer to the apparent contradictio then lies in the state 
of mind and degree of emphasis with which Strong approached 
the question. 
1. Strong , ENOM1 21. 
2. Ibid. 
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1 
Strong confirms this opinion in an article referring 
to his state of mind at the time of publication of 
Essays in Critical Realism. He says feels, though he 
is not sure, that he was not then su ficiently conscious 
of the distinctness of the essence f om the sensuous 
experience. But he brings out that his was only a matter 
of his own subjective state anyway. 
Actually it would be better for him to speak of ceasing 
to regard the datum as an essence. ow it is rather a 
particular (or phantasm) and the log cal essence becomes 
an abstraction from it. He insists ow on what he calls 
substantialism: the real thing is d stinct from the datum 
but is apprehended in that form. 2 " he sense datum is ·only 
a predicate by the ascription of whi h the character of 
3 the real thing is known~' 
ii. Animal faith. Even where real object appears 
falsely in perception, Strong insist that "it is still the 
real thing and not any 'appearance' r immediate ob j ect 
1. · --Strong, Art. ( 1924). 
2. Strong, ENOM, 22. 
3. ENOM, 23. Strong directs his re der to two writings 
by his associates which he says epresent his present 
view (see ENOM, 29n). The first is Drake, Mind and 
Its Place in Nature. On the pro uction of this 
volume Strong collaborated. The second provides 
further exposition of "the parti 1 coincidence of 
the apparent with the real": Mo tague, !be Ways of 
Knowing. 
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1 distinct from the real thing, that ap ears." Strong attempts 
to ground this position in the view t at sense data are 
'phantasms' produced by the cooperati n of sentience and 
action. 2 Action (motor response) ref rs to the way in which 
we behave on occasion of a state of s ntience which i s in 
us; this causes a phantasm(generated y the state) "to 
appear outside us, at a greater· or le ser distance and more 
or less enlarged. 13 Thus all ta, even when they 
are true, are in one sense of re of illusion-- when 
intuiting ceases, they cease to exist. 4 Since they are 
data of real things, they are, in 
appearances. But, since they are 
such, Strong speaks of them in this 
Strong considers that the only 
ng's terms, not mere 
the real things as 
as illusions. 
ature of his theory 
which is really new is the ascription to action or behavior 
of the role of causing the sense dat to arise and of 
equipp ing it with certain of its cha Sensations 
are thus composed of a multiplicity f parts of the nervous 
process not observ~e in their minut ness, so the datum 
itself is simple, or one.6 If the p rts of sentience are 
1. Strong, ENOM, 2?. Le., what is istorted is the real object. 
2. ENOM, 28. 
3. Ibid. It is also simplified as ell as enlarged. 
4. ENOM, 29. 
5. ENOM, 29-30. 
6. ENOM, 62. 
primarily temporal, they give rise, r r example, to the 
specious present; if they have a ·_ temp ral rhythm, because 
they differ from one another in inten ity, and also possess 
a complex spatial arrangement, "the d produced by 
simplification is a sensible quality. 
In most respects, Strong express s agreement with 
Santayana: perception involves intui ion, intent, and 
animal faith, all involved in motor r action to sensory 
2 impressions. Intent designates refe an object; 
the sense datum or givenness is what s meant by intuition; 
animal faith is the unquestioning att tude which "predicates 
the sense-datum of the external thing n3 
When one falsely perceives somet ing to exist which 
in fact does not, the phantasm may be said to be deficient 
possessing no characters of 4 in any ex ernal existence. 
Any 'apparent 1 thing (when true of th object) is a case 
of the combination of the datum of in uition, and intent. 5 
When intent is eliminated, a kind of ogical essence is 
all that is left.6 Strong calls the sense datum in this 
1. Strong, ENOM, 63. Bergson, says trong, first drew 
attention to this process and gav it a name. 
2. ENOM, 92 and note. 
3. ENOM, 92-93. 
4. ENOM, 96-9?. 
5. ENOM, 97. 
61 ENOM, 97-98. 
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sense a qualified shape. But, since i is not referred to 
any position in space and says that it is 
possessed only "of a certain kind of 1 gical being."1 
Apparently he simply means by this tha an es.sence exists 
only as thought. 
In truthful peroe~tion (if ever p 
entirely truthful) the apparent t 
real thing are identical both as 
and as to character ••• In intent t 
thing and the real thing are alwa 
As to character Lidentiti7 is mad 
the fact that the sense-datum is 
Lin an abstract sensi7 This acco 
identity •.• differs from that offe 
current nee-realism, in that it a 
possibility of purely perceptual 
distinguished from error of inter 
and our ~heory is therefore a for 
realism. 
rception is 
ing and the 
o existence 
e apparent 
s identical ••• 
possible by 
n essence 
nt of •.• 
ed by 
m1ts the 
rror •.• as 
ret at ion ••• 
of critical 
'Thought' designates in a broad s nee, every state of 
3 
awareness in which the object of aware ess is absent. 
4 Thought merely uses the knowledge gained in acquaintance. 
In acquaintance, the real thing with ich one is acquainted 
5 
is actually present. But, the objects which are given in 
acquaintance "are known only by the use of ~elings as signs, " 
and this use 1s instinctive. 6 And awareness, as necessary 
for all these processes and implied b them, must be 
conceived of as a unity. 
1. Strong, ENOM, 98. 4. Ib 
2. ENOM, 111-113. 5. Ib 
3. ENOM, 192. 6. EN 232. 
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3. THE F I NAL FORM OF STRONG' f:, EPISTEMOLOGY 
i . St ron..&.!_.s own summary of his e istemolo to this 
£Oint. St rong's summary of emology was given in 
connection wi th his article in the v lume , ContemEorary 
American Philosophy, II, edited by ams and Montague. 
He says he orig ina lly began bjectivist doctrine 
o f perception in whi ch real t h ing s re represented by 
phenome nal objects.l He later came o feel that this was 
essentially a denial of significance to the phenomenon 
and to the real object. 2 
The truth , I now t hink , is that phenomenal 
t hin g and real t h ing are always identified 
in the view of the naive perci ient and for 
h is intent, but in fact , are i some respects 
i dentical and in other respects not so, 
according as perception is veri ical or 
erroneous.3 
His earlier view, Strong feels, did not explai n why 
the psychical (i.e . non-physical) r 
phenomenally as the brain is connec 
exi s tents that appear as the rest o 
outlying 
body . 4 The 
adoption of a non-representative vi w of perception and 
the log ical the ory of essences m_a_r_k~~-h_e ___ s_  a~y_s~J __ a_n __ e~p~o_c_h_ 
in his t~inki~ .5 Introspection sh 
(eleme nts ) of the se l f consists in 
t hat the nature 
1. Strong , Art .(l930 ), 314 . 4. Ibid. , 315. 
2. Ibid. 5. Ibid. , 315-316. 
3. Ibid. 6. Ib d . , 316 . 
137 
He admits a great indebtedness o James, but calls 
his will-to-believe ''the :rm.keshift of a mind not free 
from credulity."l There is no knowl dge without attention 
and no attention without some sort o bodily response, 
which g i ves direction upon an object and converts me re 
feeling into awareness .2 Strong con.'iders that the self 
is made up of elements of feeling (p ychic atoms). These 
feelings are not conscious in themse ves but by their 
functioning together yield awareness I ntrospection is 
~ 
self-awareness.'-' That anything e x is s can be known only 
by animal faith, what t h ings 
the psychologi cal process is 
exercise of more animal faith.4 
Nervous events as part o f the 
reveal only the ti~e outlines , not 
be known, as far as 
d, only by the 
nctioning media, can 
e inne r nature , of 
external things.5 But , in i ntrospection, since one psychical 
state is used as a sign for another just preceding, . the 
real thi ng and t he vehic le by which it i s presented are 
alike . 6 Here , all that need be tak n into consideration 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
I; 
...... 
6. 
Strong, Art.(l930), 317. This 
Strong ' s own acceptance of anim 
Ibid ., 319. 
Ibid ., 321. 
Ibid. 
I b id. In s o far as isomo~hism 
t he f i e ld theory must be critic 
difference between neural proce 
the indivisible , active agent t 
Art., [1946], 469 ). 
Ibid ., 322 . 
strangely with 
s also implied here, 
zed as i gnoring the 
ses and ideas and losing 
the field (see Eertocci , 
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is the solipsistic situation. s reasonably assume 
that the nature which introspection eveals (i.e., feeling) 
is the true nature of the feeling co In all feelings, 
detectable; it may therefore be theo that "feeling, 
or something which by integration gi to it, is 
the reality which is spread ~ut in s 
Strong catalogues his epistemol combination of 
sensationalism and behavior1sm. 3 Th end of perception is 
A. 
the better regulation of conduct.- the self 
is functional and not existential. 5 The problem of 
perception and the relation of mind o body are fundamental 
for philosophy. 
ii. Develo mente subse uent to he ublication of 
ESSAYS ON THE NATURAL ORIGIN OF THE IND. In an article 
the follww1ng year6 Strong continued to defend his latest 
formulation. He insisted that altho gh the sense datum is 
in a sense representative, perceptio by means of it is 
direct, involving the real thing, it character and its 
1. Strong, Art.(l930), 322. 
2. Ibid. The metaphysical implicat ons of this wil l be 
taken up in Part II. 
3. Ibid. I 323. 
4. Ibid., 324. 
5. Ibid., 327. 
6. Strong, Art.(l931). 
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existence. Later, writing on the sub ect-object relation, he 
defined cognition as a device of natu e whose ,· object is to 
"enable animals to adjust themselves o their environment and 
1 
and so survive." Yet, at the same t me, he warned that the 
distinction between subjec~-object re ation and physical causa-
tion, the organi c and inorganic, must not be blotted out. 
Elsewhere,2 Strong spoke of data as depicting real things; 
thus, they must not be said to , but to link. This 
however, is a logical linking, nothing could ever 
bridge the psychological duality of d tum and object. But 
again, since consciousness arises out of the natural world, 
it wo~ be strange if the nature of t e real were unknowable. 3 
In his last book, A Creed for Se tics(l936), Strong took 
a retrospective view of the years of is study of epistemology 
and described his development as havi slowly. His 
attempt to eliminate errors and make improve@ents sometimes led 
4 to the transformation of aspects of thought. 
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His ultimate conclusion, he 
things are real and perception is a 
or common sense: 
them. 5 This view 
is built on the duality of sense dat real thing, and 
internal perception as analogous to xternal (as symbOliC and 
retrospective). It provides a real elf to which sense data 
can be given. Sense data are produc d by the fusion and 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Strong, Art.{l932)~. 
Strong, Art.(l932) • 
Strong, Art.(l934) 
4. 
5. 
St 
CF 
l. 
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projection of atoms of sent1ence. 1 A sound theory of perception, 
he says, is "the necessary propaedeut c and starting point of 
philosopby."2 
Sense data are not photographs b t symbols of reality. 
Yet, as Klausner observes, the datum s no longer to be taken 
3 as a universa~. · However, by abstrac ion from the datum, 
an essence, which is a universal, can be derived. This offers, 
says Strong, the aivantage that ident ty can be asserted 
between the character as embodied in he object and the 
character as intuited, wledge of the real 
thing possible.4 Yet, is no more given than 
the real existence; both are present nly through substitutes.5 
In a letter to Klausner, Strong d to one distinction, 
at this point, as rooted in the fact hat the datum is 
"given at one real time and permits c gnition of an object 
which is in another."6 
As ~or the place of instinct in he knowing process, 
Strong speaks of instinctive response 1n· .. ~ ttse of a sense organ 
and with the trust that there are re 1 objects at such a 
7 point in reality. If he is to surv ve, man "needs to know 
1. Strong, CFS, vi. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Klausner, KBS, 222. 
4. Strong, CFS, 28 . 
5. 
6. 
?. 
1 29 o 
usner, KBS, 224 and note. 
ong, CFS, 22. 
the truth about the difficult world in which he is called 
upon to live.n1 In addition to being biological necessity, 
instinctive trust is 11 a natural ubitable right." 2 
Of course, according to his senso y-motor theory of 
awareness, only the object is known wh le only the datum 
is given. 3 In his last article, Stron continued to insist 
that we see things themselves and know them to some extent as 
they are. Proof of the validity of kn wledge rests .·on th~ 
fact that 11 the materials out of which he datum is formed 
are part of the real world." 4 These m terials are sense 
impressions and motor reactions. 
4. GENERAL SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF STRONG'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
i. Survey. (1) The nature of 
intuition intent, and animal faith. 
to construct an evolutionary phycholo 
defined as composed, in part, of elem 
e sense datum; 
trong's purpose is 
The self is 
feelings, while 
its activities are the functions or t e use of the self makes 
of the feelings. Since awareness is function or use, it 
cannot be a datum of observation as a feeling or physical 
object can. The sensible picturing ( ense datum) of an 
1. Strong, CFS, 40-41. 
2. CFS, 16. 
3. Strong, Art.(l939)1 
4. Strong, Art.(l941). 
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object he calls intuition; 
an existent, intent. 
·, 
reference to it as 
of 
St~png feels that only by the me of the publication 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e~M~i~n~d did he sueceed 
in ridding himself of representation sm. Actually, it is 
only a matter of degree of emphasis o which he can be 
referring. Or to be more specific, be last mentioned 
volume is better described as presen ing the disavowal 
of the datum (in use) as an essence and the acceptance of 
it as a particular. Since the 
is always predicated of a real 
particular. He thus speaks of the 
that is, the content of an object 
without its existence until it is 
Phantasms are produced by the coope 
datum in perception 
is, in us~ a 
as a phantasm; 
ghost) 
of the object. 
sentience 
and action. When a certain state o sentience if brought 
about in us, it elicits a motor res which causes a 
phantasm, which in turn is projecte (by animal faith) 
and simplified. 
Perception thus involves ion, intent, and 
animal faith. All three rise out o motor reaction to 
sensory impressions. Animal faith s the unquestioning 
attitude which predicates the sense datum of the external 
thing. If animal faith and intent re eliminated, the 
datum of intuition that is left is logical essence in 
its nature but not in its use. 
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In truthful perception, and ther is some doubt as to 
whether perception is ever entirely t utbful, the apparent 
and real thing are identical, both as to existence and 
character. Strong is convinced that his is still 
epistemic dualism because, while the aspect bears 
the character, intent and animal convey the knowledge 
of existence) Further, purely perce tual error is possible 
as regards animal faith and intent, s well as essence. 
This is against the 'infallible give 1 theory of neo-
realism. However, it must be borne n mind that acquaintance 
is not knowledge on the conceptual 1 vel (cf. E. s. Brightman's 
situation experienced and situation elieved in). 
There iS no knowledge, accordin to Strong, without 
attention and no attention without s bodily 
response which gives direction to an object and converts 
mere feeling into awareness.2 That 
.............. 
~ it is both depend on animal fai 
ception is the regulation of conduct 
not a credulous will to believe, is 
exists and 
The end of per-
And, animal faith, 
that is necessary 
for an adequate adjustment to this e d. 
1. Animal faith is the basis upon 
reference is experienced. 
2. At most, what Strong says here 
sense perception. 
ich objective 
uld be true onl y of 
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In all sense feelings, traces of extensity are detect-
able; it may therefore be assumed that feeling, or some-
thing which by integration gives rise to it, is the reality 
which is spread out in space. This conclusion is based on 
Strong's analysis of introspection. Since in introspectio~, 
according to Strong, one psychical state is used to cognize 
another just preceding, and the real thing and the vehicle 
by which it is presented. are alike in nature, it may be 
concluded that the nature that introspection reveals iS 
the true nature of the feeling cognized. 
(2) The status of essences. In retrospect, Strong 
considered some of the changes that had come about at 
various times in his thought as not only significant, but 
of such a nature as actually to transform it. Howe!er, 
throughout his career one emphasis persisted continually, 
the conviction that since the earliest awareness of any 
object is through the instinctive use of signs or symbols, 
the most fundamental analysis must be psychological rather 
than logical. 
He believed that his ultimate conclusions were those 
of common sense. The elements are: the duality of sense 
datum and the real thing, internal perception as analogous 
(in its symbolic and retrospective nature) to external 
perception and revealing a r eal self to which sense data 
can be given, and sense data as produced by the fusion 
and projection of atoms of sentience. He considered a sound 
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theory of perception to be the necessary propaedeutic and 
starting point of philosophy. 
In the last stage of Strong's thought, the datum is no 
longer spoken of primarily as a universal. The universal 
is now precisely defined as derived by abstraction from the 
datum. The essence-universal is however still retained, 
for ~trong still feels that its presence makes possible 
an assertion of identity between the character as embodied 
1 in the object and the character as intuited. But, the 
real nature and real existence of the object are present 
only through substi t utes. 
The instinctive aff irmation of the external world is 
tied in with surv ival: it is a biological necessity and a 
natural and indubitable right. Man is able t _o know things 
a s they are because the ma terials (sensory impressions and 
motor reactions) out of which the compleoo datum of knowledge 
i s formed, are a part of the real world. 
ii. Teleological evaluation of Strong's complete 
epistemology. 
(1) Critical review of the place of teleology in 
Strong's early epistemology. To a great extent it may be 
concluded that Strong's enti r e epis temology rests on the 
conviction that there are two basic forms of cognition: 
sense p erc ption and introspection. The dl.fficulty seems 
1. Strong is concerned to insist upon identity as necessary 
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for the bridging of the gap in the dualism of the epistemic 
situation. However, he makes no real attempt to distinguish 
between logical and teleological identity. 
to be that the latter area is too limited in Strong's 
actual treatment of it. For him it seems to be mainly 
the turning of the eye · rnward, a.s it were. He generally 
gives very little consideration to knowledge via conception 
and interpretation. Strong's examination of the epistemic 
situation is too much a study of feeling with and without 
external reference. Consequently, he neglects the con-
ceptual aspects of developed teleological experience and 
treats teleology only in terms of a behavioristic analysis 
of animal faith. 
Thus, his tendency to resolve epistemology into 
physiological psychology, which he admits was a narrower 
view to which he was prone in his earlier days, is never 
completely transcended throughout his work. This pre-
occupation with the particular is furth er evidenced by 
the fact that he never actually took his essence theory 
seriously enough to att·empt to elaborate a corresponding 
metaphysics. 
His early view that the self is directly felt is 
coupled with the equally explicit insistence that the self 
is not directly known. He finds, upon introspection, that 
the self is the actual unity of a certain total feeling 
and the self attends to its feelings in knowledge by 
attending to the cognitive states of feelings (which are 
their objective side). 
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This is suggestive of a recognition of the mental as 
present in all percept ion-- a point w. ich he later e1xpounds. 
However, in the case of the to be undercut 
by his lack of recognition of self-ex erience as possessing 
an adequate quality of 1 mineness•. however, of 
the many weaknesses inherent in Stro g 1 s concept of the 
self, Strong actually makes the unit and activity of the 
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self to depend on purposive factors: active and determinative 
interests; for example, remembering s attending to states 
that are past. The category of purpo e is not accidental 
here, but rather essential. It is h unfortunate 
that Strong is unaware (or unwilling to admit his awareness) 
of his overwhelming involvement in t leology at this and 
other points. 
In regard to the question of f e ling, another contrast 
emerges between his earlier and late views. In one of 
his earliest expressions, Strong ins sts that while pain, 
for example, may call forth displeas re, it need not. 
Apparently, the individual is suffic ently free from his 
physiological-psychological processe to effect a large 
measure of transforming control over them. In other words 
the situation here is not a mechanic 1 one. The attitude 
and purpose of the subject determine, at least to an extent, 
the response that is forthcoming. 
the factor of purpose in his episte 
continually uses 
in a way that 
can be justified only by a metaphys cal teleology. 
This is certainly not in nt with his later 
avowal of behavioristic elements , es ecially, when he 
construes all knowledge of particula s in the external 
world to rest on an instinctual nse which he speaks 
of as motor or mechanical . 
In his early analysis of pain , Strong seemed to be 
laying the groundwork for a system f categories of 
knowledge. This promise is never f lfilled to the extent 
one would expect in an investigator hose chief concern 
was the relationship, i n knowledge d being, between 
mind and matter . However, i t can b said that not only 
did he allow more than phenomenal to the categories 
of space and time at the outset of is career, he actually 
seems to develop to the place in hi later thought where 
almost all the categories would be onsidered metaphysical. 1 
The reason for this perhaps wa his insistence that 
knowledge is l ogically identical2 w th external reality , 
though psychologically and existent ally dual . It is also 
in line with his belief that since he origin of the mind 
is out of rerum natura, it would be strange if' the real 
nature of the world were unknowable 
1. 
2. 
He never desires, h owever to de 
mind in knowledge . Yet, it mus 
a ppear d i ff icu lt to interpret s 
mechanical manner. 
Strong 1 s interpretation of iden 
from t h e point of view of accou 
particulars , his treatment of t 
in effect , self-refUting in its 
orientation. 
y the activity of the 
be noted that it would 
ch a process in a 
ity is not only deficient 
ting for knowledge of 
leological identity is, 
behavioristic, mechanistic 
149 
150 
Strong's early and continued ac eptance of the categories 
of experience as not necessarily phe omehal is most suggestive 
as regards the category:.of purpose. The epistemic situation 
does not demand that purpose be view d as phenomenal. The 
only way, then, that its candidacy f r metaphysical status 
could be cancelled would be by denyi g its presence in the 
epistemic situation. Strong does no attempt this explicitly 
but his failure to grant recognition to apparently purposive 
factors as they occur amounts to the implicit denial of 
their existence and in essence invol es him in a contra-
diction when he goes on to assert an mal faith and intent. 
That his conception of purpose s, at the very least, 
i ·nadequate is brought out quite clea ly when he attempts 
to explain why the mind has a body. The only answer he 
actually ever gives is in terms of s rvival value. But, 
it is a matter of undeniable fact th t, epistemicall y, 
the relations of mind and body accom lish much more than 
merely making survival possible. 
does not really fulfill its announce 
in it to take into consideration at 
s, Strong's first book 
intention. He fails 
11 such factors as 
the aesthetic, the pleasurable , and e en the refinements 
of mechanisms. At least many such notions are ent irely 
unnecessary for survival alone. ng 1 s hypothesis 
falls Short of the facts. 
In the same vein, he insists on the power 
of interests (conscious purposes) to oderate the degree 
of consciousness as effectively as ph sical causes are 
able to do. Indeed, he ignores almos completely the 
attributes of the personality as a wh He thus reduces 
purpose to a biological set of a.n toward a certain 
type of motor expression. Hence, his investigation is 
arbitrarily limited to the objective, sensuously 
observabl-e. In this way, be roots al thought ultimately 
in sensation. But, when he admits th t agency is a 
necessary character~stic of concrete ind, the contra-
diction is apparent for intelligent a ency is inconceivable 
if it is not purposive. 
Among Strong's earlier attempts o escape solipsism 
are present elements which persist an characterize all his 
subsequent effort. His appeal is to nstinctive, external 
reference. But, it is significant to note that Strong would 
apparently not disagree with ~. S. ghtman that it iS by 
rational faith that we are justified n speaking of the 
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external world. Strong .finds ce of external reference in 
instinct but the cr iterion of such ief in the rational 
superiority of such an hypothesis. 
In support of this opinion, it found that Strong 
introduces various lines of evidence o show that the 
instinctive passage iS justified by reason. He mentions, 
for example, the order of the physic 1 world being imposed 
on the intell ect independent of one' will and knowledge. 
He defines the intellect as recreati just creative. 
These and other evidences Strong int show that he is 
actually affirming a rational proces of induction such as 
Brightman appeals to. 
Strong's point in emphasizing t e place of the 
instinctual is to show that rational induction is but the 
philosophic explanation and justif'ic of what actually 
transpires instinctually and unnotic the experiential 
situation on the part of the average person (until, of 
course, some problem or contradictio arises). Another 
reason for the particular form of hi presentation appears 
to lie in his purpose to show that p stulation by hypothesis 
is not a case of demonstrative certa nty. 
Thus while instinct, for Strong, designates non-
reflective thinking and acting acco ding to an idea which 
r epresents (stands for and makes pos ible adjustment of 
relation to) an ext r amental reality it should not pass 
unnoticed that Strong is compelled t introduce distinctly 
purposive elements in any thorougb-g ing attempt to 
explicate his position. Thus, he ha recourse to the 
concept of adjustment. In other wor s, purpose lies at 
the heart of Strong's attempt to tra scend the situation-
experienced. The very nature of kno ledge is purposive, 
almost in the sense of Royce's defin tion of a true idea as 
a fulfil l ed purpose. 
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This only brings to the surface teleological factors 
that have been present from the very outset of Strong's 
thinking. Since the epistemologica framework espoused 
in those issues which have demanded he category of purpose 
for a full solution remained substan ially unchanged even 
when Strong later made explicit his mechanistic 
metaphysics, it must be concluded t Strong made all 
along an illicit use of purposive 
In spite of the keenness of of his discussions, 
Strong tends to slip on a number of ccasions into arguing 
from assumptions that are implicit i and derived from his 
metaphysics. Although he gives soli siam, for example, 
serious consideration, it as thoroughgoing 
as it could be. Note in this regard argument from the 
spatial nature of the sense organ fo the reality of space 
in the external world. This is actu lly circular, for the 
spatiality alluded to is what the pr all about. 
(2) Teleological criticism of second period. 
Strong's disavawal of his early repr sentationism does not 
involve a denial that an essence or 
representing an object. The point o 
can be viewed as 
hie altered view is 
that in the existential situation th person does not 
interpret the datum as representing hat is out there. 
He insists that interpretation is w at the philosopher, 
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not the na·ive actor in the situation, is engaged in. 1 The 
latter takes the datum as the object, not as representing it. 
He explains this as the result o the cumulative ef~ect 
of the instinctive activity and exper ence of the race. Now, 
this is, in effect, a teleological re ponse which makes 
survival possible. Indeed, the categ ry of purpose is the 
~mportant factor in the whole theory. The depth of this 
telic response suggests that purpose s located deep in the 
nature of man. This is significant f r any interpretation 
of the nature and character of the un verse fro'm which man 
has evolved. 
The value of Strong's ess~nce 
area of meaning. If the object as 
ory is seen in the 
en were only 
psychological, how could it ever be r ised to the level 
of being known in a conceptual sense~ Further, the unity 
of self-experience suggests that ther never could be a 
psychological experience devoid of co nit ional elements. 
However, the inadequacy of Strong's a alysis of introspection 
makes this last appeal unavailable to him. What is more, 
it actually undercuts his assertion o the essence theory. 
And, if there are essences, this too ppears suggestive 
of a universe which would be much mor than midway between 
mind and matter. If it is to be capa le of being known, 
reality must be able to appear in psychological-logical 
form. The supposition of the existence or a tertiUm quid!. 
1. Strong's emphasis here is thus psychological rather 
than logical. 
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something neither of the nature of mind or matter, is really 
unnecessary. 
The difficulty with Strong's theory resides in 
the relevance of his introduction Strong says that 
the ego is the subject in the cogniti e situation. In the 
case of objective reference, for exam le, it is the ego that 
does the referring. Between sensatio s and instinctive 
response lie essences. But, when Str ng goes on to insist 
that the being and activity of the eg must be described in 
mechanistic fashion, the need for ess nces becomes very 
obscure. 
Apparently Strong introduces his concept of essence 
and emphasis on logic to supplement t e deficiencies of a 
pure mechanism. But these factors do not belong and will 
not fit into Strong's system, unle ss up his 
mechanistic orientation, since essenc (as he interprets 
it) and logic have no real meaning ap a teleological 
perspective. 
Strong never makes good by way o demonstration . how 
these emphases of his are compatible with a mechanism. 
Indeed, along with this, he emphasizes the so-called 
mechanism of knowing so strongly that the appearance of the 
purposive, and that which necessitates it, can never be 
anything but an inexplicable emergence -- which latter is 
just what he is determined to avoid. 
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The contents of an individual's actual awareness 
Strong describes as temporally embracing an interval or 
a time-span. When he goes on to assert the infinite 
divisibility of time and space and admit that this is 
not experience but deduced, it is clear that his treatment 
of time and space iS fraught with metaphysical assumptions. 
These assumptions appear to manifest an atomistic, realistic 
pluralism. 
This is to be contrasted with the epistemic situation 
itself which seems to suggest, at least in the case of time, 
a non-atomic situation (cf. Bergson's real duration). This 
implicit dependence of Strong's epistemology on his 
metaphysics is brought out explicitly in his admission, 
toward the later part of his life, that his epistemology 
rested on the assumption of the existence of a real world 
in space and time. 
In drawing out the implications of his epistemology, 
Strong gives instinct a fundamental place in his philosophy, 
more basic actually than intelligence. These wider applica-
tions of his epistemology appear prime facie to disclose the 
same metaphysics (implicitly and explicitly). The conclusions 
of his epistemology are quite frequently but occasions to 
focalize these metaphysical expressions. 
It must be objected, however, that his subord.ination 
of intelligence to instinct is at variance with the necessity 
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of recognizing mental elements as present in perception 
itself, and with his own admission of this. Thus, even 
on the level of his epistemology, Strong iS determined to 
resolve all apparently purposive activity into mere motor 
response. Hence, he arbitrarily selects instinct as ~asic 
because intelligence cannot function without it. The fact 
that the dependence is mutual he never takes into considera-
tion. Strong's conclusions stand only because the teleological 
is ruled out from the beginning. His emphasis on blind 
instinct is, on the other hand, in agreement with his 
ateleological metaphysics. Indeed, his purging of 
instinct of mental factors is so thorough that light iS 
thereby thrown on his ultimate metaphysical development of 
a neo-materialism, midway between mind and matter. 
(3) Teleological evaluation of Strong's final 
epistemology. In turning to an examination of the material 
of this final chapter on Strong's epistemology, let it 
first be noted that Strong's announced attempt to construct 
an evolutionary psychology in his epistemology manifests 
the presence of prior, metaphysical assumptions. Meta-
physically, he has already decided that the only adequate 
solution to the problems of being is to be found in a natural 
origin of the mind from the physical universe. 
There is no question of God, or of any kind of 
c r eative, cosmic process. The evolving process must be 
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natural--indeed, mechanical. Teleological considerations 
are never expressly al~owed. It is within this framework 
that al~ investigation of the knowing processes must be 
carried on. The assumption may be tacit--it usuaily is--
but it is never absent in so far as Strong can help it. 
It is not to be suggested, however, that Strong's 
epistemic analysis is entirely lacking in objectivity. 
As Whitehead remarked about the medieval philosopher, 
so with Strong: be is extremely objective within the 
rigid limits of his metaphysical presuppositions. 
After Strong's disavowal of the original representa-
tionism of his first volume, he came to assert that the 
datum is an essence (a logical universal). The problem, 
raised earlier in this dissertation, was how the particular 
could be known if all that were ever actually known were 
the universal essence. Strong hi~self said that the 
essence was the what of the thing without its thatness--
existence in particular location in space and time. The 
knowledge of the particular was then referred to affirma-
tion or belief. 
To spell out this distinction (as at least one of 
his aims), Strong asserted that though the datum and the 
object are distinct, the datum experientially is not a 
universal, put a phantasm. That is, the datum itself is 
an intuitive 1 picture 1 (no crude~-or otherwise--image theory 
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is here meant) of the object. The datum is the content 
of the object without its existence; the datum is then 
the phantasm or ghost of the object. Intent designates 
the mental reference to the datum as representing an 
existing object. Animal faith is an unquestioning reaction, 
with a sense datum {phantasm) present to intuition and an 
external thing present to intent. 
All three factors are actually inseparable in the 
experiential situation. However, if the datum is taken 
in abstraction from intent and animal faith, it is 11 a 
universal, unreferred to any position in space and ti3e, 
and only pos sessed of a certain kind of logical being."l 
The datum, taken as functioning with the other two elements, 
is a phantasm. 
Now the question remains as to why so{ile data are pro-
jected and others are not. If intent (and animal faith to 
complete the process) is brought in, it may then be asked 
why the instinct functions in this way. The only answer 
Strong gives in this regard iS tbat such activity of 
instinct is a biological necessity and a natural right. 
To probe as . far as one ought to into this answer would 
lead far into metaphysics. The full discussion is therefore 
deferred to the second division of this dissertation. 
1. Strong, ENOM, 98. This is Strong's theory of 
universals. 
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However, on the level of epistemology it may be asked 
whether this does not amount to at least the activity of 
human purpose (conscious or unconscious). If Strong 
suggests that there is no more purpose in this instinctive 
response than in air rushing into a vacuum, a very real 
problem arises. Can he then explain bow the existence of 
an object is known? 
All that would ever be known would be the essence of 
the obJect. This essence would be dealt with (not known) 
according to the external reaction of animal faith. But, 
if intent is a mental reference to the external existence 
of an object (and Strong defines it in this way) then 
such a mental reference must involve at least unreflecting 
knowledge~1 If so, it must be more than a mere physical 
(or motor, as Strong puts it) process (or even unconscious 
sentient process). 
What Strong's position involves at this point in the 
knowledge situation is that the conscious, purposive 
knowledge involved in intent bas its roots in the unconscious 
processes of the universe. But, these processes would have 
to be described as purposive if purpose is ever to be 
gotten out of them. The status of •unconscious' is thus 
1. [f Strong should say that it is not knowledge, but a 
principle of knowledge (cf. a category), the same 
problems as introduced below would apply to the origin 
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of a priori categories. Further, this category would be 
essentially purposive in its function. The same implica-
tions are involved in any assertion of intuition, etc. 
put in doubt. A fuller discussion of this point is properly 
reserved for metaphysics, but it is proper to ask whether 
unconscious purpose, which Strong cannot avoid involving 
himself in, could have any meaning or ground except as 
an aspect of the expression of a purposing, cosmic mind. 
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One point needs to be made before the discussion advances 
farther. The above examination of Strong's developed approach 
to the doctrine of essence shows clearly that Charles W. 
Morris, Klausner, and others have misunderstood Strong when 
they asserted that he deserted the sense datum as a universal. 
Strong's distinctions at this point do not make the sense 
datum a particular in an unqualified fashion. It is true 
that the situation is more precisely explicated than in 
the earlier essence view, but the place and nature of 
e~sence remains basically the same. In fact, one of Strong's 
major deficiencies is his failure ever to explaiO f-' exactly 
how qualia are known. A recourse to telepathy is open to 
him, but perhaps the reason he never takes it is its 
tendency to exalt the power of the mind in a rather non-
physical way. 
This is borne out by Strong's own comment to the effect 
that the two epochal developments in his thought were the 
disavowal of representationism (by asserting the object as 
present to the responding knower) and his adoption of the 
1 theory of essences. An article, written the same year as 
his Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind, _ suggests not 
a rejection but rather a continued approval of the earlier 
doctrine of essence, as the latter volume also explicitly 
states.2 The doctrine remained unaltered to the close of 
3 Strong's life. 
Strong's animus against the introduction of any kind 
of pervasive teleology or, of course, theism, is clearly 
shown in his reaction to William James• doctrine of the 
will-to-believe. Strong calls it the make-shift of a mind 
still not free from credulity. It is not strange then that 
he prefers to call his own emphasis on attention and animal 
faith, as necessary for knowledge, a behavioristic element. 
Yet, James' will to believe seems to be at least as reason-
able and as fundamental as 'animal' faith. And further, 
unless he construes behaviorism in a quite different sense 
than is usually meant, it is difficult to see how he could 
square it with his panpsychic emphases. Perhaps this is 
one reason why, in the later years of his life, bis pan-
psychim tended to pass into a nee-materialism. 
1. Strong, Art.(l930). 
2. Cf" . Strong, ENOM, 98-99. 
3. Cf . Strong, CFS, 28. 
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Earlier, however, he found direct evidence for his 
panpsychism in his analysis of perception. He concluded 
that since in introspection one psychical state is used 
to cognize a psychic state just preceding, and in this 
case the real thing and the vehicle by which it is presented 
are alike, the nature that introspection reveals may be 
assumed to be the true nature of the feeling cognized. 
He also goes on to say that in all sense feelings traces 
of extensity are detectable; therefore, he infers tha t 
feeling, or something which by integration gives rise to 
it La hint of neo-materialism17 is the reality which is 
spread out in space. 
The reasoning here seems somewhat dubious. He is 
essentially saying that since one psychic state can be used 
to cognize another~ and since in this case the nature which 
introspection reveals may be assumed to be the true nature 
of the feeling cognized (the real thing and its vehicle 
being alike), then an introspection of sense feelings 
would reveal the inner nature of the external world . This 1 
however, rests on the assumption that the real thing and 
its vehicle are ali ke. 
On Strong's theory a feeling is never knoWluntil after 
it has passed--then it is knownby means of another feeling. 
If this be true, then there iS no guarantee that the feeling 
that serves as the veh~cle and the feeling that is known 
are the same in nature, for our knowledge of the feeling that 
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knows depends itself on a third feeling standing for it. 
Thus, even the use of the word 'feelin~ alike for all these 
items is itself a rather arbitrary judgment. It would seem 
that we can no more penetrate to the inner nature of our 
, 
own being than we can to that of external objects.-
As for traces of extensity being detectible in all sense 
feelings, that itself may be questioned. 2 Can this assertion 
mean more than that we have the experience of space in regard 
to certain objects and not to others? If so, the status of 
the space experience will depend not on the fact of our 
having it, but on the significasce of that fact. Is its 
source in us or in something outside us, or does it arise 
as a result of a relationship? 
It is true that if one could penetrate, as Strong bas 
attempted, to the inner nature offuelings themselves, and 
show that space resides in their very being, then he would 
3 have a case. However, his approach itself seems to make 
' this impossible. And, if it were possible, Strong would have 
1. Strong himself maintains that the nature of a feeling 
does not consist in its being felt . For, he would say 
that some feelings are actually made up of smaller bits 
of sentience--according to his metaphysics ••• On the 
feeling of feeling, see also Hartshorne and Whitehead. 
2. Here Strong moves by analogy from the introspective to 
the perceptual datum. 
3. James' suggestion that the nature of a fe eling lies in 
its being feltzaises serious doubt as to the whole 
possibility of a feeling possessing extension. One's 
immediate experience of feelings seems to convey the idea 
that they are non-spatial in their very nRture. This is 
further supported by the experience of a spat i al feeling 
of a limb that no longer exists, having been amputated. 
There is also the inconceivability of some feelings as 
having anything at all in their natur e to do with space--
cf.joy, anger, etc. 
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to show that space is not in feeling because of interaction 
with something else, but, is present as a charact eristic of 
its own being. 
It would seem that Strong himself realized the weak-
ness of his own arguments here, for later he gave up his 
panpsycbism, as defended, and settled for a neo-materialistic 
view. And yet, he still maintained to the end of his career 
that t'lhatever might go to constitute feelings, feelings , 
once constituted, function from that point on as the building 
blocks of the univer se. The over-all metaphysics : implied 
seems to be a kind of ateleological, semi-idealism -- and, 
on the other hand at the same time a cmaterialism (ultimately). 
At any rate, one factor does not change. Whatever his 
metaphysical ultimate, he insists on its every manifestation 
in as mechanistic a fashion as possible. 
A question now occurs in reference to E. s. Brightman;l:s 
analysis of the situation experienced and the situation 
believed in. Could it not be said that the criticism 
applied to Strong's analysis of feeling would also apply 
to Brightman's insistence that the situation experienced is 
not properly a case of knowledge? 
Brightman says there is an absolute difference · between 
what is given as myself and all other selves. 1 This iS 
1. For this and following material see Brightman, Letter 
to Charles Hartshorne, 5/30/35. 
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notwithstanding the fact that my own past and future have 
to be inferred, because they are inferred as what was or 
is to "be given to a self which experiences itself as the 
same as the self of the specious present." Strictly 
speaking, we can intuit nothing except the contents of 
our own specious present. This is what Brightman elsewhere 
calls self-experience--a given experience which has, as 
one of its qualities, that of being 1 mine•. 1 
Now, the last point, it will be noted, sets the rest 
of Brightman's discussion off from Strong's, since 
Strong does not designate self-experience as possessing 
2 
such a quality. Strong says the self, in itself, is 
inferred by the ego, never observed as such. In a sense 
both B. P. Bowne and Brightman would agree with this 
last point; that is, the total self is always a matter 
of belief and not an immediate experience. 
The difficulty is that Strong would apparently apply 
this to the datum self, in that he does not explicitly or 
adequately designate the quality of mineness as attaching 
to the self, or the qualified ego as directly experienced. 
If he would do this, then much of the above criticism could 
1. Cf. the discussion of the self in ITP. 
2. Indeed, Strong actually makes the self a compound and 
even though in his early writings he spoke of the self 
as the fusion of one's total feelings, at no point does 
he delineate self-experience as possessing the quality 
of mineness. 
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be set aside; at least, to the degree that the quality of 
mineness would give a contlnuity~ · that would otherwise have 
to be built up out of discrete atomic units, and a 
consciousness which could assist in explaining how intuitive 
experiehce could become the contents of explicit knowing. 
But, the question of the relation between intuition 
and knowledge still remains. Brightman says the specious 
present is not a case of knowledge, but immediate, intuitive 
experience. Strong says that a feeling may be intuited while 
it is taking place, but it cannot be known until it is past. 
Now, if intuition is not knowledge, how is the passage 
effected from intuition to knowledge? If, according to 
Brightman, I intuit the contents of my specious present, 
then, when they are past, if I am to remember them, I must 
have knowledge of them because they become part of the 
total situation believed in. What is the connecting link 
1 between intuition and knowledge? 
It would appear to lie in the ability of the functioning 
self to lift into the realm of the explicitly known that 
which was previously simply confronted in direct experience. 
For this to be possible, it would be necessary to appeal to 
the unity and identity of the self, dynamical~y conceived 
as continuous growing activity.· 
1. That is, what constitutes the passage (or link) between 
one datum self and another? 
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The question of the adequacy of Strong's theory of 
the self must wait until the .discussion of metaphysics 
proper. However, his lack of explicitness on the subject 
of the 1 mineness• of self-experience suggests what may 
well be a major deficiency in his metaphysics of the self. 
It seems to foreshadow weakness in regard both to the 
unity and identity of the self. And it roots in his 
determination to construe self-experience mechanistically 
rather than purposively. Thus, Strong lacks the essential 
elements that make Brightman's analysis more coherent. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
i. The teleologi~al nature and end of knowledge. 
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By his reduction of epistemology to physiological psychology, 
Charles Augustus Strong neglected the conceptual aspects of 
developed teleological experience and admitted telic response 
into his analysis of knowledge only in terms of the act of 
objective reference on the basis of animal faith. However, 
in his attempt to account for the unity of knowledge, Strong 
was compelled to appeal to explicitly purposive factors : 
active and determinative interests. And this latter, and 
animal faith as well, were in effect a n introduction of 
purpose not as accidental but as essential to his analysis. 
When,, on the other hand, he attempted to remain 
consistent with his naturalism and explain wh.yr the mind 
has a body, his only answer was the end of survival. 
This patently contradicts the fact that while knowledge 
makes possible survival it also makes possible a host of 
values which alone make survival worth-while. For these, 
Strong has no explanation. Further, even the concept of 
survival as an end is, for him, an unallowable involve-
ment in teleology. 
ii. The significance of Strong's emphasis on 
analysis and animal faith. Strong's perspective is 
almost invariably excessively analytic. He ignores 
almost cqmpletely the attribu.tes of the personality 
as a whole. He thus reduces human purpose to a 
biological set of the organism toward a certain type 
of motor expression. In this way. he arbitrarily 
lmnts his epistemic investigation so as to root all 
thought ult~~ely in sensation. This little agrees 
however with his subsequent admission that agency is a 
necessary characteristic of concrete mind; for, what is 
intelligible agency l if not purposeful? This excessive 
preoccupation with sense-perception also renders self-
experience inexplicable on Strong's terms. The category 
of purpose, in spite of Strong's efforts to the contrary, 
turns out to be the important factor in Strong's entire 
theory of knowledge. The key problem that Strong's 
epistemology sets out to answer is that of l self-
transcendence. The appeal to animal faith is from one 
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perspective the introduction of a motor response that 
makes possible adjustment to a real world. In other 
words, animal faith is a purposive response with the 
end or goal, survival. Purpose then lies at the heart 
of Strong's attempt to transcend the situation-experienced. 
A true idea is in one sense a fulfilled purpose. The 
depth of this telic response on the part of the knower 
in intent and animal faith is so great as to suggest 
a purposive universe from which man has evolved. 
iii. The concept of essence as involving purpose. 
Strong's introduction of essences of a logical nature 
into an epistemology oriented in terms of a behavioristic 
mechanism is quite unnecessary. Indeed, -since the 
logical has no real being or function except in a 
t elaiogical background, Strong's theory would. have 
been much more coherent had he left such factors out 
entirely. His extreme emphasis on the mechanism of 
knowing makes the appearance of the purposive even 
epiphenomenally an inexplicable emergence--just what 
Strong was trying to avoid. 
What is more, if the activity of intent and animal 
faith and the subsequent arising of essences is not 
dealt nwith in terms of intelligent purposive processes, 
it is impossible to explain how an object could ever be 
known. The essence (which does not give particularity) 
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would be known while an object would never be more than 
dealt with according to the motor response of intent and 
animal faith. The only solution is to admit conscious, 
purposive knowledge on the human level. But then, the 
processes of the universe would have to be described as 
purposive, if purpose is ever to be gotten out of them. 
iv. The bearing of Strong's metaphysics on his 
epistemology. The fundamental orientation of Strong's 
metaphysics was determinative for his epistemology. 
The cardinal principle of his metaphysics was the natural 
origin of the mind from the physical universe. Quite · 
frequently the conclusions of his epist emology are but 
occasions to set forth metaphysical presuppositions. 
Thus he arbitrarily exalts instinct over intelligence 
because he finds that in the epistemic situation intelli-
gence cannot effectively function without it. He takes 
into consideration neither the fact that the dependence 
is mutual nor that the interpretation of instinct in 
a completely mechanical manner is not the only 
alternative. His conclusions are made to appear 
necessary only because the teleGlogical is ruled out 
.. 
from the beginning. 
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6. TRANSITION 
Part I has dealt with epistemology and therefore 
has been unable to consider teleology in the extended 
fashion that is possible in untrammeled metaphysica l 
discussion. This sect i on has, however, set forth Strong's 
essential ep istemological position in terms of its own 
inner and out er s tructure, its implications from and for 
his metaphysic s , and tbe significant teleological factors 
involved i n the entire discussion. 
It has been shown that whereas Strong disclaims 
any belief in teleology, he is involved in teleology 
at every crucial point in his epis temology. It has 
a l s o been pointed out t hat at the same time Strong's 
epistemological analysis neither accounts for nor 
sustains an adequate category of purpose. 
It now remains to carry out a similar investigation 
of his metaphysics, and to determine the nature of his 
total view and the place of tel eo l ogy in it. Part II 
is thus devoted to the subject of metaphysics. The t hree 
major periods of Strong's thought are discussed in as 
many chapters. In Part III, the concluding chapt er of 
the dissertation, the comprehens ive r elations of his 
epistemology and metaphysics are brought together with 
reference to their teleological significance. 
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PART II 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF TELEOLOGY, 
OF THE DEVELOP~illNT OF STRONG'S ~mTAPHYSICS 
CHAPTER V 
THE PSYCHOPHYSI CAL IDEALISM OF STRONG'S FIRST PERIOD 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With this chapter the investigation returns to Strong's 
earliest publications and initiates an examination of the 
development of Strong's metaphysical thought. After a con-
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sideration of his activity in the journals prior to the pub-
lication of Why the Mind Has a Body, that volume itself is 
subjected to an intensive study. The final section of the 
chapter is devoted to the responses evoked by Strong's first 
book and the articles from his pen that followed its publica-
tion. The entire investigation is critical, and its primary 
orientation is in terms of the teleological factors implicit 
in this stage of Strong's thought. 
While the earlier sections of the chapter and the 
earlier parts of the critique itself do not deal explicitly 
with teleological considerations, they are necessary for the 
teleological evaluation of the issues that finally come to 
the surface. 
Thus, this chapter expounds Strong's early concept of 
psychophysical correlation and shows how he arbitrarily and 
materialistically assumes a one-to-one relationship between 
body and mind. Strong's theory of consciousness is examined 
and revealed to lack the unity that only a dynamic principle 
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of purpose can give. Bound up with the question of conscious-
ness is that of the nature of time. Strong's conception of 
time does not account for the experience of succession, and 
his introduction of memory into the specious present is in 
such a behavioristic form as to render successful purposive 
remembrance a miracle. Other intimations of his underlying 
materialism are pointed out, culminating in his Darwinian 
naturalism. 
With this total development as a background, Strong's 
deterministic analysis of free will is subjected to a teleo-
logical critique. It is found that his previous deficiencies 
from the side of purpose reach a very sharp focus in this 
doctrine. Here it becomes clear that because of the lack of 
any cohesive, purposive principle, Strong is able to save 
neither a significant freedom nor an intelligible description 
of the human person, as distinct from the machine. 
2. STRONG'S METAPHYSICS PRIOR TO THE PUBLICATION 
OF HIS FIRST BOOK 
i. Relation to Munsterberg's mind-body doctrine. 
Essentially, Munsterberg expounded what James called the 'con-
scious-automaton' theory. Strong finds his presentation 
brilliant. 1 He praises Munsterberg for having seen that the 
possibility of the interaction of mind and body depends on 
the meaning of the relation of cause and effect. 2 In this 
1. 
2. 
I Strong , Art.(l892}, 179. 
Ibid., 184. 
regard, Strong concludes that a physical cause may be spoken 
of as producing a physical effect, but not as producing a 
mental effect, since in the last instance there could be no 
quantitative relation between the cause and the effect as 
there is in the physical world.l The same may be said of 
the mind's power to inaugurate physical causes. In both 
cases, all that is certain is the fact of invariable suo-
cession.2 
So much, then, for the empirical relations of mind and 
body: it is impossible to explain them without getting into 
metaphysics.3 Now, when volition is analyzed, nothing is 
discovered which is not compatible with parallelism; yet, 
one of the most characteristic of all mental facts is the 
ego's manifestation of a predominating influence in our 
mental life. 4 Thus, the facts at least preclude the classi-
fication of the voluntary act as a reflex action. 5 However: 
The self which decides and chooses consists of 
presentational elements (or fused residues of 
such) bound together by ~ies resembling those 
of ordinary association. 
These elements we are for the most part not conscious 
of. The elective affinities exhibited by the self are deter-
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mined by the associative connections between sensory and motor 
presentations in the cortex; and, these associative eonnec-
I Strong, Art.(l892), 185-186. 
Ibid., 186. 
Ibid., 187. 
Ibid., 190-191. 
5. Ibid., 192. Strong 
forgets this when he 
agrees with Drake's 
dictum that all purpos-
ive action is but ref~ 
reflex action. See 
Drake, MPN, 229. 
6. Ibid., 195. 
tions depend largely on "the emotional coloring with which 
the presentations invest themselves for the individual con-
sciousness.''l The apperceptive connections of ideas thus 
arise out of associative connections. 2 
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ii. Relation to James Ward's psychology. Ward, says 
Strong, has offered a critique of the fundamental conceptions 
on which Munsterberg and other younger physiological psychol-
ogists have based their experimental work.3 Ward calls 
Munsterberg's preoccupation with cognitive states presenta-
tionalism.4 Strong defends Munsterberg, but admits that this 
Kantian element must always be supplemented by the realization 
that while "representative knowledge holds for other beings, ••• 
it does not hold for ourselves."5 · We know ourselves because 
we are in ourselves--we immediately grasp ourselves in con-
sc:t.ous experience, "the one point at which we come into immed-
iate contact with reality." 6 Strong insists, in this connec-
tion, that conscious experience is not less than knowledge , 
but more.7 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
iii. Consciousness and time. Confronting the problem 
J Strong, Art.(l892), 195. 
Ibid. 
Strong, Art .(l894), 73. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 80. 
Ibid., 81. 
Ibid. But later epis.temolog ical analysis of int rospective 
knowledge leads Strong to conclude that this too is 
representative. 
of the nature of present time and the relation of conscious-
ness to it, Strong states that .he prefers the "natural 
answer"--"consciousness is in present time ••• present time 
is present time, not past or future.l Now, Strong says that 
present time so conceived is a mere boundary line; yet, he 
forthwith admits that "consciousness, in order to exist at 
all, must have duration." 2 How then is this possible with 
succession having been sharpened down to a point? His answer 
is that this is a moving not a resting point. 3 This onward 
motion constitutes actual duration. A resting point is a 
mere abstraction.4 
Again, it may be asked: why a point? Strong says that 
this conce ption is necessary to bring out the infinite 
successiveness of t1me. 5 Reality is nothing but an ever-
changing present: "actual succession must precede the knowl-
edge of the succes~ion." 6 The consciousness of successibn 
rests on memory. 7 
Consequently, Strong feels that the successive unity 
of consciousness cannot be asserted, only a simultaneous 
unity of consciousness. ''The only unity is the unity of that 
which is iri consciousness at once."8 In the successive 
states of consciousness there is continuity, not unity: we 
are our various conscious states.9 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Strong, Art.(l896), 149. 
Ibid., 150. 
Ibid., 152. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. Strong simply assumes 
without the introduction of 
supporting analysis. 
this 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
153-154. 
155. 
156. 
156-157. 
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3. THE PSYCHOPHYSICAL IDEALISM OF WHY THE MIND HAS A BODY 
i. The observable facts. The exact empirical relation 
of consciousness to certain physical processes "is one of 
concomitance or uniform co-existence."l These physical proc-
eases certainly include the brain, but do they include any-
thing more'? Strong says that it cannot be established that 
consciousness corresponds "to the total bodily process. 112 
Consequently, he limits, for convenience, the psychophysical 
process to the brain process.3 
It is in this sense that he formulates his law of 
psychophysical correlation. It rests on the observable facts 
of the apparent action of mind on body, the apparent action 
of body on mind, and the even more impressive empirical evi"' 
dence which suggests the dependence of mind on body. All of 
these empirical data are found to lend no support strictly 
speaking, to any particular causal theory. 4 
Thus, Strong states his law of psychophysical correla-
tion as expressing the fact of intimate connection between 
the events of mind and body without involving "any causal or 
metaphysical implications."5 The extent of this correlation 
on the mental side may be expressed in terms of a definition 
of a sensational brain event: nthe sensational brain-event 
is that brain-event ••• which is indispensable to ••• the occur-
1. Strong, WMB, 39. 
2.. WMB, 49. 
3. Ibid. 
4. ·~JMB , 37. 
5. WMB, 38. 
178 
renee of the sensation."1 Further, "particular mental states 
never occur except in connection with particular brain-
2 
events." But still, no particular causal theory is yet 
necessitated. 
ii. The question of · causal relations. Strong's study 
now turns to a consideration of the empirical arguments 
which may be brought forth in favor of either interactionism, 
automatism, or parallelism. Interactionism he calls the 
doctrine of common sense: mind acts on body and body on mind. 
Automatism appeals to those facts which seem to support the 
view that mind is dependent on body. It is a kind of "one-
sided materialistic interaction." The parallelist finds mind 
and body (or brain action) so unlike that he cannot settle 
for any such view as that which suggests that brain action 
(at least conceived in a materialistic· fashion) produces con-
sciousne ss. Thus, the rels.t ion between mind and body is 
asserted to be non-causal and simultaneous. 
The primary basis of parallelism "is the minute corres-
pondence and correlation" of the events of mind and body. 3 
1. Strong, WM~, 65. 
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2. WMB, 70. Though forced to admit that this is an assumption, 
Strong actually treats it, as here, as if it were an 
undisputed fact. 
3. WMB, 74. 
But, parallelism ·does not deny all efficiency to conscious-
ness. If it did, it would make the very existence of con-
sciousness unintelligible, since it would have nothing to 
do. 1 Parallelism rather asserts the efficiency of the 
physical within its own series and the efficiency of the 
mental within its own series. 
Turning now to the arguments that are adduced for the 
various positions·, Strong begins his examination with auto-
matism. Automatism asserts "that mental states are in all 
cases effects of brain-events, and do not in their _[own] 
2 turn become causes. He concludes, however, that no real 
reasons are brought forth by the proponents of thie theory 
to compel its acceptance. 
Further, empirical considerations raise serious doubts 
of a specific nature. Such a causal relation differs from 
all others known: it refuses to allow its effect to become 
a cause in any way.3 Why, if causation is nothing but 
uniform sequence, is there n~ just as much uniformity between 
volition and movement as between stimulus and sensation? 4. 
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Finally, no clue is given as to how a brain event could creat~ 
or even ensure itself of being followed by, a mental state.s 
Interactionism fares little better at the bar of empiri-
1. Strong WMB, 81. Since Strong treats purpose epiphenom-
enally, one wonders how he would accout for its existence 
on his evolutionary principles. 
2. WMB, 87. 
3. WMB, 100-101. 
4. WMB, 101. 
5. Ibid. 
cal investigation. Strong finds that interactionists must 
admit that when volition or consciousness is active in any 
way, the brain event is always the mid-wife of the mental 
state. Empirically, in terms of the observable data, there 
is no reason why the brain· event could not accomplish what 
it does without any assistance from the mental state; i.e., 
if the mental state were only an acoompanient of the brain-
event .1 Indeed, "the, seeming intelligence of the mental 
state may be due simply to its necessary correspondence 
with the brain-event which calls it forth." 2 
If it be argued on evolutionary principles that ftthe 
physical world would [not] contract to produce a conscious-
ness [ex.cept] on condition of the latter being of use," 
this brings us face to face with the problem of how the 
physical world could ever produce what is mental. 3 Such 
a consideration demands a transcending of empirical inves-
tigation in favor of the metaphysical. 
The two most common arguments for parallelism are based 
on the principle of the conservation of energy and the nature 
of the causal relation. The principle of the conservation 
of energy is appealed to as making the phy$ical world a. 
closed system into which non-physical causes cannot intrude. 4 
But, this is not a conclusive argument, for if the principle 
1. Strong, WMB, 122. 3. WMB, 124-125. 
2. Ibid. 4. WMB, 127. 
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of causation is taken as resting on an examination of 
physical events unaccompanied by consciousness, it does not 
follow necessarily ·that the same situation must hold good 
1 
when consciousness is present. And, this argument has 
even superficial validity only as long as the relation 
between mind and matter is conceived in ordinary dualistic 
fashion. 2 
The argument for parallelism from the nature of the 
causal relation holds that causality can connect events only 
of the same order. 3 As for what is actually detectable in 
causation, Strong is in agreement with Hume that all we 
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have to do with is a sequence of phenomena; but, he takes 
fundamental issue with Hume's denial of the so-called causal 
relation as "absolutely opaque and impenetrable to thought." 4 
Science, says Strong, has discovered anoverwhelming 
number of correlations between phenomenal relations that 
make possible an unbelievably high degree of predictability 
5 
and control. Indeed, is this not the very heart and secret 
of the success of physical science? There is thus at least 
a phenomenal bond between cause and effect. 6 No such bond 
can be denied (even if it cannot be established) by empirical 
7 
observation alon~. 
1. Strong, WMB, 141-142. 
2. 1JilMB, 141. 
3. WMB, 143. 
4. WMB, 149. 
5. cr. ibid. 
6. WMB, 151. 
7. cr. ~~B, 159. 
iii. Metaphysical principles. Finally turning to a 
full metaphysical orientation of the discussion, Strong 
begins with a consideration of the physical world. He 
feels that this is the proper place to begin metaphysical 
inquiry. But, he does not believe it is possible to deny 
"that in perceiving material objects we have immediately 
to do with anything but our own mental states."1 However, 
divergence of opinion arises on .the question of whether 
mental states stand, at least in some cases, for things 
outside the mind. Strong calls such existences "things-
in-themselves." Those who deny them he call.s phenomenal-
ists; those who affirm them, idealistic or critical real-
ists.2 The mind-body problem he judges to be bound up with 
the problem of the existence of things-in-themselves.3 
Strong builds his own argument for idealism on the 
fact that no evidence is available f'or any object not con-
nected with consciousness (i.e. perceived ).4 But, if' the 
object is assumed to cease to exist when human perception 
of it ceases, one is lef't with a peicemeal, fragmentary 
world.5 The need here can be met, he says, only by some 
form of' realism.6 Thus, the idealist may consistently 
postulate extramental (i.e. outside his own mind) causes 
1. Strong, WMB, 166. 
2. Ibid. 
4. Cf. WMB, 182-188. 
5. WMB, 190. 
3. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 
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of external objects, which causes continue to exist when 
unperceived; of these extramental causes, perceived objects 
are symbolic.l Thus, if things-in-themselves (extramental 
causes) exist, they cannot be known immediately, but only 
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by inference.2 The nature of such existences is then problem• 
atical. 3 
The postulate of a soul-substance must be laid aside: 
its place is taken by 11 the strean of consciousness with its 
empirical characters."4 Every thought and feeling shares 
in this reality; although, of course, a perception which is 
as a state of consciousness real, is as a symbol of an 
extramenta l reality but a phenomenon. 5 And, . even if each 
pulse of consciousness were an absolute unity, its reality 
would not rest on this unity apart from experience but only 
as characterized by experienee. 6 Consciousness, so long as 
it lasts, is as real as anything can be; further, it is a 
type of, or integral part of, the universe of real things. 7 
Since consciousness is a reality, the basis is present for 
inference to the nature of other realities outside of it.8 
Strong uses the term 'thing-in-itself' to refer to 
realities external to consciousness because these realities 
1. Strong, ~~~ 191. 5. 1/lMB , 209. 
2. WMB, 192. 6. WMB, 210. 
3. WMB, 193. 7. Ibid. 
4. VllMB , 209. 8. Ibid. 
come to us only through our perceptions which are symbols 
of them.l The possibility of things-in-themselves depends 
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on the possibility of an intelligible account of their nature; 2 
and, for strong, this turns out to be an idealistic account. 
His argument develops as follows: 
The best explanation of the permanent possibility 
of the sensation is the presence of an extra-
mental cause which by its persistent action on 3 sense makes the sensation permanently possible. 
That there are existences external to my mind is estab-
lished by certain indisputable cases in which causal rela-
tiona are recognized as connecting our mental states with 
extremental r ealities and also connecting our mental states 
inter se. 4 This real causality is clearly distinguishable 
from the phenomenal causality that is observed to hold 
sequentially between observed physical events. 5 And, no 
valid case can be introduced to preclude the use of such real 
causality to transcend experience by inference. 6 
Thus, the inference to things-in-themselves is analo-
gous to that to other minds: both are necessary to give the 
conception of the universe continuity and intellig ibility.7 
Further, since it is out of things-in-themselves that indi-
vidual minds are evolved, the former must be of such a nature 
as to give rise to human consciousness as exper!enced.s 
1. Strong, WMB, 211. 
2 • 'A'MB, 212 • 
3. WMB, 236. 
4. WMB, 241. 
5. Ibid. 
6. WMB, 250. 
7. WMB, 274. 
8. WMB, 275. 
Since consciousness is not in space, things-in-
themselves are not, strictly speaking, outside 
or ~eyond it, but only other than it; and the 
wor d composed of consciousness and things-in-
themselves is not in space, though it may be in 
something of which space is the symbol.l 
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Consciousness is the only reality of which any immediate 
knowledge is possessed; being the only available sample of 
reality, no other conception of reality can be held.2 There-
for, things-in-themselves are menta1. 3 
iv. Strong's psychophysical idealism. This position 
holds that the brain process makes possible the symbolization 
of a thing-in-itself, this latter being the accompanying con-
sciousness.4 The law of psychophysical correlation gives 
assurance that mind and body are, in their main outlines, 
of such a nature as to make correlation possible.5 Thus, 
it is seen how there is an adequate basis for a relation of 
symbolism. 6 
When the parallelism of the mental and physical is 
subjected to metaphysical interpretation, "no real paral-
lelism remains. 117 This is supported by the fact that one 
(the physical)series is not real but phenomenal.s "Psycho-
1. Strong, WMB, 295. 
2. Ibid. This is an example of Strong's easy idealism 
in his first period. 
3. Ibid. 
4 • wrvm , 3 36 • 
5. WMB , 337. 
6. Ibid. 
]l . WMB, 343. 
8. Ibid. 
physical idealism is thus, at bottom,a doctrine of identity 
rather than that of parallelism." 1 The efficiency of con-
sciousness may now be logically asserted; the origin of 
consciousness may be explained; and, the basis is supplied 
for a genuinely monistic philosophy. 2 
The phenomenal causal relation between sensory 
stimulus and sensational brain-event is the 
symbol of a real causal relation between an 
extra -mental event and the sensation, the phen-
omenal causal relation between volitional brain-
event and voluntary movement the symbol of a 
real causal relation between the volition and 
an extra-mental.3 
Psychophysical idealism is monistic in form as well 
as content: not only does ~t conceive the universe in all 
parts as mental in n ature, it also comprehends both indi-
vidual minds and other t h ings-in-themselves in a single 
system, the continuity and order of which find their sym-
bolization in "the continuity and order of the physical 
world." 4 
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Th is position avoids the difficulties of ordinary par-
allelism because it refuses to turn "the physical inefficiency 
of the mind into a general inefficiency."5 But, it still 
has its own difficulties, Strong confesses. Consciousness 
seems so much simpler than the complexity of the brain process. 
1. Strong WMB, 343. 
2. W1ffi, 344 . But not 'monistic' in the sense of a block 
universe. 
3. VJMB, 345. 
4. \117MB, 346. 
5. WMB, 349. 
Therefore, it must be shown that cons ciousness is actually 
mo r e complex than it seems to be: that it possesses a 
detailed structure and history. 1 
Fur ther, how can a physical object be conceived to 
possess anyt hing analogous to sensation and will as we know 
them? 2 And, how is physical continuity consistent wi t h 
be i ng ment al?3 The ques t ion remains as to how many feelings 
t he r e may be; we must form some idea of their mental nature.4 
Or, how can t he apparently unitary individual mind sustain 
cont inuity with the world out of which it is evolved"t5 
In essence, all these questions relate to the nature of 
consciousness. Strong feels that the plural side of con-
sciousness presents no real difficulty, since, being correl-
ated with processes transpiring in locally separate brain 
a r eas, it is itself, in a way, spread out. All the real 
difficulties, as he sees them, are on the side of unity.6 
An investigation adequate for the scope of this problem, 
Strong promises in a forthcoming volume.7 
4. FURTHFR DEVELOPMENTS 
i. The ego as the stream of consciousness. One of the 
most interesting interchanges of articles in this period was 
with Charles M. Bakewell. The latter reveiwed Strong's book, 
1. Strong, WMB, 353. 
2. WMB, 354. 
3 ~ Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. WMB, 354-355. 
6. WMB, 355. 
7. Ibid. 
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commenting especially on Strong's doctrine of the ego. It 
is a mystery, he said, how on Strong's position one could 
ever know the series of passing states that constitute the 
stream of consciousness. 1 Strong replied by admitting that 
how the past, or the past self, becomes the present self 
is a mystery. 2 
Bakewell returned to the discussion with further crit-
icism of the concept of the ego as, in effect, the 'passing 
thought .r3 He judged Strong's admission that memory for 
him w~s a. mystery to be an understatement. Bakewell finds 
it to be a self-contradictory ·assertion.4 Strong replied 
that what he was actually trying to assert was that one can 
in some sense be aware of the subject; although, in such 
immediate feeling it is not necessary for the subject to be 
distinct from itself.5 
Bakewell responded that the pulse of feeling_ with which 
Strong was dealing and upon which he was attempting to build 
his metaphysics, was actually an abstract, unreal phase of 
experience.s A world built up on such a basis, he says, 
would be sheer, discontinuous plurality. 7 Further, Strong is 
contradicted by the facts when he fails to differentiate 
between the transcendence involved in passing to the past 
(our own) and that involved in passing to other selves.8 
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1. Bakewell, Art.(l90i)l, 222. 
2. Strong, Art.(l904) , 339. 
3. Bakewell, Art.(l904)2, 342. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Strong, Art. ( 1904):, 547. 
Ba.kewe 11, Art • (1904) .:>,55 4. 
Ibid. 
4. Ibid. , 343. Ibid., 560. 
ii. A deterministic analysis of free will. In the 
same year (1904} Strong gave attention to an analysis of 
free will, attempting to show that determinism and free will 
are not muturally exclusive concepts. 1 He defined deter-
minism as the view that our acts are the result of our 
natures.2 The true determinist, he believes, holds freedom 
to be a fact.3 
We are free from ••.• the necessity of performing a 
certain act of which we happen to be thinking ••• 
the consciousness of freedom, then, arises when 
alternative courses of action are weighed against 
each other ••• We are free as respects each course 
of action but not as respects both or all. To be 4 free as respects all courses would be not to think . 
According to Strong, all consciousness leads to action, 
so the thought of one act alone would lead automatically to 
the performance of that act. Freedom is then equilibrium 
between two or more thoughts; at least, as far as equilib-
5 
rium exists. Consequently, freedom amounts to the power to 
deliberate and act \!llwithout external constraint." 6 
Because the self is not separated from its nature (i.e. 
the ego is not the mere form of consciousness emptied of all 
content), we cannot think about a thought or feeling at the 
moment it exists. 7 It is only in reflection that one is 
able to contrast himself with the motives and feelings which 
1. Strong, Art.(l904) 4 • 
2. Ibid. , 127 . 
3. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., 128. 
6. Ibid., 129. 
7. Ibid., 130. 
4. Ibid., 12~-128. 
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he feels to be influencing him. When one is influenced, 
one is not aware of it because he is at that moment hi s 
feelings, and thus is determined by himself and no other.l 
iii. Suggestions of panpsychism. Also of metaphysical 
significance were Strong's articles entitled, "Idealism 
2 
and Realism." The first was particularly concerned with 
the phychological side of the issue. Here, he reaffirmed 
his belief that the establishing of a general idealism 
is . but a way-paver for a panpsychistic metaphysics. 3 In 
his second article, he turned to a consideration of the 
distinction of object and perception. He defends idealism 
by t he argument that since the only parts of the world that 
can be given in experience are intra-mental facts, it is 
only an unnecessary doubling of them to assume, in addition, 
external facts not of the nature of mind which underly and 
g ive rise to the 1ntra-mental.4 
Indeed, he describes givenness as an inseparable char-
acter of an object without which, as far as is known, it 
5 
could not exist at all. He believes that the metaphysical 
dispute between idealists and realists is most simply solved 
by the affirmation of the existence of matter independently 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
Strong, Art.(l904) 4 17130. Strong, Art.(l904 )6~ • 
Strong, Art.(l904)6. 
Strong, Art.(l904)7. Later Strong will postulate some-
t hing midway _between mind and matter as giving rise to 
both. 
Ibid., 547. 
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of the thought of it, "but in the shape of sensation--in 
the shape, that is, of my sensation who experience the 
matter. '' 1 
The very fact that the esse of matter can not be 
percipi in the intellectua! sense makes it 
possible that it may be percipi in the sense of 
sensation.2 
A further blow for metaphysical idealism was struck 
the following year in his answer to Moore's effort to 
refute idealism. In a vein similar to the foregoing, he 
continued to insist that to establish the permanence of 
objects, one must go beyond "any data which consciousness 
can possibly furnish us."3 
5. SURVEY AND EVALUATION 
i. Summary. (1) The earliest emphases. In his first 
published article, Strong finds the only conclusion as to 
the total relation of so-called cause and effect that is 
empirically certain to be the fact of invariable, concomi-
tant succession or variation. In his earliest writings, 
he was also already speaking of the self as consisting of 
presentational elements (or fused residues of such), bound 
-
together by ties resembling those of ordinary association. 
The apperceptive connections of ideas arise out of the emo-
tional coloring of the presentations. However, although our 
1. Strong, Art.(1904)7, 550. 
2. Ibid., 551. 
3. Strong, Art.(1905), 189. 
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knowledge of other existences is representative, the same 
is not true of our knowledge of ourselves. We immediately 
grasp ourselves; such conscious experience is not less than 
knowledge but more. 
193 
Consciousness is in the present time and present time 
contains no elements of past or future in it--it is a mere 
boundary line; but, although a point, it is a moving point. 
The concept of a point is necessary to bring out the infinite 
successiveness of time. Since the consciousness of succession 
rests on memory, Strong concludes that the successive unity 
of consciousness cannot be asserted, only a simultaneous 
unity--the unity of that which is in consciousness at once. 
Continuity, not unity is involved in the separate states of 
consc iousness. 
{2) Causal theories. As a result of his examination 
of the empirical data of the mind-body relationship, Strong 
concludes that on this level no particular causal theory is 
strictly implied. Thus, his law of psychophysical correla-
tion merely expresses the fact of intimate connection between 
the events of mind and body without involving any causal or 
metaphysical theories. 
Three basic theories appeal to the empirical data for 
support: interactionism, automatism, and parallelism. Inter-
actionism is the view of the common sense. Automatism is a 
kind of one-sided materialistic interactionism. The paral-
lelist makes the relationship between mind and body non-causal 
and simultaneous, but does assert an efficacy both to body 
and to mind, each within its own series. 
When the several views are set down in this fashion, 
Strong finds the only one which can continue to maintain 
itself in the face of the strict examination of the facts 
to be some type of parallelistic theory. The key reason for 
rejecting interactionism is its materialistic formulation. 
Indeed, even parallelism, to be rendered initially attractive 
must involve mind and matter as conceived in other than the 
ordinary dualistic (cf. scholastic realism) fashion. Thus, 
ultimately, the parallelims of the mental and the physical 
becomes an identity, since the physical series is not real 
but phenomenal. In this way the full causal efficacy of 
consciousness is asserted. Further, parallelism (at least 
an adequate formulation of it) must assert real causation as 
holding between members of the same series (mental and phys-
ical). 
To this end, Strong records his rejection of any full 
acceptance of the Humean criticism of causation. He can 
agree that all that an external observation of phenomena can 
reveal is sequence. However, this phenomenal bond is not a 
completely arbitrary matter. The relation is not absolutely 
opaque and impenetrable to thought. The discovery by phys-
ical science of correlations between phenomena which make 
possible a high degree of predictability and control, makes 
it clear that there is some sort of empirical bond between 
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phenomena. For practical purposes this deserves the name 
of cause and effect. 
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(3) Things-in-themselves and consciousness. If there 
are objects outside the mind which give rise to certain mental 
states that symbolize them, Strong would designate them 
'things-in-themselves' to distinguish them from the subject's 
particular experience of them in perception. Though it would 
seem necessary to postulate the existence of such realities 
to deliver the world from the fragmentariness of ceasing to 
exist when ceasing to be perceived, this can only be done by 
inference; thus, their existence remains problematical. 
Strong gives up the concept of the soul and in its place 
substitutes the stream of consciousness with its empirical 
characters. Even if each pulse of consciousness were an 
absolute unity, its reality would not rest on this unity apart 
from experience, but only as characterized by experience. 
Consciousness, as an integral part of the universe of 
real things, provides the basis for inference to the nature 
of other realities outside it. Indeed, the very possibility 
of things-in-themselves depends on an adequate (idealistic) 
account being given of their nature. 
The postulate of the existence of things in themselves 
provides the best explanation of the permanent possibility 
of sensation. The postulate is further supported by the Pact 
that there are certain indisputable cases in which causal 
relations are recognized as connecting mental states with 
other mental states, and also with extramental realities. 
And, what is more, since it i s out of t h ings-in-themselves 
that individual minds are evolved, the former must be of 
such a nature as to give rise to human consciousness as ex-
perienced. 
Now, since eonsciousness as such is not in spac~ though 
it be as s ociated with a body, things - in-themselves are not 
s tric t ly speaking outside of or beyond it, but rather, other 
than i t . And, the world composed of consciousness and things-
in-themselves is not in space, though it may be in something 
of which space is the symbol. 
(4) The ana lys is of free will. In analyzing free will, 
Strong concludes that determinism and free will are not 
mutually exclusive. The true determinist, he says, holds 
freedom to be a fact, but simply insists that our acts are 
the result of our natures. We are free from performing a 
certain act of which we happen to be thinking. All conscious-
ness leads to action; thus, the thought of one act alone 
would lead automatically to the performance of that act. 
Freedom is the equilibrium between two or more thoughts as 
far as that equilibrium exists. Freedom is the power to 
deliberat e and act without external constraint. 
The consciousness of freedom arises when alternative 
courses of action are weighed against each other~ We are 
free as respects each course of action but not as respects 
both or all. Because the self is not se parate from its nature 
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(i.e., an empty form without content) one cannot think of a 
thought or feeling at the mome nt it exists. It is only in 
reflection that one can contrast himself with the motives 
and feeling s which he feels to be influencing him. When one 
is influenced, he is not aware of it, because he is at that 
moment his feelings: thus, he is determined by himself and no 
other. 
ii. Critique. (1) The extent of psychophysical 
correlation. At the very outset of his writing career, 
Charles Augustus Atrong was convinced that the only thing 
empirically certain. about the mind-body relation was the fact 
of invar iable, concomitant succession or variation. This is 
the same view which he later embodied in his law of psycho-
physical correlation. 
Now, it may well be asked whether this is something of 
which Strong has a right to be certain. It is beyond doubt 
that mind appears to affect body and body mind; it even 
197 
seems undeniable that in some sense mind or consciousness 
depends on body. However, the idea of invariable concomitant 
variation between the brain event and the mental event, is 
something that he himself is forced to admit as open to doubt. 
This precise correlation is simply not supported by the facts 
of physiological psychology, either then or now, or by intro-
spection. 
As Strong himself confesses, the idea of a separate brain 
event paired with each mental event is not something observ-
able but rather of the nature of a psychological hypothesis. 
It seems, therefore, that Strong has revealed an underlying 
bias in favor of a rather materialistic approach (in spite 
of his panpsych1sm) to the problems of psychology and meta-
physics. 
Further, this atomistic, localizing tendency may be 
one reason why he desires to define his idealism in such a 
way as to make the metaphysical nature of reality consist 
of bits of sentience. However, once this criticism is made, 
it must in all justice be admitted that the general purport 
of his law of phychophysical correlation does rest squarely 
on observed ' facts--it is what appears. 
(2) Th,e lack of unity in ·consciousness. His earliest 
views of consciousness are also strikingly similar to the 
more extended views developed later. His is essentially 
a view of the self as a fusion of presentational elements 
built up on the basis of association. Again stressing his 
pluralism, he insists that the particular ties that come 
about are the result of the emotional coloring of each of 
the several presentational elements. How this process could 
yield a truly unified self remains a mystery. It is not 
adequately bettered when he asserts that we immediately 
grasp our selves and that such conscious experience is not 
less than knowledge but more. The question still remains as 
to how immediate knowledge is possible of that which is at 
best an additive unity. 
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He is at pains to delineate our knowledge of ourselves 
from our knowledge of other existences--the latter are known 
only representatively. However, a self made up of a plural-
ity of presentational elements would appear to involve the 
same duality, basically, that in the case of other exist-
ences necessitates representative knowledge. Strong's 
formulation would consequently allow no true unity {purposive) 
in the metaphysical situation and no true immediacy in the 
epistemic situation, at any point. 
{3) The nature and continuity of time. The concept 
of time as a present, moving point Strong believes adequate 
to make possible the consciousness of succession. He be-
lieves that the movement furnishes the duration and the 
point-character the ground of successiveness. The con-
sciousness Qf succession is dependent upon memory. Con-
sciousness is thus viewed as a simultaneous unity--the unity 
of what is in consciousness at once. The separate states of 
consciousness are bound together by continuity, not unity. 
The view of time as moving ( cf. Bergson's duree reel), 
if conceived as a given datum, seems acceptable--at least 
intelligible. The matter of time being a moving point is 
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not quite so clear. strong seems to feel that an infinite 
numbe·r of points will transform discreteness into succession, 
or better, real duration. Mathematically, this almost seems 
like multiplying zero by five and deriving five (or even more). 
Logically, it s eems impossible to come out with a new factor 
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without introducing a ne w factor at any point. 
Perhaps Strong would reply that infinite multiplication 
has a kind of creative effect. But besides casting doubt, 
in this regard, on his attempt to give an account of the 
natural origin of the mind, such a solution appears justi-
fied only if compelling reasons demanded it as the only 
alternative. In st r ong's account, such reasons are to be 
found only in the necessity of explaining the experience of 
time as successive. One may well ask whether the concept of 
a point is necessary for this. 
In the first place, the experience would be adequately 
accounted for on the basis of the Bergsonian concept of given, 
real duration. Second, Strong's failure to see this suggests 
the possibility of a faulty analysis on his part of the exper-
ience of succession. He seems to be construing that experience 
as if it were a matter of witnessing a parade of discrete 
points. However, his own admission that time as experienced 
is an interval (duration) suggests otherwise. In fact his 
emphatic insistence that consciousness must be defined as in 
present time, and his assertion that great care must be 
exercised to keep present time pure, supply further evidence 
that the experience of succession is not an experience of 
discrete points, but the duration of some kind of conscious 
identity. 
(4) The teleological implications of self-identity. 
·The fact that Strong insists on the continuity of conscious-
ness through its separate states must not be taken as an 
implicit suggestion of a theory of time similar to that last 
suggested. Such a possibility is ruled out by his denial 
to consciousness of any successive unity. In this regard 
he says that the present state of consciousness may be a 
unity, but it is discrete from any past state or state to 
come. He even compares the knowledge of our own past to 
our knowledge of other minds. And, for Strong, other minds 
are completely separate from our mind. 
This raises the problem as to how continuity can be 
asserted between entirely separate factors. B. P. Bowne 
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or E. s. Brightman may appeal to the continuity of the infi-
nite person--Strong cannot; at least, he does not. 1 It might 
be suggested that his panpsychism would come to the rescue 
here by making it possible for one consciousness to feel 
(cf. prehend) its own past states and also another conscious-
ness. However, Strong does not make such an appeal. Indeed, 
it seems highly doubtful that he could, since his definition 
of time demands, as he has stated, that even in the specious 
present, the interval be bound to the past by a primal memory. 
Now, the only solution to the problem of memory . that he 
offers at all is quite materialistic, standing without explicit 
relation to his idealism. He says that the physical brain is 
1. Later, Strong will make explicit his belief that Darwinian 
naturalism makes the postulation of any God unnecessary. 
permanent l y effected by the occurrence11 of the past--in 
this way memory is possible. The quest :~on still persists 
as to how an effect of the past can be ~.dent ified with the 
experience of memory. Certainly not al:. the effects of the 
past issue in memory; as a matter of fa •:t, some actually 
issue in loss of memory or an influence on the person below 
the explicitly conscious level of memo~r. And, when memory 
functions as a successful purposive end•~avor, the presence 
of the p~rposive must be viewed as a major miracle. 
In sum, then, Strong's conception of time is inade-
quate to account for the experience of succession. His 
description of consciousness in relation to time necessi-
tates the positing of a continuity which is either the unity 
of real duration (which Strong denies), or it is nothing. 
And, his introduction of memory into the specious present, 
in addition to emphasizing the previous difficulties, is in 
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so materialistic or behavioristic a form, as to make the 
simplest type of spontaneous remembrance a completely inex-
plicable factor. It also renders the experience of successful, 
purposive remembrance a miracle in which an ego, completeiy 
isolated in the present, is enabled to leap over the bottom-
less pit of the discreteness of time and being, and recognize 
as its own past what is indistinguishable from someone else's 
present. 
The inadequacy of Strong's doctrine of consciousness and 
the ego is further brought out by the type of substitute he 
introduces in'place of the traditional soul. This is simply 
the stream of consciousness with its empirical characters. 
In the light of the above discussion, it would seem highly 
questionable whether Strong has any right to refer to the 
subject as a stream of consciousness: a succession of dis-
crete conscious points bound together by his particular type 
of continuity would appear to be more precise. 
(5) Suggestions of his ultimate nee-materialism. Since 
consciousness evolved out of whatever is the real nature of 
things, that nature must be so construed as to give rise to 
human consciousness. This apparent truism reveals a funda-
mental conviction in Strong's mind: the human mind was 
evolved from the real universe in a perfectly natural manner. 
~~atever else may be said, it can never be denied that the 
ultimate nature of reality bears some relation to conscious-
ness, since Strong will allow no emergence. 
It is not, then, Strong's idealism that is basic, but 
his unswerving confidence in the Darwinian concept of evolu-
tion, metaphysically construed. It is thus not entirely 
impossible to understand his later giving up of panpsychistic 
idealism, but still holding that the real world must be some-
thing somewhere between mind and matter, fearing otherwise, 
that the natural origin of the mind would be falsified. 
One of the reasons for his change in ultimates may root 
in Strong's apparent lack of an idealism, even in his earliest 
days, that was rigorously grounded and fully defended. He 
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seems to be satisfied ofte n with a rath er pat defence of 
his idea.listic metaphysics. For example, he says that since 
consciou sness is the onl y sample of reality of which i mmediate 
knowledg e is possessed, no other conception of reality can be 
he l d. 
Now, Strong himself has gone to great pains to show that 
although one may have immediate know ledge of some one bit of 
reality, that does n ot mean , eo ipso , that no other kind of 
reality exists. Therefore, what he shou l d have done was to 
examine what woul d be meant by the concept of another kind 
of reality--for example, matter in the traditiona l or nee-
material istic sense . If he had done this, one could hope 
that he wou l d have discovered t hat such an assert i on c ould 
sustain no intell igib l e meaning. If he had done this , he 
mi ght not have gravitated to a materi a li stic posit i on . 
It is a l so worth-while to n ote that in his earliest 
extensive formulat i ons of his thought, Strong's view of 
space foreshadowed the possibility of the very kind of devel-
opment noted above . He careful l y and correct l y observes 
that, from one point of view , consciousness as such is not in 
space. His t h ings - in-themse l ves are not then , strict l y speak-
ing outside of or beyond consciousness , but rather other than 
it . And then, i nterest i ngly enough , he conc l udes that the 
world composed of consciousness and t h ings-in-themse l ves is 
not in space , though it ma;t be in somet!::ling of which space is 
the symbol . 
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(6) A teleological critique of Strong's doctrine of 
free will. Strong's analysis, in this period, of free will 
is astute and provocative. It raises some very definite 
questions as to the possibility of significant, purposive 
action on such a basis. He says that the true determinist 
holds freedom to be a fact, but simply insists that one's 
acts are a result of his nature. This certainly sounds 
equ ivalent to limited self-determination. However, Strong 
goes on to say that one is free in that he is not obliged 
to perform a certain act of which he ~appens to be thinking. 
Now, this would appear to be simply the assertion that 
it is possible to deliberate and act without external con-
straint. In fact, this is what Strong explains his asser-
tion to mean. The difficulty arises in connection with the 
concept of constraint. Strong says one is free in some of 
his experiences from external constraint. But, what about 
the internal situation? 
True deliberation and significant, purposive action 
would seem to demand an element of pure, unconstrained activ-
ity within--unconstrained even from within by non-rational 
factors. On Strong's position, the inner situation might 
almost be mechanical, as far as his explanation of this 
particular problem goes; and, as long as external constraint 
were not present, the person could be said to be free.l 
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1. One might ask on such a basis whether the individual could 
be prope rly called a person. Would not an independent 
machine fulfill these functions just as well? 
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But, would real power to deliberate and act purposively 
remain? The possibility of the whole being quite mechanical 
on such a theory would utterly obliterate true purpose. 
Wi t hout real purpose, it is impossible to assert significant 
thought · and action. How then could man be said to be free as 
regards any particular course of action? 
That the difficulties suggested above are real is borne 
out by Strong's behavioristic conception of consciousness. 
All consciousness, he says, leads to action: the thought of 
one act alone would lead automatically to the performance 
of that act. Now, empirically, this may be flatly contra-
dicted. One may entertain in thought the possibility of one 
act, see no alternative act, and yet refuse to act at all. 
If Strong says that what he means is that there is always an 
alternative--in this case the possibility of refusing to act 
at all--it may be asked why he asserted so ambiguously that 
all consciousness leads to action and the thought of one act 
alone would lead automatically to the performance of the act? 
The meaning of act certainly shifts between these two 
concept s. Further, if 'ac t ' may be used in the special sense 
of r e fusal to act, one may inquire why the discussion of the 
entertaining of alternatives could not proceed on the basis 
of alternatives of thought rather than of action. 
What is more, when freedom is defined as equilibrium 
between alternative s , what is the status of the power that 
abolishes the equilibrium? Strong says t he power of freedom 
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makes possible the holding of alternatives in equilibrium; 
are we to assume that . the power that decides for one over 
the other is not the power of free choice? What then is it? 
The result of the inner functioning of a machine? Then, 
all truly telic function is gone, and with it anything that 
can honestly be called significant thought or action. 
Significance in thought and action must always lie in pur-
pose. 
Strong's explication of why man feels free both con-
tributes an acute insight to the discussion (on the basis of 
his previous thought}, and the same time supports the con-
clusion our discussion has reached. Strong says that since 
the self is not separate from its nature, one cannot think 
of a thought or feeling at the moment of being influenced 
by it. \¥hen one is being influenced, he is notsware of it, 
because he is, at that moment, his feelings; thus, he is 
determined by himself and no other. 
Strong's theory here is strategically influenced by 
his doctrine of time and his view of the nature of conscious-
ness. Because of his position on these matters, he insists 
that one never knows his feelings until a subsequent moment 
(introspection is retrospective). Thus he builds up his 
particular explanation of the experience of freedom. 
However, certain empirical questions arise. Is it not 
true that one is at times aware of having been influenced by 
something or someone? If' so, then, since according to Strong 
one's ~reedom is always a result of his nature (apparently 
quite mechanically conceived), a person is free only in his 
momentary feeling of freedom--a moment later in re~lection 
he may be aware of having been influenced. 
Now, what about the continuity Strong asserted between 
the separate states of the self? I~ one feels that he is 
free in a certain choice, and a moment later realizes he 
was not free, would he not instinctively (or by in~erence) 
become suspicious o~ the next ~eeling and carry into that 
experience the awareness that he is not really ~ree, and 
thus lose his ~eeling of freedom? 1 
I~ the separate states of the self are so discrete 
that this is not possible, what happens to Strong's principle 
of continuity? Or, for that matter, could personal identity 
be maintained at all? If he does not have recourse to the 
supposed discreteness of the several states of the self, how 
could Strong meet this objection? If he does not meet it, 
he has. failed to explain the ~eeling of ~reedom. Further, if 
he attempts to shift ground by abandoning his retrospective 
doctrine of introspection, he would have to abandon (or 
1. Certainly, it cannot be asserted that in the moment of 
each experience a person is a blank. The ~act that what 
we experience in any situation depends in part of the 
selective activity of the individual in the moment of 
experience shows this to be ~alse. Further, if it were 
not so, then it would a pparently be impossible to explain 
memory (or sel~-identity). One would have to remember 
what he had never known. 
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radically revise) his doctrines of time and consciousness. 
If strong says that man as determined by his own feelings 
and even thoughts is, technically speaking, determined, but 
practically speaking , free, one must demur: the assurance 
is insufficient until an adequate discussion of human purpose 
is forthcoming . If one is determined by his own feelings and 
thoughts in a mechanical or behavioristic fashion, it may 
be questioned whether anything deserving the name of freedom 
would ever be present. If man is determined by his thoughts 
and feelings in a rational or persuasive manner, the use of 
determinism as applied to the highest and deepest experiences 
of freedom appears definitely suspect. Again, Strong's 
teleological deficiencies have proved pivotal. 
6. TRANSITION 
This chapter has traced the development of Charles A. 
Strong's metaphysics from his first published writings 
thro~gh the period keynoted by his first book. The subse-
quent chapter is devoted to the period during which the 
perspective of his second volume, The Origin of Consciousness, 
was dominant. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE DEVELOPED PANPSYCHISM OF THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter traces the development of Charles A. 
Strong's metaphysics in the second major period of his 
thought. It g ives special attention to the teleological 
inadequacy of his panpsycbistic doctrines of consciousness 
and the self and his specific explanation of purpose. 
The treatment of the concepts of consciousness and the 
self bring.sout the theoretical and empirical weaknesses 
of Strong's formule.tion of each. Because of their 
deficiencies,deriving from their materialistic orienta-
tion, they make impossible the deduction of any adequate 
teleology, although a cosmic purpose, especially, must be 
presupposed to make the account meaningful at all. 
Strong's failures in these foundational matters are shown 
to be reflected in the doctrine of purpose he does avow. 
What has been implicit is manifest explicitly at this 
level from the teleological p erspective. 
2. INTERIM STATE OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
ness, 
In a series of articles on the nature of conscious-
1 
Strong continued to develop his doctrine with 
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1. Published in 1912, they consisted of three papers, the 
first two of which were read befor e the Oxford Philosophy 
Society the previous year. 
increasing precision. "Consciousness," he said, "is the 
awareness, sometimes accompanying cognition, of the states 
of mind by means o'f which we cognize. 111 In the case of 
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a sense perception, for example, an 'image' (sense perception) 
is correlated with a brain event. This is what amounts to 
being a 'psychical existence.' Consciousness consists of 
all psychical states taken together; in this sense 
2 
consciousness exists. 
To cognize or to be aware is to think of a thing or 
experience it without any thought about it. Such knowledge, 
whether it be perceptual or conceptual, is bare 'knowledge 
3 by acquainta.nce. 1 To explain the mechanism of awareness--
for example, the delayed nature of the image--two assump-
tions are necessary: "that the objects of sense perception 
are real existences" and that they are not only in time 
but in space, "or in an order symbolized to us by space" 4 
The acceptance of the reality of individual minds is 
unavoidable; and, if only they exist, reality at least 
"consists of an immense number of simultaneous parts. 11 5 
1. Strong, Art.(l912), 534. 
2. Ibid. I 572. 
3. Ibid., 589. 
4. Ibid., 593I 
5. Ibid. I 595. 
A cognitive state in itself is a non-cognitive 
1 
feeling. Various feelings and images follow each other 
in a train, the unity of which depends on each member 
being accessible to memory. 2 
The possibility therefore exists that the thread 
on which our feelings (so~r as they are cognitive) 
are strung is an external one; that we never can 
understand their performances unless we take 
account of their external relations. In a word, 
feelings need not be intel l igent in themselves, 
prov i ded they follow one another in an intelli-
gent order. The functions they discharge will 
then communicate to our life as a wholg as much 
intelligence as we feel it to possess. 
3. THE PANPSYCHISM OF THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
i. Introduction. At the close of his first volume, 
Strong promised a further discussion and elaboration of 
his theory of mind-stuff. The clarifications promised 
concerned "the seeming disparity in complexity between 
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the mind and the brain ·~process, the nature of mind-stuff 
Lan27 the origin of consciousness out of it."4 These 
constitute the aim and purpose of The Origin of ConsciousRess. 
Strong notes that there have been changes in his 
philosophical views in the fi f teen years since his first 
book appeared; but, he feels that these were not so much 
1. Strong, Art.(l912), 598. It would be more accurate for 
Strong to call such a feeling non-self-conscious. 
2. Ibid. I 598-599. 
3. Ibid., 599. 
4. Strong, OC~l. 
in his metaphysical theory as in " the premise , the 
fundamental conceptions, on which the theory is bui lt 
u p. 111 Thus, whi le he continues to believe that what 
appears as physical is actually in itself psychical (but 
not u nextended), his idea of matter and consciousness and 
their re l at i on to mind are altered. 2 
The probl em of mind and body Strong v i ews as partly 
a causal and part ly an existenital question.3 He accepts a 
type of parallelism, but considers it to be actually a 
new theory sinc e i t reverses the relation of ordinary 
parall elism and h olds that 1'~mental states, i nstead of 
being the effe cts, are the causes of the brain-events. 11 4 
Strong believes that his panpsychist theory actually 
recon ciles and inc l udes with in i t self all the alternate 
t he ori e s : that of interactionism, c onsciou s automatism, 
and paral le l ism . 5 He says that it was only since the 
publication o f Why the Mind has a Bod y that i t became 
cle a r to him that the pass i veness of consciousness insisted 
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upon by the automatist is " not the mi nd or psyche as an 
existence but consciousness , i.e . , t he function of awareness." 6 
1. Strong , oc' 1-2. 
2. or< 
' 
2 . 
3 . Ibid. 
4 . oc ' 3 . 
5. oc , 4. 
6 . oc, 3-4 . Underl ini ng mine . 
Another change in his view concerns the significance 
of the contents of perception; he is now desirous of making 
clear that it must not be assumed that things as they really 
are differ to a very large extent from the way they are 
exhibited in perception. Further, while he used to 
consider consciousness as constituting the substance of 
the mind, he now makes fee~ing or sentience (cf. mind-stuff; 
the substance of the mind-eonsciousness is its function.l 
What is introspected is not consciousness but rather feeling 
or sentience. 2 
The psychic state as it appears in tntrospection and 
the psychic state as it really is may also be distinguished, 
because introspection is not intuition (since is is retro-
spective) and error may arise since "introspection takes 
place by means of the mental images left behind in primary 
3 
memory." This is a further refinement of the representa-
tionism of his first bo ok. On this basis he goes on to 
modify the metaphysical idealism of his panpsychism. 
I have come to see, first, that space proper is 
the space of external things--which are external 
only because they and we are in it--and, secondly, 
that no good reason can be offered for refusing to 
regard space as real; Since existences (including 
among them selves) are plural and are held apart by 
1. Strong, OC, 11. Substance: the totality ofnon-cognitive 
feelings in themselves. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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relations corresponding at least to spatial 
ones, so that in~ case we shall not1escape a tridimensional system of relations. 
The psyche must thus be held to be both psychic and 
2 
extended. If this extension is not an obvious datum 
3 of introspection, it is at least a discoverable one. 
At this point there enters an element which is 
most suggestive for Strong's ultimate tendency in the 
direction of neo-materialism. He says that if universal 
reality be not taken as fundamentally psychic (he casts 
his lot on this side now), psychic character belongs to 
ultimate reality at least eauall~ with the material or the 
4 
extensional. From his law of psychophysical correlation 
(which insists on an invariable correlation of the events 
of mind and body) as developed in his previous book, he 
now develops what be calls his physical method: the use 
of bodily facts and relations as clues "to the analysis 
5 
and interpretation of mental facts." 
Strong announces that his purpose in this volume is 
to show that mind bas evolved as a natural product in the 
1. Strong, OC, 13. There seems to be a confusion here be-
tween space as real and something like space being real. 
2. Ibid • . I.e., Strong embraces a double-aspect theory. 
Of. Fechner. 
3. Ibid. Discoverable, Strong feels, by inference from, 
for example, so-called feelings of extensiveness. 
4. OC, 15. It may be said that this amounts to at least 
a weak behaviorism. 
5. 00, 14. 
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ongoing of the universe. He feels that the description 
most philosophers give of the origin of mind amounts 
simply to saying that 11 at a certain moment consciousness 
1 
begins to be. 11 He finds this · hardly less creationist and 
just as unsatisfying as the traditional theological 
2 
answer. In order to exhibit the natural origin of the 
mind, Strong concludes that one must show that the ante-
cedents of mind are of the same fundamental nature as 
3 
mind: to this end, be postulates his theory of mind-stuff. 
ii. The nature of mind~stuff. Strong conceives of 
his mind-stuff as complex: it has parts--as a visual sensa-
tion or even a complicated thought apparently contains a 
number of simultaneous details. 4 At this point, Strong 
has recourse to the claim by psychologists of having 
discovered a character of extensity in sensation. This 
is presumed to be the space of the brain event which 0 in 
5 
its true inner being is the sensation itself." 
Now, it has to be admitted that in some sensations it 
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is easier to detect this quality of extensity (for Strong, 
not necessarily external) than in others, but even in the 
case of sound, Strong points out a certain 11 voluminousness. 11 6 
1. Strong, OC, 16. 
2. Ibid. 
3. oc, 17. 
4. OC, 23. 
5. OC, 24. This amounts to a 
direct experience of the 
space of a brain event. · 
6. oc, 24. 
His basic assumption, however, is that such relations 
must be present in all psychic states alike; thus, he 
supposes that in certain sensations the quality of 
extensity is covered up, though present; while in others 
1 
it is patent. To the extent that it is not obvious it 
is believed in by inference (from vague feelings in some 
cases). 
Critics, says Strong, are accustomed to accuse the 
mind-stuff theory of atomism; and, he is quite willing 
to admit that on his theory the parts of mind-stuff are 
separately rea1. 2 He denies, however, that they are 
discrete in the sense of being individuated by gaps: 
mind-stuff constitutes a continuum (but in the sense of 
a juxtaposition). 3 
Strong derives his final test for the constitution 
of mind-stuff from introspection, corrected by what iS 
known about the brain event. 4 Introspection, he finds, 
does not reveal 11 gaps of nothingness between the minute 
parts of our psychic states. 11 5 
If his theory is stil l criticized as ignoring the 
absolute unity usually conceived as necessary for an 
adequate description of mi nd, Strong replies that intro-
1. 
2. 
'::t 
'-'• 
4. 
5. 
Strong, OC, 24. 
oc, 24-25. 
QC 1 24. 
Ibid. But why not the other way around? 
oc, 25 
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spection reveals at best no such absolute unity, 
but "only a plurality of elements in the form of a 
field, 11 the inner cohesion of which may be explained by 
1 
the aid of memory. Thus, the entering wedge is present, 
he feels, by which to show that the psychic state is in 
2 
reality much more complex than it first seems to be. 
iii. The psyc~. Psychic states are to be 
distinguished from essences--they are the means or 
3 
vehicles by which essences.are given. The sensory 
examination of the brain in physiological psychology 
reveals brain-events; 4 the introspective consideration 
of the psychological nature of the self yields psychic 
states (non-cognitive in themselves) which can be paired 
with brain-events. The meaning or logical significance 
of psychic states is what is referred to by the term 
essences. This specified in greater detail his previous 
use of the concept of essence. 
Psychic state.s may be made up of •mental images r as 
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well as sensations, but these latter arise out of sensations. 
Visual sensations have a primary place in this process.5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Strong, OC. 25. 
Of. 00, 27. 
00, 79. The meaning of a psychic state is its essence. 
But Strong has had to admit in WMB that this is an 
h~pothesis rather than a!!£! of physiological psychology. 
Q 1 102. 
Note how difficult it is to recall odors. Pure generality 
(the abstract idea) is a character of the essence not of 
the psychic state, as such. 1 
All psychic states, if they are not actually existent 
within the body, are at any rate bound up inseparably with 
it. The only psychic states an individual can experience 
are those bound up with his own body, and these 11 are in 
some peculiar sense mine 11 • Finally, if all one's psychic 
states ceased to exist, the individual ego would cease to 
exist. 2 All body is a manifestation of mind-stuff. 
Strong feels that the best explanation of these data 
is to suppose that "psychic states are states of the psyche 
or self. 3 The self must not be conceived of in impossible 
abstract terms, but rather as a changing thing now in one 
4 
state, now in another--a self concretely characterized. 
A psychic state is then an expression for 11 the psyche in a 
5 
certain state. 11 In this sense, the self (qualified) in 
its various forms or feelings is the sole datum of intro-
spection: for example, I do not introspect 1pleasure 1 but 
introspect 'I am pleased. 1 6 The psychic whole of these 
1. Strong, OC, 103. A psychic state arises out of the 
functioning of feelings. It is a ~ate of consciousness 
on the level of i mpressions. 
2. 00, 104. This behavioristic reference is Strong's only 
attempt to deal with the 1mineness 1 of self-experience. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. 00, 105. 
6. Ibid. 
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1 feelings or elements is the self. But, note that Strong 
is speaking of self-experience as E. S. Brightman would 
speak not of the datum-self but the total self. Strong 
never provides an adequate analysis of the datum-self. 
Stressing his belief that this view of the self is 
the only real alternative, Strong contrasts it with other 
suggested formulations and concludes that the self can be 
neither an object of sense perception, nor can it be the 
b ody--it must be an object of introspection. 2 And, since 
introspection is retrospection, a past state is cognized 
by a present state, perhaps by means of "a primary memory-
image.113 
Since we can know past states of our own consciousness 
and form some idea of their nature, there is no reason 
why we cannot do the same in regard to existences other 
than ourselves--in both cases we 'twO uld be cognizing 
something which lies beyond us in one sense, but does not 
therefore lie outside our cognitive reach.4 But, the 
further question can still be asked: what guarantee is 
there that Strong's theory of cognition will actually 
explain bow adequate knowledge i s obtained? To the 
consideration of this problem Strong now turns. 
1. Strong, OC, 105. 3. oc, 105-106. 
2. OC, 105-10?. 4. oc, 124-125. 
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iv. The adequacy of cognition. Strong is convinced 
that his vehicular th eory of knowledge makes possible 
certain corollaries which assure adequacy to the knowing 
process. Part of his case rests on the negative 1~vidence 
of the unworkability of a complete or even considerable 
1 
agnosticism . Since perc ept ion is serviceable for life, 
it must contain an element of resemblance; and, this is 
particularly undeniable in the instance of the spatial 
qualities of objects, since they are probably the most 
2 important of all for successful adjustment. However, 
this element of resemblance does not bring back repre-
sentationism, because it is still the object not the 
symbol in terms of which, by animal faith, an individual 
responds. 
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If perceptions are to serve effectively for biological 
utility, they must at least reproduce "the main relations 
3 
of things." Of course, it is not required that all 
perceptions be perfectly adequate. In fact, colors perhaps 
render better service than if they were absolutely accurate, 
"and nature would probably not have found it easy to equip 
us with such photographically realisti c preceptions. 114 
1. Strong, OC, 226-22?. 
2. oc, 22?. 
3. Ibid., This suggests the possibility of the creative 
activety of the mind, to a degree, in perception. 
4. Ibid. 
Where it is possible to examine, as it is in 
introspection, both the object and the vehicle (which 
cognizes it) in terms of the same form of cognition 
(the psychic state), "they may be assumed to vary as 
the given-essences exhibiting them do." This situation 
in its adequacy of cognition testifies that introspection, 
l 
on the vehicular theory, is, in effect, adequate knowledge. 
Thus, the greater likeness of the vehicle to the 
object, would enable it to call forth a truer rendering 
2 
of the object by a given es s ence. But, since all that 
is necessary in sense perception is the practical value 
of delivering those traits necessary for successful 
action, sense perception need not exhibit the nature 
of things, but only their relations.3 
As it is all but impossible for us to conceive the 
inner nature of portions of matter or lower organisms 
related to our own bodies, and yet, the relation is 
there, so the only alternative is to suppose that in 
some way there is a continuity between the inner being of 
.d. 
such realities and the self we know in introspection.-
1. Strong, OC, 231. 
2. oc, 232. 
3. OC, 233. 
4. Ibid., Note how Strong's approach tends to be 
external even in regard to our own bodies. 
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Definite light is thrown on the nature of such realities 
only by the consideration that because of the evolutionary 
derivation of mi nded bo dies out of lower organisms (and 
they in turn out of inorganic matter), the nature of all 
these existences must be ultimately and fundamentally the 
same; i.e., 1 psychic. And, "things in their real nature 
2 
are at once physical and psychical. 11 
v. Memory and personal identity. Strong's object 
all along has been to give an account of cognition by 
analyzing or resolving it into simpler components; only 
in this way, he says, can it be conceived of as a natural 
product of evolution. 3 The final difficulty in the way 
of such a psychology he considers to be 11 the apparent 
4 
unity of the mind. 11 At the outset he warns that the 
predication of indivisible being (existential unity) of 
the psyche would be fatal to his evolutionary project: 
what must be done is to treat this seeming identity and 
unity as the functional incidents of a process. 5 
Hume, in his analysis of the mental stream, failed to 
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realize that for us to know that feelings are unrelated they 
1. Strong, OC, 233~234. 
2. OC, 235. 
3. oc 1 239. 
4. Ibid. 
5. oc, 240. 
must actually snmehow have become related. 1 Mill was 
forced to recognize this fact in his admission that while 
for him the mind was only a series of sensations, these 
sensations are nonetheless "aware of themselves as a 
2 series." However, says S~rong, Hume and Mill erred in 
their analysis of the stream of consciousness. If both 
the elements which stand prominently forward and the 
"interstitial feelings that join them are taken together, 
the mind is not constituted of a detached series but is 
a real stream." 
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The only interruptions there are in consciousness occur 
4 
when it temporarily ceases. But, it still must be admitted, 
says Strong, that a continuity of feeling is not the same 
thing as a feeling or knowledge of continuity. 5 The latter 
depends completely on memory; by remembering our past states 
we feel that they were continuous with each other. 6 When we 
feel that a later state has grown out of an earlier one, we 
are dependent upon our actual experience of the transition 
? between states. 
Memory is simply the "reinstatement of an earlier ex-
perience, with the recognition that it is such; 11 what is 
reinstated may derive from sense perception or introspection 
and these two are never completely isolated from each other. 8 
1. Strong, OC, 241. 
2. Ibid. 
3. oc, 242. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
? . Ibid. 
8. OC, 243. 
The recall of psychic states is particularly relevant 
1 for the bearing of memory on the unity of the mind. 
If memory is posited as necessary for retention 
(the preserving of our experiences from the past since 
225 
they are not given to consciousness in the interval), 
Strong questions whether this by itself would necessitate 
an unanalyzable, sui generis view of the unity and identity 
of the mind (an absolute identity). 2 He argues that if 
memory in this way proves absolute identity, forgetfulness, 
to the extent that it exists, must prove absolute dis-
3 
continuity. Further, he cites pathology as demonstrating 
that the brain is the instrument of retention. In cases 
where the brain has been injured in a certain way, the 
power of retention has been destroyed. 
Strong thinks that this view is acceptable as long 
as all material objects are recognized as inwardly 
4 
psychical. On the periphery of the ego (as the entire 
psychic existence reacting and adjusting), in what might 
be called the unconscious self, "are stored not only our 
memories, but our ideas before they come up by association."5 
1. Strong, OC, 243. 
2. oc, 243-244. 
3. 00, 245 
4. OC, 246. 
5. Ibid. This appears to be 
a kind of cabinet, picture 
thinking. 
These factors bear a relation analogous to the self 
l 
as does the brain in repose to the brain in action. 
What persists are not 'traces,' but arrangements for 
renewal (or 'psychic disposition') which furnish the 
potentialities for a variety of different functions. 2 
In other words, something psychical does persist, but. it 
need not be construed in the sense of the traditional 
concept of the soul; for here is not simple, unanalyzable 
unity, but great complexity. 3 
The second argument for an existential unity of the 
self is based on the recognition of experience when memory 
revives it; it is said that this would be i mpossible 
4 
unless the ego were in both cases identical. But, says 
l::itrong, this in turn would raise the problem of how such 
n 
an abstract ego could know concretely.~ Thus, he prefers 
to p6sit a psychic state exactly reproducing an earlier 
one: to recognize is then to have the feeling of familiar-
ity which is a coloring by which sensations, and perhaps 
6 
even memory-images, come attended. This familiarity is 
explained to oneself by the reflection, in abstract form, 
? 
that one has experienced the imagined situation before. 
The whole process is to a great extent mechanical. 8 
1. Strong, OC, 246-24?. 5. Ibid. 
2. QC 1 24? • 6. Ibid. 
3. oc, 248. 7. Ibid. 
4. oc, 249. 8. OC, 250. 
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Comparative lack of vividness occasions the reference of 
1 
an essence to the past rather than to the present. 
All these effects can be produced, with the 
result of a true act of memory, without the 
ego having unity or being anything but (in 
its vehicular part) a resembling psychic 
state.2 
The difficulty of how a ser ies of psychic states 
could judge themselves to be i dent ical or continuous 
is easily resolved, Strong says, by the fact that . what 1oes 
the jUdging is not the series but the last state. 3 
Or more precisely, it is the state succeeding the last 
of the series which the judgment refers to; that is 
. 4 
"the ego of which this psychic state forms a part." 
Cognition and will, which are in a sense external 
5 
functions, make this possible. 
What remains most nearly the same in the experience 
of personal identity is the retention of a certain 
stock of memories, and yet even this is n~absolutely 
uncbanging. 6 However, such personal identity is 
7 
adequate for practical purposes. 
vi. Fate and free will. The world is governed 
by cau•e and effect, but man is free to realize some 
of the ends he bas "at heart."8 Fatalism is thus a 
1. Strong, OC, 250. 5. oc, 252. 
2. QC 1 251. 6. oc, 252-253. 
3. Ibid. 7. oc' 253. 
4. lbid. 8. oc, 324. 
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fallacy and illusion. One is free to decide on one 
course of action or another, · or on no action at all; 
and free from the compulsion to decide at once--one 
1 
may take time to deliberate. This freedom, empirical 
2 
and undeniable, is the only necessary for morality. 
This does not mean that our decisions are un-
caused; it is simply the assertion of the experience 
of decision or choice. 3 The speculative theory of 
uncaused decisions 11 is needed not for lluman morality 
4 but for 11 the Being who made the universe." The human 
will has an efficacy, genuine though limited, since 
it is a force among other forces. When we act, all 
that is operative and real is our present nature--our 
will. 5 
The self is responsible, since it possesses the 
above freedom, and this responsibility has a definite 
bearing on whether the universe can be judged to be 
6 
on the side of the good. The Good here must be 
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interpreted as referring to what the majority of human 
7 beings value for the purposes of survival. As for Nature, 
1. Strong, OC, 325. 
2. Ibid. 
3. OC, 325~326. 
4. OC, 326. The statement is of course only hypothetical. 
5. OC, 328. 
6. oc, 329. 
7. Ibid. 
it seems indifferent--in its general action more or 
less like the weather. The best universe for humans is 
probably that in which men are left on their own; 1 that 
is to say, possess a freedom that begets maturity. 
4. RESPONSES AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
i. Strong's physical method. In his review of 
The Origin of Consciousness, Roy Wood Sellars found it 
significant that Strong refused to accept materialism 
because he believed that a psychic character appears 
2 
clearly in the object of introspection. Sellars feels 
that one of the pivotal weaknesses of panpsychism is 
reached when Strong concludes that even simple qualities 
are not ultimate. The physical analogy, says Sellars, 
is at work: 11 there must be a one-to-one correspondence 
3 between matter as known and feeling." 
This last emphasis was confirmed by Strong in A 
Theory of Knowledge (1923). Although primarily concerned 
with problems of epistemology, metaphysical elements were 
not entirely absent. These grew particularly out of his 
effort to show that immediate experience is in time and 
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4 
space and that it constitutes the inner nature of the real. 
1. Strong, OC, 330. 
2. Sellars, Art.(l919), 31?. 
3. Ibid. 318. 
4. Strong, TK, viii. 
On this basis he describes the self as "identical with an 
extract from, or pattern of process in, the nervous 
1 
system." 
ii. Continuity in space and time. Strong points 
to the fact that a sensation is not just an aggregate of 
parts; it has continuity in time and also a sort of 
2 
spatial continuity. There are relations between the 
terms in immediate experience, even if they are not 
3 given. Now, continuity must be applied to both time 
and space. In agreement with Bertrand Russell, Strong 
defines the continuous nature of a line (for example) 
as arising when the series of points which compose it 
4 
can be said to be 1compact. 1 This compactness designates 
the existence between any two points of an infinite number 
5 
of points in a certain arrangement. 
Continuity, as regards both the realms of time and 
space, is Strong's substitute for existential unity, and 
6 is the basis for all relations in space and time. 
External relations hold between physical objects--such 
1. Strong, TK, viii. , 
2. TK, 27. 
3. TK, 28-29. 
4. TK, 42. This would seem to be a rejection already of 
real continuity. 
5. Ibid. There is no such thing as absolute roncrete unity. 
6. Ibid. · 
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relations are accidental; logical relations, holding 
1 between the abstract character of things are essential. 
A physical relation joins its terms into a whol~ tha 
2 
unity of which is formal, one of arrangement. Its unity 
exists ultimately as an idea before the mind; externally, 
there is not unity but continuity, spatial juxtaposition.3 
The spatio-temporal order is ultimate in its incapability 
4 
of being explained by any deeper unity. 
The continuity of time is built out of a multiplicity 
5 
of instants. Time and spacediffer mathematically; 
motion, its possibility arising out of this difference, 
is "the superposition of the continuity of time •.. upon 
6 
the continuity of space." Every duration of time is 
composed of an infinite number of shorter durations 
existing successively; thus, nothing can transpire in 
7 
a duration as such. 
"A duration is a limited series of instants concreted 
into a whole by a mind. 118 This concretion by the mind into 
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a whole (something more than a continuum) takes place either 
after or before the event; events take place only in instants, 
and it takes an infinite series of them to make an event. 9 
l. Strong, TK, 43. 6. TK, 46. 
2. TK, 44. 7. !bid. 
3. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 
5. TK, 45. 
An instant is 11 a point of time at once separating and 
1 joining the past and the future." 
To account for change, present reality must be 
taken in its nature as force and cause--the source or 
2 principle of change. Space is more real than time in 
3 
the sense that "matter is more real than duration." 
If there are to be units of matter, there must be 
points--a point which unites as well as spparates, 
4 
and in its very nature involves position. Point, 
position, line, plane, solid, etc. are all merely 
abstractions from space. From one point of view, only 
matter exists since only matter is force, while order 
5 
i S of the nature of truth. 
Yet, matter is more than force, it is psychic in 
natur e; spec i f i cally, it is fee l ing. Strong supported 
his metaphysical idealism epistemologically in an 
article that same year in wh ich he asserted that 
Bergsonians are in error in omitting belief from their 
6 
analysis of experience. Belief that data reveal 
reality is an element internal to the data: t h is is the 
? 
world of common sense. This is also one of the grounds 
1. Strong, TK, 46-4?. 
2. TK, 4?. 
3. Tk, 48. 
4. Ibid. 
5. TK, 49. 
6. Strong, Art.(l923), 193. 
?. Ibid. 
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for .Strong's panpsychist ic metaphysics, since this 
further emphasizes the fact that objects are never 
given except as modifications of consciousness. 
iii. Teleological implications of Strong's present 
metaphysical development. In 1925, Durant Drake published 
a volume entitled Mind and Its Place in Nature. Drake 
in .his preface, records his indebtedness to Charles A. 
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Strong. Not only had they been conversing and corresponding 
for a dozen years, but this volume also was begun in 
response to Strong's urging, and was discussed in detail 
1 
with him. Further, they had reached "practically 
complete agreement, 11 and Strong authorized him to state 
2 
that it represented his own view. It will be noted 
that Drake's discussion appears to go considerably beyond 
Strong's metaphysical orientation in the direction of 
materialism, Actually, Drake is only bril'lgit.tg,::to ,)the 
surface presuppositions and conclusions that Strong has 
held to a great degree all along, but bas refraine~ from 
expressing. Perhaps one reason for Strong's hesitancy 
previous to this time was due to the effect it might 
have had on his orthodox Christian father. The later died 
in 1921 and Drake's volume was the first extended work, 
representative of Strong's position, to appear subsequent 
to that date. 
1. Drake, MPN, xiii. 
2. Ibid. 
In discussing the self as an agent, Drake comments 
that some will object that a view of the self which 
identifi es it with the psychophysical organism leaves 
1 
out its most distinctive characteristics. It will be 
said that the self works teleologically, while the body 
2 
and brain work mechanically. Drake replies that a 
purpose is a set of the organism, 
a tendency towards a certain sort and amount of 
motor expression, which persists through vary-
ing circumstances until that motor expression 
has been accomplished--or until that particular 
set of the organism 3s crowded out of existence 
by other tendencies. 
The situation is analogous to a self-regulating 
clock or a self-righting top; although, there might 
conceivably be some indeterminate factor somewhere . in 
4 
the process. Purpose is able to affect the future 
only as a force in the causal nexus; but, since the 
future is not yet existent, it has no PO'!i1er to produce 
5 
events. And, such is the intricacy of the natural 
processes, that though the causal connections be in 
doubt, one should be hesitant to say that the results 
effected could not be accounted for by natural causes. 
So, the conclusions of the vitalists certainly seem 
6 
somewhat hasty. 
1. Drake, HPN, xiii, 224. 
2. Ibid. 
3. MPN, 229. 
4. Ibid. 
5. MPN, 230-231. 
6. MPN, 230. 
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Intelligence, empirical ly, is an organization 
of the sensori-motor process ... representative 
of the nature of the surrounding world •.. 
Volition may be defined as the process by 
which a series of mental states ••• evoke, 
through the efferent nerves, bodily move-
ment. Decision (the fiat of the will) is 
the resolution of opposition, the overcoming 
of contrary motortendenctes. It is ... natural 
to suppose, a priori, that animal behavior, 
including our own, is merely a complex result-
ant of the behavior of •.• ordinary1atoms in their new and peculiar situation. 
Drake goes on to describe voluntary action as 
11 simply a refinement upon reflex-action. 112 That there 
may be an immaterial spirit or self and that it is 
immortal is something that Drake feels should not be 
denied, but neither should it be affirmed--it is a 
matter of guess work, and be feels his theory bas as 
much room for any such facts, if they be discovered, 
3 
as any othe~ theory. Consciousness is a function 
4 
of the living organism. But, although the brain is 
a mechanism, its action may allow some free play: 
if in the brain or in the world there are intelligible 
irregularities, they must be admitted--however, so 
far, they have not been shown with certainty to 
exist. 5 
1. Drake, MPN, 232-233. 4. MPN, 245. 
2. MPN, 233. 5. MPN, 252. 
3. MPN, 243-244 
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5. SUMMARY AND CRITICISM 
i. Survey. (1) The nature and origin of 
consciousness. Strong speaks of feelings as not 
necessarily intelligent in themselves. He would 
assemble consciousness by threading non-cognitive 
feelings together in an intelligent order. The 
functions they discharge will communicate to our life 
as a whole as much intelligence as we feel it to possess. 
Consciousness is the function ofawareness (feelings related 
together). The object of introspection is not conscious-
ness but feeling or sentience. 
Consciousness is able to originate naturally in the 
course of evolution since the same bits of sentience 
(or feeling) that constitute, under certain sets of 
conditions, the physical world, under cer tain other 
conditions constitute consciousness. And, if ultimate 
reality be not taken as fundamentally psychic, psychic 
character at least belongs to ulti mate reality equally 
with the material or the extensional. Strong calls his 
method physical : the use of bodily facts and relations 
as clues to the analysis and interpretation of mental 
facts. His purpose is to show the mind has evolved as 
a natural product in the ongoing of the universe. 
Creationism or emergence are equally unsatisfying. To 
exhibit the natural origin of the mind, one must show 
tha t the antecedents of mind are of the same fundamental 
nature as mind. 
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Strong's mind-stuff is plural: it has parts. 
For example 1 a visual sensation or even a complicated 
thought apparently contains a number of simultaneous 
details. Even some sensations of sound reveal a certain 
voluminousness. The extensity of a sensation may be 
inferred to be the space of the brain event which in 
its true inner being is the sensation itself. 
(2) The unity of _mind. The bits of mind stuff are 
separately real, but they are not individuated by gaps--
mind stuff in its totality constitutes a continuum. 
Strong1 s source of knowledge for the mature of mind 
stuff is thus introspection, corrected by what is known 
about the brain event. However, no absolute unity of 
mind is revealed in introspection, but a plurality of 
elements in the form of a field, the inner cohesion of 
which may be explained by memory. The psychic state 
(or aspect of conscious experience) is thus in reality 
more complex than it first seems to be. 
If psychic states do not actually exist within the 
body, they are nevertheless bound up inseparably with it: 
those bound up with my own body are in some peculiar 
sense mine. Further, if all one's psychic states ceased 
to exist, the individual would cease to exist. These 
various facts are best explained if psychic states are 
taken as states of the psyche or self. The self 1s then a 
237 
changing thing, concretely characterized, now in one 
state now in another. Thus, I do not introspectively 
observe 1 pleasure 1 but rather introspectively observe 
1 I am pleased.' The self is the psychic whole of these 
feelin gs or elements. 
In Strong's attempt to conce i ve cognition as a 
natural product of evolution, he asserts that only by 
a nalyzing or resolving it into simpler components can 
this be done. Thus, his project, if successful, will 
find the seemi ng unity and identity of the mind to arise 
as the functional incidents of a process. 
(3) Self-identity. The mind becomes a real stream 
of consciousness, and not a detached series when both the 
elements which stand prominently forward in introspection 
and the interstitial feelings that join them are taken 
together. The only interruptions there are in con-
sciousness occur when it temporarily ceases. The 
feeling of continuity, as over against the continutiy 
of f eeling, depends on memory. When one feels that a 
later state has grownr. out of an earlier one, he is 
actually dependent on his experience of the tran~ion 
between states. 
Memory is the reinstatement of an earlier experience 
with the recognition that it is such. What iS reinstated 
may derive from sense perception or introspection, and 
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these are never completely isolated from each other. But 
the fact of memory no more proves the absolute identity 
of the self than does the fact of forgetfulness prove 
absolute discontinuity. Further, pathology demonstrates 
that the brain is the instrument of retention. Such 
a view is acceptable as long as all material objects are 
recognized as inwardly psychical. What persist are 
complex arrangements for renewal, not traces. 
Strong judges an absolutely identical ego abstract 
and views the fundamental problem here to be how such an 
abstract ego could know concre~ely. Therefore, he explains 
recognition as resting on one psychic state which 
exactly reproduces an earlier one. As a result, 
sensations (and perhaps even memory images) come 
attended by a feeling of familiarity. This fa~iliarity 
is explained to oneself by reflection, that one has 
exper i enced the imagined situation before. All that· 
is necessary for this is that the ego, in its vehicular 
part, be a resembling psychic state. What is most nearly, 
but not completely, the same in the experience of personal 
identity is one's stock of memories. 
(4) The continuity of space and time. Strong 
describes a sensation as not just an aggregate of parts; 
it has a sort of spatial continuity as well as continuity 
in time. The root analogy of continuity is illustrated 
1n the case of a line. It arises when the series or 
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points that compose it are compact; i.e., when the infinite 
number of points which exist between two points sustain 
this certain arrangement. 
External relations(accidental) hold between physical 
objects; logical relations, holding between the abstract 
character of things are essential. A physical relation 
may join its terms into a whole (continuity), but unity 
exists ultimately as an idea .before the mind. 
Time is composed of instants. Since every duration 
of time is composed of an infinite number of shorter 
durations existing successively, nothing can transpire 
in a duration as such. A duration is a limited series 
of instants concreted into a whole by the mind. 
This concretion takes place either before or after 
an event. An event takes place only in instants, of which 
it takes an infinite series to make an event. An instant 
is thus a point of time at once separating and joining the 
paat and the future. Present reality, as in its nature 
force or cause, is the source and principle of change. 
Space might be viewed as more real than time in so far as 
matter is more raal than duration. 
(5) Purpose. Drake, speaking for Strong as well as 
for himself, sees, as a criticism which will be levelled 
against their position, their apparent omission of the 
most distinctive characteristic of the self: teleological 
activity. Drake replies that purpose is a set of the 
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organism analogous to a self-regulating clock or self-
righting top. The existence and activity of purpose, so 
far as it yet is known, can be accounted for by natural 
processes. Volu ntary action is simply a refinement upon 
reflex action: consciousness is a function of the living 
organism. The brain is a mechanism. 
ii. Evaluation. This critique shows the teleological 
inadequacy of Strong's doctrines of consciousness, the self , 
and his specific explanation of purpose. The doctrines of 
consciousness and the self are necessary for the elabora-
tion of any adequate teleology. In these doctrines, because 
of their mechanistic explanation, no significant teleology 
is derivable, although a cosmic purpose, especially, must 
be presupposed to make the account meaningful at all. These 
conclusions are confirmed by an examination of the doctrine 
of purpose that Strong does assert. 
{1) The constitution of consciousness. Strong's 
concept of feelings as not necessarily intelligent in 
themselves, but as constituting consciousness, raises a 
number of problems. He says that they are threaded to-
gether in an intelligent order and thereby function to 
communicate to our life as a whole as much intelligence 
as we feel it to possess. The substance of mind is taken 
to be feelings, While consciousness iS the function of these 
feelings. 
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In the first place , Strong bases his concept of non-
cognitive feel i ngs on the fact that when one is conscious of 
an obj ect he is not se lf-conscious at the same time . Waiving 
the objection that self-consciousness could take place at the 
same t_me that one is conscious o-f an object , it may be ob-
served that if Strong ' s observation were accurate all i t would 
prove would be that sense feelings are experienced as non-self-
conscious, not as non-cognitive .l Note a l so that Strong is 
not appea l ing to se lf-experience but to cognitive experience. 
It may a l so be asked who or what the agent is that 
threads the various feelings together . If these feelings 
simpl y interact with each other as physical atoms, the probl em 
of relation and arrangement emerges. Is i t pure l y accidental 
that an intelligent order comes about ? If not , and there is 
something about the nature of Strong ' s atoms of sentience 
which causes them to arrange themse l ves i n a certain way , 
the.n , the question of the discreteness of the at oms comes to 
the fore. Are they monads necessitating a pre-established 
harmony to exp l ain their re l at ionships ? Since Strong intro-
duces no God or even fate, this would hanily s e em t o be the 
case. Is it then al lowable to conceive of Strong's a t oms 
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of sentience as prehending each other according to certain 
eterna l patterns ? Of the lat ter , there is no suggestion or evi-
dence :In Strong . Fur ther, sinre Strong ct.es not allow any act:ion at a di stance, 
1. See Brightman , Comments on Drake , MPN , 248 . To the 
latter's " It is not correct to say t hat the minute 
events which make up the life of the mind are conscious," 
ESB replies , "The analytic fallacy. 11·' 
prehension would appear to be unallowable. This 
conclusion is also supported by ~trong's emphasis on 
an extreme pluralism. What then is their principle of 
unity? 
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(2) The unity of the self. Now, Strong says existence 
is plural, and the several parts are separated by relations 
corresponding to spatial ones: the psychic, within and 
without the mind, is extended. At least, psychic character 
belongs to ultimate reality equally with the material or 
the extensional. Further, he insists that individuation 
does· not take place by means of gaps; in l ts totality, 
mind-stuff constitutes a continuum. Thi s is the unity of 
mind revealed by introspection: a plurality of elements 
in the form of a field. 
The nature of continuity is illustrated in terms of a 
line: it arises when the series of points that compose it 
are compact--when the infinite number of points which 
exist between two points sustain the relation of compactness. 
All the relations between physical objects are external or 
accidental. However, logical relations, holding between 
the abstract character of things, are essential. Matter 
is force; the order of nature, truth. Voluntary action is 
simply a refinement upon reflex action. 
Again, the question of the basis of relations enters in. 
Two things, says Strong, are contin~ously related when the 
infinite number of points which lie between them are 
compacted together. Passing by the objections of Zeno, 
one must ask what the relationship is between the 
several points. Do they just lean against each other 
as two physical objects might be said to do? If so, 
how are . they then able t o be threaded together in intelli-
gible order? Strong admits that logical relations involve 
essential unity. How does this essential unity arise out 
of the accidental spatial order of Strong's atoms of 
sentience? 
The only answer ~trong seems to give is that this is 
an aspect of the inner nature of his atoms of sentience. 
But, though this might account for the logical aspect of 
1 the inner nature of one such atom, how do several become 
related so as to give the continuity to the self even of a 
field of force? What can threaded mean in this sense? 
Apparently, all otrong can say is that as, externally, 
physical objects may affect each other by being spatially 
proximate, so by ana l ogy, internally, mind-atoms may 
interact · in some si~ilar manner. Strong calls this his 
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1. An objection might be raised here as to how the inner 
nature of a bit of sentience, conceived on Strong's point 
analogy, could even be spoken of as somehow logical, or 
for that matter, as a feeling. 
physical method: the use of bodily relations to interpret 
mental facts. But Sellars notes that logically this 
necessitates a one-to-one correspondence between matter 
as known and feeling. In fact, Strong implicitly admits 
the same thing. 
What then, specifically, is this relationship by which 
mind-atoms are able to affect each other? It seems that 
the most Strong can suggest is that it is analogous to 
spatial proximity. Now, ~trong criticizes the evolutionary 
concept of emergence as reducing simply to the assertion 
that mind somehow arises out of a certain combination of 
matter. He says that such an explanation is as mysterious 
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and unsatisfactory as the old theological (or any philoso-
phical) idea of creation. But, has Strong himself accomplished 
any more? 
Does not his own explanation essentially assert that 
somehow, internally, mind-atoms interact analogously to 
the pattern of the causal proximity of physical objects in 
space? It would appear that Strong has no more explained 
the origin or consciousness, even on his own terms, than 
the opponents he criticizes. His is a kind of inside-out 
metaphysical idealism. He begins by attempting to solve the 
problem of physical causation by resolving the apparently 
physical into the psychical. He ends by handling the 
psychical as if it we r e physical. 
(3) The inadequacy of Strong's doctrine of self-
identity. The second basic question as to Strong's analysis 
of consciousness pertains to its empirical adequacy . Does 
it really do justice to our expe r ience of intelligence and 
nurnose ? The unity of the self he is after he confesses to 
~ ~ 
be simply comparable to the unity of a physical continuum. 
Or, from the inner pe rspect ive, the self is taken to 
be the psychic who le (or totality) of one's fee lings. All 
introspect ion is retrospection. He considers the mind to 
be a real stream of consciousness because there are no gaps 
between the feelings; yet, all pas t feelings are past--
there is no real duration such as that given in the 'specious 
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present .' Neither memory nor recognition involve any absolute 
unity or identity of the self. 
The fact of memory, Strong says, no more establishes 
the absolute ident ity of the self than does the fact of 
forgetfulne ss prove the absolute discontinuity of the self. 
What Strong forgets is the fact that the forgetfulness to 
whic h he refers is patently not absolute, while the memory 
in question certainly is in the same sense, absolute. 
That is, while one may have periods of forgetfulne ss (cf. 
sleep, unconsciousness, etc.) one may well proceed through 
l ife bridging t hese periods and effecting the absolute identity 
of the self (compa re self-experience or experience as 'mine'). 
Strong's argument would have relevance only in an 
instance of amnesia, and such like, where in addition to 
instances of forgetfulness the original identity is never 
recovered. In such situations, however, if anything is 
proved, it may be that there is such a thing as absolute 
discontinuity. At any rate, all experience is in the form 
of the unity of self-experience, and cases of discontinuity 
merely serve to underline the absolute continuity of 
ordinary experience. 
Now, Strong rests the perduring unity of the self on 
the persistence of complex arrangements for renewal in the 
brain, a.nd on ·one psychic state exactly reproducing an 
earlier one. The self is concretely characterized now in 
one pyschic state and now in another. The inner cohesion 
of the unity of mind is thus explained.in terms of memory. 
Sensations and perhaps even memory images, says Strong, 
come attended by a feeling of familiarity. All that iS 
necessary is that the ego, in its vehicular part, be a 
resembling psychic state. What is most nearly the same 
in personal identity is one's stock of memories, and even 
these are cha·nging. 
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What then is the self? It is, for Strong, the psychic 
whole of the feelings. But, the nature of this whole is in 
doubt. If it is no more than all the feelings taken together 
as an additive unity, on what would the causal efficay of the 
ego be based? If is more than the sum total of all the feelings, 
how can he say that what remains most unchanged is merely 
one 1 s ~ock of memories. In such a case it would be a 
perduring,identical ego which would make the memories 
1 my 1 memories. But, on Strong's basis, how is identity 
retained at all when some of the stock of memories change? 
Thil whole would then be different. And, on what basis 
would the older feelings that remained, maintain precedence 
over the newer additions? 
What would unite even all the previous feelings so 
that they could constitute one self, much more an identical 
self? It would seem that all they could have in common 
would be association with the same body. AS a matter of 
fact, Strong says that certain psynhic states are in some 
peculiar sense mine in so far as they are bound up with 
my own body. But, where, then>would identity be, in 
view of the complete renewal of the chemical components 
of one's body every several years? 
If Strong replies that identity is not to be looked 
for in anything but similarity of arrangement, it may 
be asked what in the nature of similarity of arrangement 
in itself, could guarantee self-identity? Moreover, even 
strict similarity of arrangement cannot be asserted. 
Apparently this is one of the mysteries o~ consciousness 
that Strong was trying to avoid. 
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That what Strong is actually attempting to maintain is 
self-identity on a spatial and material basis, in spite of 
the introduction of psychic atoms to obviate the difficulties 
of a thorough-going materialism, is borne out in his des-
cription of the continuity of a sensation as spatial as 
well as temporal. In fact, he goes as far as to call the 
spatio-temporal order ultimate as being incapable of explana-
tion by any deeper unity. Certainly, this shows that by 
the time Strong has reached this middle stage of his thought 
he is already, implicitly a materialist. 
(4) Strong's doctrine of purpose. As has been seen 
throughout the foregoing examination, teleological factors 
in the thought of C. A. Strong have been prominent chiefly 
by their inadequacy or absence. Th~~ brought out ag~in 
in his discussion of fate and free wi~l, and by the state-
ments of Drake to whom he gave approval. He does, however, 
correct certain of his previous utterances which involved, 
at least implicitly, an extreme behaviorism. He now says 
that one is free not only to decide on one course of 
action or another, but also to decide on no action at all. 
Axiologically, he desc1· ibes the Good as simply what 
human beings fundamentally will. Nature, on the other hand, 
1s apparently indifferent. Man is on his own; this is 
probably the best universe for him. If this is true, how 
can Strong call nature indifferent--it has made possible the 
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best kind of universe for man, one in which be is on his 
own and free. What is more, man fundamentally wills the 
Good (what contributes to survival)--this is what, in 
another context, he says he meant by the rather relativisti-
cally appearing statement above. 
If the universe has given this kind of nature and 
environment to man, it appears far from indifferent. But, 
since Strong makes the physical basic and all physical 
relations accidental, it appears that all this must be 
accidental. This follows from his root analogy founded 
upon his analysis of space and time. Perhaps a better 
word would be miraculous. The only way he can avoid 
purpose is at the cost of intelligibility. 
According to his naturalistic evolutionary principles 
be is concerned to insist that nature never produces any-
thing but what is useful (at least for survival). This 
is not the assertion of accidental process; this is the 
trumpeting of the presence of purpose both in the universe 
and in man. If Strong's universe is his God, his God is 
an amazing combination of purposeless purposiveness! 
When, on the level of the human self, he adopts a 
view that equates purpose with the activity of a self-
righting top, or a refinement of reflex action, it becomes 
difficult to understand how be can possibly distinguish 
between a machine and a person. Certainly, a freedom 
necessary for intelligence, significance, and truth is 
banished. Strong, however, appears oblivious to this 
problem. As E. S. Brightman comments, such a c once ption 
of purpose could not account for the fac ts, since it would 
allow only ~ ' very limited ends and only slight variat ions."l 
Strong's trouble is that he limi ts his examination of 
purposive factors to the narrow confines of what is 
manifested in behavior, the objectively, sensuously 
observable .2 Strong actually operates in terms of an 
uncritical faith in mechani sm.3 And, far from being 
emp irical, Strong does not offer evidence but merely 
theor i zes.4 
6. TRANSITION 
The next chapter completes the development of 
Strong's metaphysics. Only in this last period do 
teleological factors succeed i n becoming much more than 
implicit. 
1. Brightman , Comments on Drake, MPN, 229. 
2. Ibid. "Epiphenomenal i sm i s a me r e fallacy of observa-
tion.'' A. Alexander , STD , ·II, 9, quoted by Brightman 
in MPN, back cover. 
3. CS, Ibid. , 231. 
4. CS, Ibid., 233. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE FINAL FORM OF STRONG'S METAPHYSICS: A CREED FOR SCEPTICS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The divisions of this chapter correspond to the several 
writings which characterize the phases of this period in 
Strong's thought. Attention is first turned to the Essays 
on the Natural Origin of the Mind. Second, the various 
articles by Strong and others which led to the publication 
of A Creed for Sceptics, are examined. Finally, Strong's 
activity in the journals is followed through his last article, 
which was published posthumously. 
This chapter presents a. teleological critique of Strong's 
completed metaphysics. It points up his underlying anti-
teleological bias that was implicit in Strong's thought from 
the beginning. It also reviews his failure to make possible 
any metaphysical unity or epistemic immediacy at any point 
in self-experience because of the lack of any real principle 
of purpose. It further shows that Strong was deeply involved 
in purposive factors in every crUcial issue of his metaphysics, 
but without recognizing it. This is seen particularly in his 
central doctrine of the natural origin of the mind. Also 
sub,ject to critical examination are his doctrines of the 
physical method, man as a novelty, and human purpose as 
derived from a cosmic mechanism. 
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2. ESSAYS ON THE NATURAL ORIGIN OF THE MIND 
i. The continuity of space and time. Strong opens his 
investigation in his Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind 
with the enunciation of his conviction that things are not 
mysterious in themselves: wherever mystery lingers, our con-
ceptions must be judged, to that extent, erroneous. 1 A 
relation as obviously natural as that of mind and body 
must be capable of explanation. 2 Further, he is convinced 
that "the fundamental nature of all things is the nature of 
the self;'' thus, he prefers to call it sentience rather than, 
as Bertrand Russell does, "something midway between mind 
and matter. " 3 
As regards space and time, strong takes for granted 
that finite portions of either are really infinitely divis-
ible.4 A point is a position without extension and an 
instant, a now without duration.5 The source of these con-
cepts may be a process similar to Whitehead's "extensive 
abstraction." 6 The· dilemma that is to be faced is that if 
duration and instants are conceived as mutually external 
{instants as mere boundary lines of durations), the real 
must then apparently be confined to instants, and thus be 
1. Strong, ENOM, 1. 
2. Ibid. 
3. ENOM, 26. 
4. ENOM, 126. If so, how could an infinite number of them 
yield any length or duration? 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
deprived of the character of enduring; or, if the real is 
located in durations, it is unable ever to be a present.l 
Now, for Strong, the present alon.e is real; though it 
does not endure, it is not empty, but is rather one of the 
constituents of t~mporal endurance. 2 Two distinct instants 
contain two distinct states of the rea1. 3 Instants which 
are next to each other (i.e., are successive states of the 
real) are ,joined or connect ed by a .Junction.4 All instants 
not immediately successive are disjoined or disjunctive.5 
''Temporal sequence depends on the fact that the real of one 
instant brings forth the real of the next."6 
In reference to space, Strong illustrates his concept 
of a point by allusion to t he intersection of two lines. If 
they intersect, they have one single point in common: there-
fore, this point and every other point in the lines are 
distinct from each other.7 Points are the constituents of 
a line (space)--the loci of reals. 8 
Now, if two points are next to each other, there is 
no place between them; so, a junction is then a boundary 
which includes rather than separates--"it is between the 
1. Strong, ENOM, 132. 
2. Ibid. 
3. ENOM, 133. 
4. ENOM, 133-134. 
5 • EN OM, 134. 
6. Ibid. It is difficult to see how this would be possible 
if relations are wholly external. 
7. EN01il' , 135. 
8 . Ibid. 
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points only in the sense in which friendship is between 
friends.''l Since the smallest extension possible consists 
of two points, if these be divided at their junction, 
extension d1sappears. 2 Conversely, if an infinite number 
of infinitesmial points be conjoined, they will yield a 
line of f inite length; this follows necessarily if a finite 
line is infinitely divisible. 3 
In a similar manner, Strong concludes that between two 
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s uccessive instants there is nothing, since at least two 
instants are necessary to yield the smallest temporal interval~ 
Therefore, Leibniz's views of space and time were correct. 5 
Now, motion as such apparently cannot be found in a point 
of space or an instant of time; but, says Strong, there very 
well may be something there which prescribes change of place 
6 by matter or energy. But , this is hardly sufficient by itself 
to explain change and motion. Strong goes on therefore to 
assert that it is the nature of the real to continue in being. 
That is, in a self-perpetuating fashion, to be real is "to 
prolong its being from instant to instant." 7 The new instant 
of the real was naturally involved in the old: it was present 
potentially and its arising was its being actualized.s 
1. Strong, ENOM, 136. Underlining mine. 5. Ibid. 
2. ENOM, 137. 6. ENOM, 151. 
3. ENOM, 138. 7. ENOM, 153. 
4. ENOM, 141. 8. Ibid. 
Among the philosophic consequences of his analysis, 
strong mentions its explanation of the application of number 
to the real world. This is possible, he says, because nature 
is essentially, in one aspect, number.l Further, the identity 
through time of each bit of energy is supported by the prin-
ciple of the conservation of energy.2 Strong calls his view, 
synechism, after Charles Peirce: the real exists in space 
and time, reality belongs to the parts rather than to the 
whole, and the unity of the world is one of law and order 
rather than an existential unity. 3 Strong calls his reals 
bits of sentience, but expresses a willingness also to 
accept Bergson's term life, or even Bussell's description of 
it as midway between matter and mind. This, then, takes him 
farther in the direction of materialism than did his earlier 
expression of the conceivability of Russell's view. At that 
time he preferred to call it sentience.4 
ii. A defense of mind-stuff . One of Strong's chief 
arguments for mind- stuff arises out of his attempt to render 
intelligible the concept of unconscious mental states. First, 
he distinguishes feelings from acts of awareness according to 
his over-all analysis of consciousness: feelings are viewed 
as existents, and acts of awareness arise as functions of 
feelings. 5 
1. Strong, ENml , 155 . 4. ENOM, 159. Cf. 26 . 
2. ENOM, 156 . 5. ENOM, 295. 
3. ENOM, 158. 
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Conceived of in this way, Strong concludes that there 
is no "reason why feelings may not exist outside a conscious-
ness or mind. 111 He rests this distinction on an examination 
of and reflection upon a certain physical situation (espe-
cially that of a nervous event's being and function) as a 
manifestation of the psychical. A nervous event, in itself 
mere atoms and electrons, may function to make possible the 
adjustment of the organism to other objects. Thus , feelings 
which, in themselves are not aware, may by their function 
mediate awareness.2 
Since contemporary physics reduces physical facts to 
events (redistributions of energy), Strong says that his 
analysis of events into a series of instantaneous states is 
not to be construed as milit~ting agatnst these states always, 
actually, being joined in the form of events.3 Analogously, 
then, Strong insists that "feelings of which we are not aware 
may make us aware."4 Thus, though a. complex object consisting 
of parts in a certain arrangement can be reacted to or known 
by a single and indivisible concept, the object is still 
brought before the knower "by a complex of feelings which is 
composite and divisible, and of which at the moment I am not 
aware. " 5 
1. Strong, ENOM, 295. 4. ENOM, 301. 
2. ENOM, 298-299. 5. Ibid. 
3. ENOM, 299-300. 
Awareness is always a kind of external function: it 
"transports the knower beyond the state by means of which 
he knows " to the object.l Feeling is never aware of itself 
at the moment of its existence. 2 There is no reason, there-
fore, why feelings cannot exist apart from any awareness of 
them. 3 
3 . SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND RESPONSES 
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i. Strong's own summary of his metaphysical development. 
In the same year as the above publication (1930), Strong 
set forth his . intellectual biography in a chapter in Con-
temporary American Philosophy.4 He still insists that pan-
psychism is the only possible basis for an explanation of 
the connection of mind and body.5 However, he describes 
his earliest views as lacking precision: he had then called 
the stuff of things consciousness, little suspecting the 
ambiguities hidden under the obscure word.6 
Now, he has come, explicitly, to substitute for conscious-
ness something midway between mind and matter. 7 This, to 
Strong's mind, corrects the inadequacy of his early view of 
the bodlliness of things as due wholly to perception. 8 How-
ever, he gives assurance that even his later introduction of 
materiality into the essential nauure of things is to be 
taken as indicating only that the real exists in space as 
1. Strong, ENOM, 301. 
2. Ibid. 
3. ENOM, 303. 
4. Its title: "Nature and 
Mind.'' 
5. Strong, Art.(l930), 314. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
well as in time. 1 Feeling is the nature of the subject's 
life or experience, but an entity which feels is done away 
with.2 As feeling exists in humans, it is a complex inte-
gration of elementary units, making possible the mirroring 
of external things and one another for the better regulation 
of conduct. 3 
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Since introspection reveals traces of spatiality in our 
feeling s, they must be composed of parts; and, like the 
nervous parts through which feelings are revealed to the eye, 
they must be active in their nature (since feelings do, in 
fact, prompt to action), and thus they are as truly forces 
as the existents in the physical world. 4 "The character-
istics of real things are feeling and impulse, and they con-
sist of what Leibniz calls metaphysical points. 115 
Change is not a reality--it is a passage from one state 
of reality to another; nothing ever exists but the states.6 
Space must be viewed as composed of points: since whatever 
exists must be somewhere, an extension, which is a multiplicity 
of wheres, will not do, unless each point (or where) is given 
reality. 7 Change is the rearrangement of these metaphysical 
1. Strong, Art.(l930), 316. 
2. Ibid., 317. He has in mind here the elimination of the 
traditional view of the soul. 
3. Ibid., 324. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 325. 
7. Ibid. 
units, occurring from instant to instant.l The ultimate 
fact in change is the annihilation of one instant (or rather 
of the arrangement of units in it) and the immediate creation 
of another instant in which the units are differently 
arranged . 2 Since the arrangement of units in the second 
instant is born out of the first, the second is, con-
sequently , the next instant. 3 Thus, causality lies deeper 
and nearer the substance of things than time: 4 causaltiy is 
the force in reality, existing at an instant, by which i t 
gives birth to reality at the next instant.5 
Further, what resides at a point at any instant is not 
a simple unit, but a variable amount of energy, the units of 
whi~h need n ot be impenetrable to each other.6 In this way , 
fields of force could arise, making tension or intensity a 
fourth dimension in the instant; thus, the instant affords 
room for velocity , acceleration and momentum, possibly exist-
ing in .the instant in the form of the relative height of the 
different wayes. 7 Continuity, both temporal and spatial, 
would then depend on the causal relations by which adjacent 
reals cooperate, the quality (at least)of energy, remaining 
identical in successive instants.s 
1. Strong, Art.(l930), 325-326. 
2. Ibid., 325. Cf. Whitehead. 
3. Ibid. How could the second instant be related to the 
first except through internal relations~ 
4 • C f. Bowne • 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid . 
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Strong considers himself as simultaneously an inter-
actionist and parallelist. He considers himself a paral-
lelist, because the existent called self and its physical 
manifestation never interact; he calls himself an inter~ 
actionist, because there is interaction between the self 
and the contiguous parts of the real world--the physiological 
processes first of all surrounding the brain process . l 
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As for the wider meaning of nature itself, it is morally 
indifferent in that it does not care for our human goods and 
ills; yet, it is far from tolerant of bad conduct.2 The ground 
of morality is not in nature, but in human nature.3 Religion 
consists in living as nearly as possible with a full awareness 
of the truth of reality and conforming ourselves to it.4 
There is another, but not lower wisdom, which lies in cor-
rectly knowing the laws of human nature. 5 
ii. Responses of contemporaries. In his re~iew of 
Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind, Charles w. Morris 
observed that , for Strong, thinking is but a further com-
plication of the functioning of psychic states. 6 He also 
notes an uncritical use by Strong of the concept of the 
infinite in his analysis of space and time into points and 
7 instants. 
Ross Thalheimer feels that Strong's view that "the ulti-
1. Strong , Art.(l930), 328 . 5. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 329 . 
6. Morris, Art.(l931), 590. 
7. Ibid. , 592 • 
4. Ibid. 
mate elements of sentience are the unit s existing in points 
and instants" is "irreconcilable with his doctrine that bits 
of sentience have extension and duration." 1 Further, "Strong 
makes no attempt to justify his fundamental assumption ••• 
that in order to ' explain' the re l ation between mind and 
matter, mind and matter must be alike. " 2 And, doe s n ot Strong. 
asks Thalheimer , i n spite of his .opposition to emergence, 
actually presuppose that at least sense-data emerged out of 
bits of sentience?3 Mo reover, how is it that sense data are 
not in space and time while bits of sentience are?4 
A. C. Ewing judges Strong to have dismissed much too 
lightly the problem of how an infinite number of unextended 
points can make up an extension . 5 He notes also, tha t in 
effect, Strong attempts to explain all thought in terms of 
images and motor reactions . 6 
4 . A CREED FOR SCEPTICS 
i. Introduction. At no point in Strong's entire career 
do the wider implications of h i s ontology receive a s extended 
an expression as in his last book, A Creed for Sceptics. He 
informs his reader that his u se of the term sceptic in this 
context is "in the popular sense of a disbeliever in tradi-
7 
tional religion." He confesses, therewith, th.at the enter-
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1. Thalheimer, Art.(l931), 303. 5. Ewing, Art.(l931), 237. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. , 238. 
7. Strong, CFS, v . 
p r ise to which he has given his life was to explain the 
origin of consciousness as Darwin explained the origin of 
the species .l In this study, he says he never doubted that 
the origin of consciousness was explicable on naturalistic 
principles. Although, he admits that his master-key, his 
conception of being, sometimes has seemed to him almost a 
barren abstract1on. 2 
In regard to the details of his naturalistic philosophy, 
he is frank to confess that his analysis of space may not be 
sound; although, in contrast, he feels quite secure in his 
analysis of time.3 Further , he is still convinced that the 
only correct intellectual attitude toward the universe is 
that of science. 4 His purpose in the formulation of his 
creed for sceptics is to set forth the minimum on which a 
courageous man may live. 5 Freedom, truth, and goodness, at 
least, are not illusions.6 
ii. The orig in of consciousness and values. Again, 
Strong reasserts his view that the universe as a whole is 
morally indifferent: yet, despite this, he holds that ethical 
and moral distinctions have a fixed and unalterable basis.7 
The environment for these distinctions is quite materialistic . 
1. Strong, CFS, v. 
2. Ibid . 
3. CFS, vii. 
4. CFS, vii-viii. 
5. CRS, vii. 
6 . CFS , viii. His meaning of goodness is discussed below. 
7. CFS, 91. 
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Creation, in any sense but that of the "continual pro-
duction of the later by the earlier," is without foundation: 
it is simply a mythical idea without any correspondent in 
experience.l In addition to being eternal, the universe is 
boundless in space: the idea of anything outside this uni-
verse is without foundation.2 
The order as well as the existence of the universe is 
an ultimate fact that is incapable of explanation.3 There 
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is no unity within the continuous field of force that con-
stitutes the universe; there is simply an indefinitely great 
(perhaps infinite) number of conspiring and conflicting 
forces. 4 The universe is bound together in no unity dist inct 
from the multiplicity, but rather by the interaction of its 
part s .5 
With this as a background, unity of a spiritual sort 
does arise. It is made by mind: it produces "a unitary 
datum which does not exist in the real world, but is true 
of it." 6 It gives relations, but these do not exist in 
nature, since in the latter there are only "junc t ions between 
adjacents in space and time." 7 Such groupings as do arise 
in rerum natura come about simply by accident or chance.s 
Chance is crowded out when it gives rise to self perpetu-
1. Strong, CFS , 91. 5. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 
3 . CFS, 92. 7. CFS, 93. 
4. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 
ating forms; indeed~ when chance leads to sense organs 
and brains~ · "it overpasses itself and becomes conscious 
vision and purpose. ttl 
The universe cannot be a conscious, spiritual being 
because the universe is not a living organism like man.2 
The importance of consciousness in the world is usually 
exaggerated by most philosophers: actually, "it is probably 
265 
a rare accident, inevitable under the conditions, but without 
cosmic significance. "3 The absence of purpose and the pres-
ence of evil in such degree (and disproportion) prove that 
the universe was not made for man or by a being like man.4 
Yet, "we are products of just such a world as this, and 
should be out of our element in any other;" and, life to a 
rea.sonable person is worthy and able to be lived, since we 
live in an environment made by man. 5 Indeed, this human 
env i ronment might soon become a paradise, "were it not for 
the elements o~ savagery and unintelligence that still persist 
in many men." 6 
This savage nature, however , is capable of being altered 
almost without limit by reflection in a free community : here 
is the basis of hope for mankind.7 "Each person, besides 
1. Strong, CFS, 93. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. CFS, 93-94. This point could stand elaboration, but 
Strong simply states it. 
5. CFS, 94. 
6. Ibid . 
7. CFS, 95. 
being caused, ia. a cause, and a more or less adaptable one."l 
And, with the f r eedom to choose, man is exposed to the nec-
essity of accepting the consequences of his acts. 2 Vfuat is 
more, nature is impartial, and judges the transgressor and 
rewards the well-doer in such a way as to introduce the most 
explicit recognition of good and evil outside the human 
environment .3 
The distinction between good and evil in human life is 
objectively true. This is "because the human will to be 
happy and not to suffer is unalterably f1xed." 4 The source 
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of this tendency lies in evolution's breeding these restraints 
and predispositions in man, since without them life in socie~ 
would be impossible.5 The natural direction of the human 
will, which is present in man without his volition, is two-
fold: to avoid conflict and to introduce it.6 The total 
effect here is a balance, granting any degree of normalcy in 
the economic situation. 7 Since conflict, probably more often 
than not, results from a limited supply of goods, the pugna-
cious tendencies of man might be restrained by meetingfuis 
need.s In the light of the objective (i.e., necessary for 
1. Strong, CFS, 95. This presupposes the human person as a 
purposive unity--something that strong has never ade-
quately made place for. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. CFS t 96. 
5. Ibia. This is an undeniable instance of Strong's non-
purposive purpose. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
life) nature of morals, goodness is as necessary as truth. 1 
That ins t inct , as set forth above, is a sound basis for 
morals is borne out by the fact that instincts are the 
deepest t hings in man: the half of religion which is not 
supers t ition consists in conforming man to his good 
instincts. 2 And, human experience demonstrates that good 
ins tincts (those which support peace and therefore survival, 
for example--love and justice) outweigh the bad. 
Strong sums up his creed in a few verses which express 
quite well the tone of his thinking in this regard. 
On Ult imate Questions3 
Mad prophets, who, enthroned in Church and State, 
Of matter and of spirit dare to prate: 
What about these deep issues do you know? 
You speak as knowing--but who told you so? 
I'll tell you. 'Twas the fores of such as you, 
Who hoped, and feared, and wild conclusions drew, 
And--not knowing they knew not--thought they knew. 
And the i r false prophet's mantle has fall'n on you. 
You say spirit is real, but ethereal: 
And, all t he while, you mean it is material. 
You say men cannot, of themselves, know truth: 
Do you yourselves then know it, in good sooth? 
Truth is for those who seek it. By the toil 
Of countle ss seekers, glad to search and moil, 
The truth about the world and man--
Ye s , about good and i ll--
Has now been known by men for quite a while; 
'Tis mounting still, 
And every day adds to the sacred pile. 
1. Strong , CFS, 97. 
2. Ibid. 
3. CFS , 98. 
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Man is a creature queerest of the queer, 
Not to another in nature very near, 
And only to himself mo st dear. 
Good is what's good for man. A man is good 
If to his kind he's good. All are his fellowst 
Nature's not kind. She's heartless quite and rude. 
This truth each day indifferently bellows. 
At last the sense of human brotherhood--
Best fruit of all the ages--ripens and mellows. 
One truth--you are not heartless--you have guessed, 
And have not left quite unexpressed: 
In all the world, around, below, above, 
Naught is divine but heavenly Love. 
5. FINAL MATERIALS 
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i. Montague on A CREED FOR SCEPTICS. In reviewing A 
Creed for Sceptics, H. B. Acton referred to Strong's sentience 
as a kind of blind vitality.l Montague considered the pub-
lication at much greater length. He noted that Strong gave 
very little attention to the argument that for man to be 
significantly free there must be a degree of freedom from 
internal as well as external constraint; that is, he must 
be free to some extent from his own past in order to be able 
to posses an authentic power of choice between a plurality 
of real alternatives.2 
In commenting that Strong finds his absolute standard 
of value in the constancy and predominance of the human 
instincts of love and justice, Mont ague questions what he 
1. Acton, Art.(l938), 133. 
2. Montague, Art.(l938), 573. 
3. Ibid. 
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calls Strong's failure to see that an "ethics which rests 
solely upon the existing instincts of a species, must be 
temporary, precarious, and contingent--in short , relatiye." 1 
Montague describes the elements of Strong's mind-dust 
as "specks or crumbs of sentience which are to our simplest 
2 feelings as these latter are to our most complex emotions." 
Ambiguity is seen in Strong ' s lack of clarity as to whether 
his monad-like elements are strictly punctiform, or are rather 
indivisible minima, like the quanta of Planck.3 As a matter 
of fact, Montague feels that they are rather like the atoms 
of Anaxagoras in be i ng mixtures of qualities. 4 
A problem arises in the light of modern physics. Mon-
tague wonders why Strong refuses to ascribe sentiency to 
fields of force, which are continuous , pervading and over-
lapping.5 Further, how can Strong reconcile his plurality 
of units of sentience with the fact of the existence of non-
additive physical fields. 6 
Indeed, Montague enquires as to whether fields of force 
would not provide a better basis for the explanation of such 
facts as consciousness, space, time, and the like. 7 As it 
1. Montague, Art.(l938), 573. 
2. Ibid., 577 . 
3. Ibid. , 578. 
4. Ibid. This last judgment seems accurate but, to it 
should be added that Strong still views them as punctiform. 
5. Ibid., 580. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
270 
stands, Strong is required to define teleology as merely 
the epiphenomenal aspect of a completely mechanistic process; 
and, the apparent unity of a self is as epiphenomenal as its 
apparent purposiveness.l 
ii . Final observations by Strong. Strong 's last 
article , "Final Observations," written on his deathbed, is a 
brief abstract of his entire philosophy. Now, he talks of 
his metaphysical system as bearing a close resemblance to 
that of Spinoza . 2 Further, the human body is viewed as 
participating "in the production of every finest thought."3 
As for freedom, he still i nsists that empirical freedom is 
all that is necessary for intelligent and moral life: one 
does not feel himself unfree when he yields to an instinct 
or habit. 4 
Vv'hen an equilibrium between instincts occurs (and this 
is the experience of freedom in the purest sense), "what tips 
the scale s will be the whim or some accidental inner circum-
stance that escapes observation, so that decision is really 
determinate after all." 5 Effort, he describes as the calling 
to mind of reasons; effort is determinate in the measure to 
which it succeeds.6 Nature is governed by chance and accident 
so ths_t nature is perpetually new. 7 
1. Montague, Art.(l938), 578. This is indeed what Strong's 
position involves . 
2. Strong, Art.(l941) , 239. 
3. Ibid., 241 
4. Ibid . , 242. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
6. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF STRONG 'S ~ffiTAPHYSICS 
i. Survey of Strong's last period. (1) Space, time, 
and mind-stuff. In this period, as previously, Strong 
insists that things are not mysterious in themselves. As 
regards space and time, he takes for granted that finite 
portions of either are infinitely divisible. A point is a 
position without extension, an instant a now without dura-
tion. Two distinct instants or two distinct points each 
contain two distinct states of the real. 
The real of one instant brings forth the real of the 
next. Each new instant of the real was potentially (natur-
ally) present in the old. A junction is a boundary which 
includes rather than separates; it is between points as 
friendship between friends. If an infinite number of infini-
tesmial points are conjoined, they will yield a line of 
finite length. This follows necessarily if a finite line 
is infinitely divisible. 
In his theory of the universe, Strong confines reali ty 
to the parts; it does not, as such, belong to the whole . 
There is no real unity in nature, only continuity. Strong 
prefers to call his reals bits of sentience, but is willing 
to allow the use of Bergson's term life, or Bertrand Russell's 
descr:lption of the real as something somewhere between mind 
and matter. 
Strong defends his mind-stuff theory by drawing an anal-
ogy between certain physical situations (cf. a nervous event's 
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being and function) and conscious experience. Following 
this 'physical method,' he distinguishes between feelings, 
as existents, and acts of awareness as functions of the 
former. Feelings of which we are not aware may make us 
aware; indeed, says Strong, a feeling is never aware of 
itself at the moment of its existence. There is no reason 
then why feelings cannot exist apart from any awareness of 
them. 
As feeling exists in humans, it is a complex integra-
tion of elementary units making possibl e the mirroring of 
external things and one another for the better regulation 
of conduct. Feelings are active forces composed of parts. 
They are metaphysical points . Change is not a reality, it 
is the passage of reality from one state to another.l Change 
involves the annihilation of the arrangement of the units of 
one instant and the immediate creation of another instant in 
which the units are differently arranged. Causality is the 
necessity by which reality at one instant gives birth to 
reality at a next instant. The units of energy need not be 
impenetrable to each other; in this way fields of force could 
arise. Continuity, both temporal and spatial, depends on the 
causal relations by which adjacent reals cooperate, with at 
least the quality of energy remaining identical in successive 
instants. 
1. For Strong, the passage itself cannot be considered real; 
see below. 
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(2) The chance origin of consciousness. Strong claims 
that he never once doubted in all his years of study that the 
origin of consciousness was explicable on naturalistic prin-
ciples;1 even though his conception of being has at times 
seemed to him a barren abstraction. ~~ile he admits doubts 
as to his analysis of space, he feels quite sure of his 
analysis of time. He remains convinced that the only correct 
intellectual attitude toward the universe is that of science. 
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When chance gives rise to self-perpetuating forms, sense 
organs, and brains, it overpasses itself and becomes conscious 
vision and purpose. Consciousness is probably a rare accident, 
inevitable under the conditions, but without cosmic signifi-
cance. The absence of cosmic purpose and the disproportion 
of evil in the world prove that the universe was not made for 
man or by a being like man. Yet, man is a product of just 
such a world as this and would be out of his element in any 
other. Man's nature can be altered; with the freedom to 
choose, he is exposed to the necessity of accepting the con-
sequences of his acts. 
(3) Values. The distinction between good and evil in 
human life is objectively true since the human will to be 
happy and not suffer is unalterably fixed. Evolution has 
bred this tendency, since without it life in society would 
1. A blind faith? 
be impossible. The pugnacious tendencies of man could be 
restrained by meeting his economic needs. Instinct is a 
sound basis for morals because it is the deepest thing in 
man: the half of religion which is not superstition consists 
in conforming man to his good instincts.l Further, human 
experience demonstrates that good instincts outweigh the bad. 
Strong's last words described his metaphysical system 
as closely resembling Spinoza's. Human freedom is always 
determinate, even though what tips the scale in favor of 
one decision over another is a whim or some accidental 
inner circumstance that escapes observation. Nature itself, 
governed by change and accident, i s perpetually new . 
2 7 4 
ii. Critical review of Strong's f~rst and second periods. 
(1) First period . In his earliest published expressions, 
Strong was already convinced that the only fact empirically 
verifiable about the mind-body relation was invariable, eon-
comitant succession or variation. But, an invariable, concom-
itant variation between a mental event and a brain event may 
be denied: Strong himself, at length, is forced to deny such 
precise correlation and speak of it only as an hypothesis. 
It must be admitted, of course, that a general correla-
tion exists between the events of body and mind. However, 
the specific form of Strong's expression suggests an under-
lying bias in favor of a materialistic, anti-teleological 
1. Instinc~certainly appear to function as if they were 
unconscious purposes. 
approach to the problems of psychology and metaphysics. 
What is more, this tendency may partially explain his desire 
to define his idealism in such a way as to view the me.ta-
physical nature of reality as consisting of atoms of 
sentience. 
In his view of the self as a fusion of presentational 
elements built up on the basis of association, Strong fails 
to explain how immediate knowledge of the self is possible 
when the object of this knowledge is an additive unity. 
Strong's doctrine of the self, devoid of the factor of pur-
pose, makes impossible any metaphysical unity or epis temic 
immediacy at any point in self-experience . 
Strong 's doctrine of time as a present moving point is 
carried, without significant variation , through the entire 
development of his philosophy. This view demands that the 
consciousness of succession rest upon memory. Here , Strong 
is deeply involved in purpose but gives no indication that 
he recognizes it. 
Further, it seems logically contradictory to assert 
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that an infinite number of points can transform discreteness 
into succession: that is, real duration. Unless this infinite 
multiplication involve a kind of creative power, and this 
would destroy Strong's attempt to give an ac count of the 
natura l origin of the mind, it is untenable. What is more, 
the concept of creation would open the way for an emphatic 
doctrine of purpose. 
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Strong's failure to see the possibility of explaining 
succession on the basis of the Bergsonian concept of real 
duration reveals a faulty analysis of the experience of 
succession into the experience of a parade of discrete points. 
It also reveals the lack of any purposive unity of the self. 
Further, this is contradicted by his avn admission that what is 
experienced is an interval or duration . 
The only solution to the problem of memory that Strong 
offers is quite materialistic and stands without explicit 
relation to his metaphysical idealism . He bases memory on 
the physical brain being permanently affected by the occur-
rences of the past. Strong may feel that this explanation 
enables him to avoid introducing purposive factors into mem-
ory, but this does not succeed in showing how an effect of 
the past can be identified with the experience of memory . 
Moreover, when memory functlons as a successful , purposive 
endeavor, the presence of the purposive must be viewed as a 
major miracle : the ego must leap over the absolute discrete-
ness of time and being and recognize as its own past what is 
indistinguishable from someone else's present. 
~hat is basic in Strong's thought even at an early date, 
is not so much his idealistic metaphysics, but his unswerving 
confidence in the Darwinian concept of evolution, metaphysi-
cally construed, coupled with the determination to avoid 
purpose everywhere except as an epiphenomenon . Consequently , 
he puts his effort not into grounding idealism but always 
primarily into es t ablishing the natural origin of the mind. 
Strong's definition of freedom as the ability not to 
perform a cert a in act of which one happens to be thinking 
makes provision for a degree of freedom from external con-
straint. However, since the -person's inner situation could 
be viewed in a completely mechanical fashion, on Strong's 
position, true purpose (and with it significant thought and 
action) would be entirely obliterated. The accuracy of 
this judgment is supported by Strong's behavioristic con-
ception of consciousness: the thought of one act by itself, 
he says, automatically leads to the performance of that act. 
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When Strong narrows his definition of freedom to pre-
cisely the state of equilibrium between alternatives, he 
fails, in his earlier expressions~ t o reveal themture and 
status of the power that eventually abolishes the equilibrium. 
Later he calls it whim, chance, or accident. But, such is 
not to be taken as involving freedom in the true sense, for 
he defines chance or accident in purely mechanical terms. 
T~e mechanism operates in terms of the influence of one's own 
feelings (which are, of course, all causally determined). 
One feels free because at the moment of acting he is not aware 
of being influenced by these feelings. 
This theory may be criticized, if not contradicted, by 
the fact that one is aften aware of being influenced by 
certain feelings . To Strong's insistence that this awareness 
is always afte r the fact , it may be objected that, unless one 
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enters successive experiences as a blank, this woul d in turn 
deprive the individual of the feeling of freedom in successive 
experiences. If Strong, t o obviate this difficulty, has 
recourse to the discreteness of the separate states of the 
self, he obliterates even his own principle of continuity . 
(2) Second period. Strong makes the substance of mind 
feelings , which are not necessarily intelligent in themselves, 
but are threaded together in intelligent order, and function 
to produce the human experience of intelligence. The con-
sciousness Strong is concerned to derive here is simply an 
accidental relation of bits of sentience unified only as a 
field of continuity in physics . 
The only answer Strong seems to give as to how the 
essentlal unity of logical relations, which he admits, arises 
out of the accidental spatial order of his atoms of sentience, 
is just that it is the inner nature and power of his sentient 
atoms to do this. But, while this might account for the 
logical aspect of the inner nature of one such atom, how 
several are so threaded together as to give the continuity 
even of a field of force to the self, remains a complete 
mystery. Strong's only appeal is to his physical method : 
by using bodily rela1fions to interpret mental facts, _physical 
objects affecting each other by being spatially proximate are 
taken as an analogy of his mind atoms which are supposed to 
be able to interact in some similar manner. This, however, 
necessitates a one-to-one correspondence between matter and 
mind--a point which Strong himself admits is impossible of 
factual and logical establishment. 
In Strong's attempt to explain the natural origin of 
consciousness, he displays a kind of inside-out metaphysical 
idealism. He begins by attempting ·to solve the problem of 
physical causation by resolving the apparently physical into 
the psychical. He ends by handling the psychical as if it 
were physical. 
Emprically, Strong's analysis of consciousness is unable 
to account for the ordinary experiences of intelligence and 
purpose. In fact, his view of consciousness as a continuity 
and not a unity actually rests on a faulty analysis of the 
empirical data. He says , for example, that the fact of memory 
no more establishes the absolute identity of the self than 
does the fact of forgetfulness prove the absolute discontin-
uity of the self. 
In so saying , does he not forget that the experience of 
memory is one of the overleaping of gaps for which no evidence 
of any element of continuity is present? Since, as far as the 
evidence goes , the abso lute discontinuity of the self for 
certain periods (for example, sleep, unconsciousness) cannot 
be denied, this necessitates the admission of an absolute 
cont inuity to explain such a phenomenon as memory. 
By resting his case against the absolute unity of the 
self, on the adequacy of the persistence of complex arrange-
ments for renewal in the brain and on one psychic state 
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exactly reproducing an earlier one, Strong is brought to 
describe the element most nearly the same in personal 
identity as one's stock of memories. 
This renders it impossible to explain the basis of the 
causal efficacy of the ego, since all that is possessed is 
an additive unity. Further, since the whole i s a different 
whole whenever any of the stock of memories is changed, what 
becomes of identity? If identity depends on association with 
the same body , where is identity in the face of continual, 
bodily changes? 
When Strong goes so far as to state that the spatia-
temporal order is ultimate, and is incapable of explanation 
by any deeper unity, it becomes dear that this is ultimately, 
and in a thoroughgoing sense, a materialism. His assertions 
about the psychic nature of the ultimately real simply reduce 
to the old materialistic view that matter is the source of 
mind . This is made even more emphatic by his disavowal of' 
any emergence theory. 
Utterances of this middle period on the subject of free 
·wil l do correct some aspects of the extreme behaviorism of 
his earlier expressions. Thus, he says that one is free to 
decide on one course of action or another, or to decide on 
280 
no action at all. However, his basic perspective remains 
unchanged. Nature is indifferent to man's welfare and destiny, 
and the good is simply what hL~an beings fundamentally will . 
by virtue of their natural origin from the universe. Man is 
on his own and this is probably, in this sense, the best 
universe for him. Man fundamentally wills the good, and 
neither nature nor society brooks persistently evil attitudes 
and conduct . 
Now, such a universe appears far from indifferent; but, 
since Strong makes the physical basic, and all physical 
relations accidental, the relation between man and the uni-
verse must be accidental, or better, miraculous. The only 
way Strong can avoid purpose is at the cost of intelligi-
bility : his universe is a blooming, buzzing confus i on of 
purposive purposelessness . Persons and machines are essen-
tia l ly indistinguishable as a result of his attempt to 
elimina te and yet keep the ethical character of nature . 
iii. A te l eolog ical consideration of Strong ' s final 
metaphysics . (1) The physical meth od . In his last period, 
Strong's attempt to remain faithful to his physical method 
involved him in a ·rather strange situation . In his descrip-
tion of the real as existent spatially and temporally at 
poin ts and instants, he speaks of the real of one ins tant 
bringing fonth the real of the next. Not only does he involve 
himself in an unexplained concept of potentiality (each new 
instant of the real was potentially [naturally] present in 
the old), but he also is h ard put to explain his junction of 
r e a ls. Actually, the only solution is the one he is deter-
mined t o avoid : internal r elations. 
Ultimat e l y , he says t h a t a junction is a boundary which 
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includes rather than separates: it is between points as 
friendsh ip is between friend s. At last then, even in his 
explanation of space and force itself, he is compelled t o 
desert his physical metaphors and appeal to a non-physical 
(even spiri t ual) experience. Fundamentally , then, space 
and time have to be explained in terms of something deeper. 
Wi t h this, his nee-materialism falls to the ground. 
What is more, his earlier avowal of panpsychism, in 
the particular form of expression and defense that he gave 
it (and this includes the factors that persist into his 
nee-materialistic period), is also dealt a death blow. He 
argued fo r the exi stence of unfelt feelings by resting his 
analogy on the physical method . The distinction between 
being and function in t he physical situation is taken as 
app licable to a distinction between feelings and awareness 
(the function of feelings) in conscious experience. If the 
validity of t he physical method can be called in question, 
the conclusions which are built up on that method also have 
grave doubt cast upon them. 
The inadequacy of the physical method is illustrated 
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by his suggestion in regard to continuity that it is brought 
about by the causal relations of adjacent reals. In this 
connection he says that at least the quality of energy 
remains identical in succe ssive instants. Quality bespeaks 
more a psychic than a physical reality (certainly a non-
quantitative aspect) since qualia may reach to the inclusion 
even of ideal norms.l 
Strong's approach, in his own words, is scientific. 
His emphasis on the physical method and his favoring of 
scientific descriptions over others contribute to the feeling 
that his perspective was never really synoptic. What else 
could explain his failure to submit to searching criticism 
such a . basic assumption as that the origin of consciousness 
is explicable on naturalistic principles? He confesses that 
in all his years of study, he never once doubted its validity. 
(2) Man as a novelty. Strong describes man as a product 
of this universe and of such a nature as to be out of his 
element in any other. A word about this nature that man 
possesses is in order. By Strong's own admission, man pos-
sesses freedom of some sort, the ability to know truly, 
responsibility for his acts, and the power of purposive 
vision and activity. It may then be asked what kind of a 
universe could produce such a being. Strong's answer is that 
the universe that has done this is a mechanistic one. Man 
was produced from and by his universe in a purely mechanical 
fashion . Certain problems immediately arise. 
Strong combats emergence or any for.m of creationism, but 
is forced to assert that out of bits of sentience, which are 
spatial and temporal in their nature, have come sense data 
which are non-spatial and non-temporal. Likewise, there has 
1. Cf. Brightman, POR, 363. 
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come about a unity for the mind's experience which is a 
unitary datum existing only in the mind, but true of the 
real world. In both cases something new apparently arises, 
but in each case it is, Strong insists, in some sense 
representative of its source. 
Is there any mechanistic analogy not only of the con-
tinuity of such situations, but of the production of . some-
thing so entirely different that the old categories are, 
strictly speaking, completely out of place? Is this not 
rather what is meant by creation? If Strong objects that 
creation is a mystery, is it not proper to remind him that 
though mysterious in itself, it would intelligibly account 
for novelty in the evolutionary process; while his mechan-
istic concept is both mysterious and unable to account for 
undeniable novelty? The employment of Occam's razor would 
seem to manifest an economy of mystery on the side of the 
creationist and an overwhelming magnitude of mystery on 
the side of the mechanist. 
(3) A critique of human purpose as derived from a 
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cosmic mechanism. What is more, a number of general objec-
tions may be brought against the mechanist position . Strong 
and Drake object to leaving mechanism as an explanation be-
cause they say the view that the world has a purpose has not 
yet been demonstrated (even in a loose sense). They seem to 
have forgotten that a universal mechanism itself has not been 
demonstrated. Further, all the evidence that mechanical explan-
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ation is made possible by the existence of real purpose (if 
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there is to be real explanation) and that mechanisms are 
used by purpose is bypassed by Strong as lacking signifi-
cance. He says that consciousness and purpose are probably 
rare accidents without cosmic significance. 
But, when this superficial viewpoint is coupled with 
his assertion that the order as well as the exis tence of the 
universe is ultimate and incapable of explanation, it becomes 
clear that Strong has never actually carried through an 
exhaustive examination of the evidence. Indeed, whenever 
purpose is demanded to render his epistemology or metaphysics 
intelligible, Strong simply introduces, in an almost completely 
uncrit ical fashion, an appeal to the maid-of-all-work, instinct. 
However, the objections to Strong's mechanism are not 
yet complete. Strong is involved in the explanation of all 
purpose in terms of sometl1ing else which itself is devoid 
of purpose. On the surface of the situation this is rather 
strange, since, having admitted purpose in the case of human 
consciousness, and having insisted that human consciousness 
and nature are continuous, he then asserts that human life, 
realizing ends as it does, must be distinct from inorganic 
nature in that the latter does not belong to the same system 
of ends. It is only in human beings that purpose arises. 
Eitr1er Strong must give up his desired continuity between the 
organic and the inorganic and thus g ive up any hope of defend-
ing the natural origin of the mind; or, he must retain con-
tinuity and admit that inorganic nature both cooperates with 
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and belongs to the same sys t em of ends as the human. 
St r ong attempts to avoid this by persisting in the 
assertion t hat mind is produced mechanically and accidentally 
and by denying that this production introduces anything 
inexplicable. But , when he attempts to make this view good, 
he either is unable to explain consciousness as experienced, 
or where he does come anywhere near success, he has first 
abandoned his physical (mechanistic) method. 
Strong's mechanism also inv.olves certain logical dif-
ficul t ies. By e xplaining the present in terms of the past, 
he involves himself in infinite regress. Consequently, he 
has no view of the whole of realily--hi s lack of a synoptic 
v iew is manifest a gain. The worst of the difficulty here is 
that Strong's inadequacy is apparently deliberate and uncrit-
ical. Indeed, it may be asked whether Strong's metaphysics 
is not in the last analysis at best partial, at worst tau-
tologous. 
Strong's incompleteness is manifested by the very sub-
jects to which he confin ed himself during his years of 
philosophical investigation. In the field of metaphysics 
he discussed ontology but in abstraction from everything 
but certain aspects of the epistemology of sense perception. 
Now, it is not imp roper that division of labor should take 
place. Unfortunately, however, in Strong's case, it is not 
so much a matter of conscious restriction to a. few problems, 
but the unawareness that there was any significant restriction. 
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When he finally turned to even a brief consideration 
of the wider field of philosophy, including ethics, philosoph1 
of religion and similar subjects, he manifested a pitifully 
unphilosophical and uncritical approach. His unreserved 
devotion t .o the analytic method most clearly manifested its 
inadequacy in these latter fields. 
This was foreshadowed in the extreme pluralism of his 
metaphysics : reality is allowed only to the parts, not to 
the whole. · It never occurred to Strong that there might 
be real laws other than the mechanical in the universe . 
V\Jhen he says that the only unity the universe possesses is 
an accidental continuity, he is, in effect, saying that 
there is no such thing as unity of any kind in the universe 
as a whol e . Thus, even the concept of 'continui:ty' becomes 
suspect. 
7. TRANSITION 
This chapter completes the exposition and criticism 
of strong's metaphysics in itself. The following chapter, 
constituting Part III, brings together Strong's epistemology 
and metaphysics for the purpose of an over-all, teleological 
critique of his entire thought . 
PART III 
THE PLACE OF TELEOLOGY IN THE THOUGHT OF C. A. STRONG 
CHAPTER VIII 
' 
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STRONG'S EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS COMPARED AND CONTRASTED 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter of the dissertation sets forth the 
place of t eleology in the thought of c. A. Strong. The 
method used is the completion of that which has been followed 
throughout the investigation: an examination of Strong's 
epi s t emology and metaphysics. Now, with the separate studies 
of the development of Strong's epistemology and metaphysics 
complete, the two fields are brought together for comparison 
and contrast. In this way, the use and recognition of tele-
ology in St rong 's total philosophy is presented, while at the 
same time the r e lation between his epistemology and meta-
physics and the development of his thought are made clear. 
2. EPI STEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS COMPARED AND CONTRASTED IN 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRONG'S PHILOSOPHY 
i. First period. (1) Epistemology. Strong's entire 
epistemology rests on the conviction that the two basic forms 
of cogn ition are sense percpetion and introspection. The 
latter is, however, t oo exclusively approached in terms of a 
kind of inner perception, thus giving very little considera-
tion to knowledge via conception and interpretation. Conse-
quently, h e neglects the conceptual aspects of developed 
teleological experience in favor of a behavioristic analysis 
of animal faith. 
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Yet, this very emphasis leads him deep into teleology, 
for when he comes to explain, epistemically, the unity and 
activity of the self , he appeals to active and determinative 
interests. still, he makes no recognition of this involve-
ment in purpose. Because of this Lack of awareness of (o r 
determinat ion to avoid) the use of teleological factors, 
he is able to speak of animal faith (actually the bearer of 
teleology) as an instinctual , mechanical response . 
Strong 's bias against purpose is also brought out in 
his treatment of the categories of experience. Since he 
early and continually regards the categories as not necessar-
ily phenomenal, it would seem that the category of purpose 
might be suggestive as to the nature and structu r e of the 
universe. Strong ' s failure even to consider the existence 
and possibilities of the category of purpose makes it clear 
that consciously or unconsciously he is determined to avoid 
anything but the treatment of purpose as epiphenomenal, in 
spite of this being inconsistent with his doctrine of the 
categories. 
T.he inadequacy of Strong's earliest treatment of the 
purposive factors in the epistemic situation is refl ected 
in his at tempt in his first book to explain why the mind 
has a body. He ignores the fact that the relations between 
body and mind do fa r more than merely make possible surviyal. 
For this he has no explanation. In fact, he does not even 
recognize that survival itself is an end that involves 
purpose and that the admission that agency is a necessary 
characteristic of concrete mind is an unintelligible 
assertion, unless construed teleologically . His appeal to 
rational induction as a confirmation of animal faith is 
equally inexplicable on a system that reduces cognition to 
the mechanism of knowing. 
(2) Metaphysics. Strong's underlying bias in favor of 
antiteleological mechanism is also manifest in his earliest 
metaphysical formulations. He insists, for example, on 
including the concept of invariable, concomitant variation 
(between a mental event and a brain event) in his account of 
the emp irical facts of the mind-body relationship. Yet, this 
contradicts his own admission that this is, after all, not an 
indubitable fact, but an unproved theory . 
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When Strong attempts to get along without the use of 
purpos ive factors his explanations never quite come off. Thu~ 
in his view of the self as a fusion of presentational elements 
built up on the basis of association, he does not explain 
how immediate knowledge of the self is possible when the 
object of this knowledge is an additive unity. The fact that 
sometimes he denies any such immediate knowledge and, on other 
occasions, insists upon such immediacy merely emphasizes the 
confusion that ensues when the unity which is explicable only 
on the ground of purpose is avoided. In similar fashion, he 
appeals to memory as the ground of self-identity, while failing 
to recognize the purposive nature of memory. 
This same doctrine of memory is also involved in his 
doctrine of t:tme ; the consciousness of succession Strong 
bases upon memory . He fee l s that this will account for the 
experlence of succession, while in rerum natura all that is 
necessary is to define time as a present moving point. An 
infinite number of these points, he says, can transform 
discreteness into succession. This would appear to introduce 
an emergent or creative element into nature and thus open the 
way for an emphatic doctrine of purpose. 
Further, to return to the factor of memory. Strong's 
naturalistic metaphysics is unable to account for memory 
functioning as a successful, purposive endeavor. At best, 
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all Strong has is an ego, accidentally leaping over the abso -
lute discreteness of time and being, and recognizing as its 
own past what is indistinguishable from someone else's present. 
But Strong is determined, always, at all costs, to avoid 
the appea l to teleology. This is because, even though he 
began in his metaphysical speculation with a psychophysical 
idealism, this was not the bed rock of his thought. As he 
wi ll confess in his final period, it is clear even from the 
beginning : the one conviction t hat Strong never doubted (and 
never subjected to critical evaluation) was that the mind 
had evolved in a completely naturalistic-mechanistic manner 
in the on-going of the universe. 
The last significant metaphysical doctrine of Strong's 
first period that needs to be noted is his conception of 
freedom. Not only does he conceive consciousness quite 
behavloristically in his view that the thought of. one act, 
by itself, automatically leads to the performance of that 
act, but me makes provision for freedom in the individual 
only from external constraint. Since he insists that one 
is determined by his feelings (and the se arise by mechanical 
causation, uncontrolled by the person), his view of man is 
accurately defined as an ateleological mechanism. With this , 
true purpose and significant thought and action are entirely 
obliterated . 
(3) Critical remarks. Strong's animus against tele-
ology, essentially a metaphysical view, is introduced into 
his earliest epistemic investigations . So also is his 
underlying proclivity for materialistic emphases . Because 
of these factors, Strong uses purpose in his epistemological 
theory as sparingly as possible, but though this is still 
considerable, he refuses to recognize and designate it as 
such. 
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His metaphysica l prejudices also determine his passing 
over even the possibility of a category of purpose in epistem-
ology. Thus, when later eng aged i n metaphysical speculation, 
he is troubled by no considerations from his epistemological 
inquiries suggesting the relevance of teleological factors. 
In fact, though his epistemolog ical and metaphysical discus-
sions are intertwined, he actually does very little integrating 
of the two as far as the implications of each for the other, 
apart from those elements that are directly relevant to the 
theory of the natural origin of the mind. 
Strong is forced , however, to introduce purposive fac-
tors to give any coherent account of the following problems 
in epistemology : objective reference, the knowing self, the 
end of knowledge, cognitive agency; in metaphysics: the 
self and memory. Because of his exclusion, at least explic-
itly, of purpose, the following doctrines lack any essential 
coherence : the categories of experience, knowledge by con-
ceptions, the nature and experience of time, voluntary 
remembering, the unity and identity of the self, the origin 
of consciousnes'S, and the experience and nature of freedom. 
ii. Middle period. (1) Epistemology. Strong 's dis-
avowal of representationism am~unts merely to the assertion 
that in the knowledge situation the knower does not take the 
datum as representing the object but takes it as the object. 
This is a response and a faith that makes survival possible. 
Now, it is the category of purpose that is the important 
f actor in this whole theory . And, the depth of the telic 
response suggests that purposive factors are located deep 
in the nature of man. On Strong's theory this should point 
to a teleological metaphysics. 
Likewise, his use of essences suggests a universe that 
is much more idealistic in nature than merely midway between 
mind and matter. Yet, the presence of his metaphysical 
assumptions in semi-materialistic form continues. Thus, he 
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admits that one's actual awareness temporally embraces an 
interval or time -span. But, he goes on to assert the infinite 
divisibility of time and space. This theory is then allowed 
to brush aside the actual experience of time by the designa-
t ion of it as simply 'specious.' Indeed, later Strong 
admitted that his e pistemology rested on the assumption of 
the ex~stence of a real world in space and time. 
In line with his behavioristic handling of the knowl edge 
situation, Strong insisted that intelligence ought to · be 
subordinated to instinct. This is not only at variance with 
his own admission of the presence of mental elements in sense 
perception itself, but it is also another instance of his 
attempt to avoid any description of purpose that would make 
it other than epiphenomenal--at heart simply a motor response. 
This is brought out very clearly by the fact that the reason 
for his selection of instinct as basic is that intelligence 
cannot function without it. The arbitrary character of this 
choice is seen in h is failure even to consider the fact that 
empirically the dependence is mutual. 
(2} Metaphysics. To explain how -his atoms of sentience 
are threaded together to g ive the continuity of a field of 
force to the self, Strong appeals to his physical method--
the use of bodily relations to interpret mental facts. Yet, 
ultimate ly, this delivers him to the assertion of a one-to-
one correspondence between matte r and mind, something which 
Strong himself admits is impossible of factual and logical 
demonstration. Without the unity of purpose, Strong's 
doctrine of the self is shipwreck. 
Indeed, in his attempt to explain the natural origin 
of consciousness, Strong displays a kind of inside-out meta-
physical idealism. He begins by attempting to solve the 
problem of physical causation by resolving the apparently 
physical into the psychical. He ends by handling the 
psychical as if it were physical. 
As a result, his analysis of consciousness is unable 
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to account for the ord t nary experiences of intelligence and 
purpose, because he is forced to deny the absolute identity 
of the self. And , because the self is but an additive unity, 
it i s impossible to explain the experience of causal efficacy. 
When Strong goes so far as to assert the spatia-temporal 
order as ultimate and incapable of explanation by any deepe r 
unity, it becomes clear that his metaphysics is ultimately a 
thoroughgoing materialism . His assertions about the psychic 
nature of the ultimately real simply reduce to . the old mater-
ialistic view that matter is the source of mind. This is made 
even more emphatic by his disavowal of any emergence theory. 
Utterances of Strong's middle period on the subject of 
free will leave his basic position essentially unc~anged . 
Indeed , man is spoken of as willing what he does because of 
his continuity with nature. Man fundamentally wills the good 
because neither nature nor society brooks persistently evil 
attitudes and conduct. It is on this basis that survival is 
possible. Yet, strong insists that nature is indifferent to 
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man's welfare and destiny. But such a universe appears far 
from indifferent. Thus, in Strong's attempt to avoid pur-
pose, he has lost intelligibility--his universe is a blooming, 
buzzing confusion of purposive purposelessness in which the 
person and the machine are essentially indistingui shable. 
(3) Critical remarks. Strong's epistemology in this 
period continues to suggest the propriety of a teleological 
metaphysics. Th is is brought out by the depth of the telic 
response i nvolved in animal faith. The appeal to logical 
essences also suggests the possibility of an idealistic 
metaphysics. 
Yet, in spite of all of this, Strong insists on what he 
calls his physical method: the use of bodily relations to 
interpret mental facts. Indeed, even in his doctrine of the 
self he maintains that his atoms of sentience must be viewed 
as threaded together to give to the self the characteristics 
of a field of force. Thus even in his panpsychistic emphases, 
his treatment of his feeling-atoms is quite materialistic. 
It is as if he imagined them as in every way physical 
or material except that inside they are not of the nature of 
matter but of feeling, or at least something between matter 
and mind. Strong recognizes the inadequacy of a thorough-
going materialism to explain the data either of knowledge 
or being, but his resulting theory is nothing more than a 
revised materialism, even if it does masquerade to some ex-
tent as panpsychism. These metaphysical presuppositions are 
determinative for Strong's explanation of the knowledge 
situation. In fact, not only does his epistemology assume 
his general metaphysics, it rests on the specific conviction 
that the spatio-temporal order is ultimate and incapable of 
explanation by any deeper unity. 
The basic contradictions inherent in Strong's thought 
stem from his attempt to avoid a real teleology in either 
epistemology or metaphysics. This confusion appears clearly 
in his suggestio.ns as to the axiological significance of the 
human will . On the one hand, he asserts that because of his 
continuity with nature man almost automatically wills the 
good (decides in favor of that which has survival value). 
On the other hand, Strong insists that nature is indifferent 
t o man' s welfare and destiny. 
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In terms of the essentials of the theory of evolution, 
Strong can say nothing about the arrival of the fit except 
that it is accidental. Now, Strong himself equates the 
mysterious with the unintelligible. ~~at then is his appeal 
to the accidental? It is either the admission of the impo-
tence of his philosophy at this point, or its sheer unintelli-
gibility. 
iii. Final p eriod. (1) Epistemology. In the last 
period of his thought, Strong was frank to confess that his 
purpose in his epistemology had been to construct an evolu-
tionary psychology. This is an effect of his metaphysical 
view that the only adequate solution to the problems of being 
is to be found in the acceptance of the natural origin of 
the mind from the physical universe. Teleological consider-
ations are never expressly allowed. It is within this frame-
work that all investigation of the knowing processes must 
be carried on. The objectivity of Strong's epistemic inves -
tigations is confined entirely within the rigid limits of 
his metaphysical presuppositions. 
Thus, Strong, while careful to distinguish the various 
factors of the knowledge situation and to rest great we i ght 
on mental intent and the activity of animal faith as 
essential for objective reference, is seemingly oblivious 
to the purposive character of these factors. What is more, 
mental intent raises the purposive element from the 'uncon-
scious' to the conscious level. 
The source of these elements Strong finds in the uncon-
scious processes of the universe. But these processes would 
have to be described as purposive if purpose is ever to be 
gotten out of them, at least without appealing to emergence or 
creation. The status then of ' unconscious' is put in doubt. 
What ~ltimate meaning could unconscious purpose sustain except 
as an aspect of the expression of a purposing, cosmic mind? 
This recourse, however, Strong refuses to take. His determin-
ation to avoid any theism is illustrated by his judgment of 
Wil li am.James 1 doctrine of the will-to-believe as the make-
shift of a mind still not free from credulity. Yet, James' 
doctrine seems to be as reasonable and fundamental as 'animal 
faith.' 
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Among the fruits of Strong's avoidance of the purposive 
is the inadequacy of his analysis of self-experience. He is 
able to lay no sufficient ground here to make possible the 
unity and identity of the self, because he fails to recognize 
and provide for the quality of being 'mine' of all self-
experience. This is the direct result of his analytic 
atomismand his exclusion of dynamic, continuous, growing 
purposive activity. 
(2) Metaphysics . Strong's attempt to remain faithful 
to the physical method involved him, in his final period, in 
an anomalous situation. In order to explain the relations 
of his atomic reals he defines a junction as a boundary which 
includes rather than separates. He explains this as meaning 
that a junction is between points as friendship is between 
friends. Thus, even in his explanation of space and force 
he is compelled to desert his physical metaphors and appeal 
to non-physical, spiritual, purposive experience. Funda-
menta.lly, space and time have to be explained in terms of 
something deeper; with this, his nee-materialism falls to 
the ground . 
That Strong's perspective was never synoptic is borne 
out by his emphasis on:·,the physical method and an analytic, 
scientific a pproach . This in part explains his failure to 
submit to searching criticism his basic assumption that the 
origin of consc iousness is explicable on purely materialistic 
principles. 
While Strong opposee emergence or any form of creationism, 
he is forced to assert that out of bits of sentience , which 
are spatial and temporal in their nature, have come the mind 
and its contents which are non-spatial and omni-temporal. 
There is no mechanistic analogy for this. This is what is 
meant by emergence or creation. Actually , only the purposive 
activity of a cosmic creator could account intelli gibly for 
novelty in the evolutionary process . 
Strong's mechanistic metaphysics is open to a number of 
additional criticisms. Strong assumes that a universal 
mechanism may be presupposed. Further, he passes by a l l 
evidence that mechanisms are made possible and used by 
purpose, as lacking significance. It is clear that Strong 
has never carried through an exhaustive, impartial examina-
tion of the apparent evide~ce for purpose . What is more, 
whenever purpose is demanded to render his epistemology or 
metaphysics intelligible, Strong simply appeals uncritically 
to instinct. 
Strong is also involved in the attempt to explain all 
purpose in terms of something else, which is itself devoid 
of purpose. Either Strong must give up his desired contin-
uity between the organic (where some kind of purpose is 
admitted) and the inorganic, and thus give up any hope of 
defending the natural origin of the mind; or, he must retain 
the continuity and admit that inorganic nature both cooperates 
with and belongs to the same system of ends as the human. 
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Among the logical difficulties Strong faces is his 
explanation of the present in terms of the past in such a 
way as to involve infinite regress . His lack of synoptic 
perspective is again prominent : he has no view of the whole 
of reality . At best, Strong ' s metaphysics is partial; at 
worst, it is tautologous . The incompleteness ofhis phil-
osophy is manifested by the very subjects to which he con-
fined h imself durin~ his years of philosophical investiga-
tion. Thus, in the field of metaphysics he discussed 
ontolog y in abstraction from everything else but certain 
aspects of the epistemology of sense perception . 
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(3) Critical remarks . The d ominance of Strong's meta-
physics over hi's epistemology is in no wise abated in the 
final period of his thought . Out of his naturalistic meta-
physics proceeded his continuing attempt to treat his 
epistemology as an attempt t o construct an evolutionary 
psychology. Teleological considerat i ons, h owever , were never 
expressly allowed. 
The core of Strong's epistemology consists of the activ-
ities of mental intent and animal faith. Though these are 
purposive to a very high degree, Strong finds their source i n 
the unconscious processes of the universe. Yet these very 
processes he is c ompelled to describe upon analysis as related 
in the wa y that friends are bound together. Thus , both their 
unconscious and non-purposive nature are cal l ed in question , 
purely on the metaphysical level. Strong's materialistic 
philosophy is shown to be arbitrary and unjustified . 
Because Strong never subjected to critic~sm his basic 
assumption that the orig in of consciousness is explicabl e 
solely on naturali stic principles, and thus never challenged 
his exclusively ana l ytic approach, he was unable adequately 
to interpret self-experience. He could not ground the unity 
and identity of self-experience in a cluster of awareness 
being mine, because the self, for Strong , is never a true 
whole, but at best an additive unity . Only the recognition 
of a dynamic, continuous, growing , purposive activity can 
account for true who l eness . 
The inadequacy of Strong 's total philosophy is seen in 
the few attempts Strong did make to take into consideration 
the wider fie l d of philosophy (such as ethics and the phil-
osophy of r e ligion). In these efforts, he was high l y un-
ph ilosoph ical and uncritical. It never occurred to Strong 
(at least as judged by his writings) that there might be 
real laws other than the mechanical in the universe. 
3. THE PLACE OF '11ELEOLOGY IN THE THOUGHT OF C . A. STRONG: 
CONCLUSIONS 
i. The place of teleology i n Strong's epistemology. 
(1) The teleological nature and end of knowledge. By his 
reduction of his epistemology to physiological psychology, 
Charles Augustus Strong attempted to make possibl e the 
definition of knowledge in purely mechanistic terms . How-
ever, he could not avoid involvement in explicitly purpos-
ive factors : animal faith, intent, active and determinative 
interests and the like. These very factors were essential 
302 
to his analysis. When he went on to admit that the function-
ing of these elements made survival possible, he introduced 
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a further recognition of teleology. And yet, because of the 
confinihg nature of his metaphysical naturalism, he was unable 
to account for values which transcend that of survival, but 
alone make survival worth-while. 
{2) The significance of Strong's emphasis on analysis, 
animal fa lth, and essences. As a re sul t of his preoccupation 
with analysis, Strong ignored almost complete ly the attributes 
of personality as a whole. Consequently, he defined human 
purpose as merely a biolog ical set of the organism. Yet, 
this is in opposition to his view -that intelligent agency 
is a necessary characteristic of concret e mind. The basic 
deficiencies here render self-experience inexplicable on 
Strong 's terms because no purposive un ty is possible. 
However, Strong's admissions of animal faith {and asso-
ciated doctrines) is a recognition of purpose as the mos t 
imp ortant factor in the epistemic situat ion. Animal faith 
makes possible the transcending of the solipsistic situation. 
A true idea is then, in this sense, a fulfilled purpose. In-
deed, the depth of telic res ponse in intent and animal faith 
is so great as to suggest a purposive universe as man's source. 
Even Strong's introduction of essences of a logical 
nature is i nexplicable in an epistemology oriented in terms 
of a behavioristic mechanism. Since the logical has no real 
being or function except in a teleological background, 
essences can be only an inexplicable emergence--just what 
Strong himself condemned as crude magic. 
ii. The place of teleology in Strong's metaphysics. 
(1) Strong's anti-teleolog ical animus. Strong's underlying 
bias in favor of anti-teleological mechanism is manifest in 
his earliest metaphysical formulations. He treats the con-
cept of invariable concomitant variation between a brain 
event and a mental event as an empirical fact; while, on 
his own admission, it is actually but an unproved theory. 
This materiali s ti c strain is later formulated in what Strong 
calls his physical method: the use of bodily re lations to 
interpret mental facts. 
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As a result, though' in his effort to explain the natural 
orlg:tn of consciousness he begins by resolving the physical 
into the psychical, he ends by handling the psychical as if 
it were physical. Even in the material realm the physical 
method ultimately proved worthless, for he is ultimately 
forced to resolve physical relations into the non-physical. 
For example, a junction is said to be between spatial points 
as friendship is between friends. Thus, contrary to his own 
assertion, space and time have to be explained in terms of 
something deeper. With this, his nee-materialism falls to 
the ground. 
(2) The naturalistic origin of consciousness. Strong 
never submitted to searching criticism his basic assumption 
that the origin of consciousness is explicable on purely 
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naturalistic principles. Th-is is in the face of' the fact that 
he asserts that non-spatial and omni-temporal mental exper-
ience has arisen out of that which is spatial and temporal 
and uncons cious. Yet, this is what is meant by emergence 
or creation and this alone could account intelligibly for 
novelty in the evolutionary process--the purposive activity 
of a cosmic creator. 
In fact, Strong never carried through an exhaustive 
and impartial examination of the apparent evidence for pur-
pose . He simply assumed that a universal mechanism could 
be presupposed. Yet, his desire for continuity in the evolu-
tionary process is opposed by his explanation of all purpose 
in terms of something else, which is itself devoid of purpose . 
Further, logically, his explanation of the present mechan-
istically in terms of the past i nvolves an infinite regress. 
His lack of synoptic perspective is again prominent: he has 
no view of the whole of reality. The incompleteness of his 
phllosophy is also manifested by his uncrit ical restriction 
of his investigation basically to ontology and sense perception. 
(3) The self as a machine. In his effort to get along 
without the use of purposive factors, Strong developed a view 
of the self that is untrue to experience. In his definition 
of the self as a fusion of presentational elements, he does 
not explain how immediate knowledge of the. se lf is possible 
when the object of this knowledge is an additive unity . The 
experience of causal efficacy is likewise inexplicable. He 
also appeals to memory as the ground of self-identity while 
failing to recognize the purposive nature of memory. 
From his mechanistic, behavioristic definition of the 
self, Strong derives his view of freedom. Man's t otal 
freedom consists in being part ially · free from external con-
straint . From within he is determined mechanically by his 
feelings over which he haa no ultimate control. Thus true 
purpose , and with it significant thought and action are 
entirely obliterated. 
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Furthermore, the ultimate determining cause of a man 
wllling what he does is the universe with which he is con-
tinuous. Nature both causes bl.m to know the truth and to will 
it, because nature will not brook persistently evil attitudes 
and conduct. But this is a flat contradiction of Strong's 
assertion that nature is indifferent to man's welfare and 
destiny. 
iii. The place of teleology in Strong's total philosOPhy• 
(1) First period. Strong's metaphysical animus against 
teleology is introduced into his earliest epistemic inves-
tigations. This is seen especially in his propensity for 
materialistic emphases. Thus, though he makes considerable 
usage of purposive factors in both epistemology and meta-
physics, he refuses to recognize and designate them as such. 
The inadequacy of Strong's philosophy is also manifested in 
his failure to integrate his epistemology and metaphysics to 
include more than those factors directly relevant to his 
form11lation of the theory of the natural origin of the mind . 
Thus, he is not troubled in his~taphysical speculation by 
any embarassing telic data from his epistemology. 
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(2) Middle period. Strong's epistemology in this period 
continues to suggest the propriety of a teleological meta-
physics. Yet, even in his panp sychistic emphases, his 
handling of the atoms of feeling continues to be quite 
materialistic. It is as if he imagined them as in every way 
physical or material except that inside they are not of the 
nature of matter (though they may ultimately not be of the 
nature of feeling either). Such metaphysical predispositions 
are determinative for Strong's explanation of the knowledge 
situation. 
The basic contradictions inherent in Strong's thought 
stem from his attempt to avoid a real teleology in both his 
epistemology and metaphysics. This is brought out particu-
larly in his view that man is able to know in order that he 
may survive; while , at the same time ·, the universe from which 
he came and by which he is determined is indifferent to man's 
welfare and destiny . His appeal to chance here is simply the 
confession of the impotence and superficiality of his philosoph~ 
(3) Final period. The dominance of Strong's metaphysics 
over his epistemology is in no wise abated in the final period 
of his thought . A fruit of this was his long-continued 
effort to reduce his epistemology to the level of an evolu-
tionary psychology. Yet, the core of his epistemology still 
consists in activities which are emphatically purposive : 
mental intent and animal faith. In spite of this , however, 
Strong finds their sourc e i n the unconscious processes of 
the universe . It is a significant thing that even on 
Strong's own analysis these metaphysical processes and 
relations turn out to be describable only in terms of 
spiritual , conscious, purposive experience. 
The unsatisfactory nature of Strong's total philosophy 
is seen in the few attempts he made to take into considera-
tion the wi der field of philosophy. In these efforts he 
was highly uncritical and unphilosophical. Strong never 
even entertained the possibility that there might be real 
laws other than the mechanical in the universe. Vfuat he 
leaves out of consideration is so extended as to constitute 
a refutation of his system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The problem of this dissertation is to determine the 
place of teleology in the thought of Charles Augustus 
strong: his use and recognition of teleological factors. 
The method chosen to implement the investigation is a crit-
ical examination of the development of Strong's epistemology 
and metaphysi cs in terms of their respective priority, agree-
ment, relative critical depth, and of Strong's use of 
teleological factors in the development of his metaphysics 
and epistemology. 
Special consideration is given to Strong's emphasis on 
animal faith and related purposive factors in his epistem-
ology--an emphasis which stands side by side with Strong's 
denial of teleological factors in his metaphysics. Particular 
attention is also given to the min0-body problem, since 
Strong focused much of his labor on the mind-b ody problem and 
the origin and function of consciousness as a natural product 
of evolution. 
I. THE PLACE OF TELEOLOGY IN STRONG'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
1. The teleological nature and end of knowledge. By 
reducing e p istemology to physiolog ical psychology, Strong 
attempted to make possible the definition of knowledge in 
purely mechanical terms. However, he could not avoid involve-
ment in explicitly purpos i ve, central factors such as animal 
faith, mental intent, active and determinative interests. In 
holding that these elements functioned to make survival 
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possible, he introduced another teleological factor. 
2. strong's emphasis on analysis . As a result of his 
almost exc lusively analytic approach, Strong gave very li ttle 
cons.lJ.~r£.tion to tr..e &tt:;."ibutes of personality as a whole. 
Consequent ly he defined human purpose, within and outside the 
knowledge situation, as simply the biological set of the 
organism. In so doing, he contradicted his own view that 
intelligent agency is a necessary characteristic of concrete 
mind. The basic deficiencies here render self-experience 
inexplicable on Strong's terms, because no lrnowing, wanting, 
purposing unit as multiplex is possible. 
3. The doctrine of animal faith. What is more , Strong's 
admission of animal faith and related doctrines (such as mental 
intent and determinative interests) involves purp ose as the 
most important factor in the epistemic s ituation, in spite of 
his fai l ure to recognize this. For animal faith makes possible 
t he transcending of t n e solipsistic situat ion. The true idea, 
t h erefore, from this perspect:tve, is true because it fulfills 
a purpose. And, the depth of such telic respons e in the human 
personality is so great as to suggest a purposive universe as 
man ' s source. 
4. Essences. Strong's concept i on of essence s as logical 
in nature, i s also hard to explain in a behavioristic, mechan-
istic orient ation . Since intel l igence and truth are incon-
ceivable without t h e pur pose to think truly, t h e logical can 
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have no real being or function except in a teleological 
background. All that Strong could possibly assert in regard 
to his logical essences is that they are unfathomable emer-
gents . But , this is exactly what he cannot a llow since h e 
is opposed to any do ctrine of eme rgence as obliterating t h e 
cont inuity of his naturali st ic, mechanistic account of the 
orig in of conscious experience . 
II. THE PLACE OF TELEOLOGY IN STRONG ' S METAPHYSICS 
1. His physical method. In spite of the panpsych ism 
of his metaphysics , Strong's mechanistic emphasis was thor -
oughgoing. For exampl e, he justified the processes of his 
epistemic theory so l e l y on the basis of thei r survival value. 
Yet, because of his r:1echanistic metaphysics , he was unable to 
account for those values which transcend that of survival and 
alone make s u rvival worth-whi le. 
Strong's underlying bias in favor of anti-teleolog ical 
mechanism is manifest in his earliest metaphysical formula-
tions. Thus, he treats the concept of an invariab le concom-
itant variation between a b rain event and a mental event as 
an empirical fact. On his own admiss ion, howeve r, it is but 
an unproved theory. 
This mechanistic strain in Strong's metaphysics l ater 
receives ex ~ lic it formulation in h is physical method--in the 
use of bod i ly relations t o int e rpret mental facts. Thus, 
whi l e in h is earlie r phi losophy he resolves the apparent l y 
physica l int ~ the psychical, he late r treats the psychical 
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as if it were physical. Yet, even in the material realm, 
this method proved worthless, for Strong is ultimately forced, 
in his analysis of spatial conjunction, to resolve physical 
relations into the non-physical. Consequently, contrary to 
his own assertions, space and time have to be explained in 
terms of something deeper. This alone is enough to destroy 
his nee-materialism. 
2 . The naturalistic origin of consciousness. The 
arbitrary nature of Strong's philosophy is nowhere more 
apparent than in his basic assumption that the origin of 
consciousness is explicable on purely naturalistic principles. 
He never submitted this, his basic assumption, to searching 
criticism. He asserts that non-spat ial and omni-temporal 
mental experience has arisen out of that which is spatial, 
temporal, and unconscious. Yet, this amounts to emergence or 
creation, the admission of· either of which strong would con-
sider to involve the abandonment of the fundamental structure 
of his thought. 
Moreover, Strong never carried through an exhaustive 
and impartial examination of the apparent evidence for pur-
pose. He simply assumed that a universal mechanism can be 
presupposed. But, right at this point, his desire for con-
tinuity in the evolutionary process runs contrary to his 
explanation of all purpose in terms of something else, which 
is itself devoid of purpose. Further, his explanation of 
the present mechanically i n terms of the past logically 
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involves an infinite regress. His lack of synoptic perspective 
is again prominent; he has no view o f the whole of reality. 
The incompleteness of his philosophy is also manifested by the 
uncritical restriction of his metaphys ics basically to ontology 
and cosmology alone. 
3. The self as a machine. In his effort to get along 
without the use of purposive factors, Strong developed a view 
of the self that is untrue to experience. By defining the 
self as a fusion of presentational elements, he is unable to 
explain how i~~ediate knowledge of the self is possible when 
the object of such knowledg e must be an additive unity. His 
appeal to memory as a ground of self-identity is combined 
. with the failure to recognize the purpos ive character of 
memory. Also inexp l icable in his account of the self is 
the experience of causal efficacy. 
Strong's doctrine of freedom is projected upon the bacl{-
grou nd of his behavioristic, mechanistic definition of the 
self. Man's total freedom consis ts in being partially free 
from external constraint. From within, he is determined 
mechanically by feelings over which he has no ultimate con-
trol. Thus, true purpose and with it significant thought 
and action are entirely extinguished. 
Furthe rmore, the ultimate determining cause of a man's 
willing what he does is the universe with which he is contin-
uous. Nature both causes him to know the truth and to will 
it, because Nature does not brook persistent evil attitudes 
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and conduct. Yet, this is in diametric opposition to 
Strong's assertion that nature is indifferent to man's 
welfare and destiny . 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Strong's anti-teleological metaphysics sets the 
approach and the limits to his epistemic investigations. This 
is manifest both in his propensity for basi~ materialistic 
analogies and in his refusal to recognize his pivotal usage 
of purposive factors in epistemology, as well as in his a l most 
exclusive preoccupation with sense perc eption. 
2. strong did not attempt to integrate his epistemology 
and metaphysics beyond the area embraced by those factors 
directly useful in support of his theory of the natural 
origin of the mind. Thus , he does not consider important 
telic data from his epistemology (such as mental intent, 
animal faith, and determinative interests) in his metaphys-
ical speculation. 
3. From the beginning, Strong's handling of his atoms 
of sentience is essential l y materialistic and abstracted 
from purposive experience. They are treated in every way as 
physical or material, except that within they are not of the 
nature of matter . 
4 . strong's materia l istic atomism is the reason f or his 
inab ility to defend a true unitas multiplex in the knowledge 
situation: no rea l unity, identity, or purpose is possible . 
5. That the basic contradictions in Strong's thought 
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stem from his attempt to avoid teleology in both his epistem-
ology and metaphys i cs is signalized by his view that man is 
abl e t o know in order that he may survive . For, at the same 
time, the universe from which he came and by which he is 
causally determined is viewed as indifferent to his welfare 
and destiny. Strong's appeal to chance in this connection 
is simply the confe ssion of the impotence and superficiality 
of his thought at this point . 
6. In spite of Strong's life-long effort to resolve 
epistemological problems by reference to mechanistic, 
physio logica l psychology, the core of his theory of knowledge 
continues to the end to consist in activities which are 
emphatically purposive: mental intent and animal faith . 
7. In spite of the unexpungeab l e character of the pur-
posive factors in his epistemology , Strong never wavers in 
his insistence that the ultimate s ource of all apparent 
purpose is the unconscious, mechanical processes of the uni-
verse. Purpose is consequently only epiphenomenal . 
8. Although Strong attempts to avoid the teleological 
imp lications of his e pi stemology by ap pealing to his mechan-
istic metaphysics, he is compe l led by his own analysis of 
metaphysical being, processes, and relations to depend ulti-
mately on the basic analogies of spiritual, conscious , 
purposive experience. 
9. In the few excursions Strong made into the fields 
of ethics, philosophy of religion, and aesthetics, he is 
h i ghly uncritica l and unphilosophical. For instance, his 
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ethics is but the wholesale reinstatement of traditional 
Christian ethical principles on the simple assumption that 
they are all necessary for survival. 
10. In his failure to entertain the possibility of the 
existence of laws other than the mechanical in the universe, 
what Strong leaves out of consideration {experienced qualities, 
personality , value, and purpose) is so extended as to constitute 
a refutation of his system. 
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